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Healthcare is recognised as a complex high risk industry that demands effective 
management of the risks presented.  A total of 260 NHS Trusts were surveyed to identify the 
risk management arrangements in place.  The results were analysed alongside three 
different sources of nationally published data (CQC, Monitor and NHSLA) to determine if 
certain organisational or system characteristics existed that would either predetermine risk 
performance or predispose the Trust to a higher or lower level of performance.  The results 
successfully dispelled a number of preconceptions relating to the size and status of the Trust 
in determining the performance achieved.  However what was evident was the influence that 
the TrustÕs culture and commitment to risk has on the safety and quality of services 
delivered.  A second finding was the significant influence of central policy in the 
arrangements that organisations had in place from the presentation and content of risk 
strategy documents, criteria considered and executive leadership.  The constraints of a 
national policy applied locally potentially limits the effectiveness of the processes in 
managing risk.  It was concluded that whilst central policy may help in standardising how risk 
is managed current arrangements focus arrangements to narrowly.  As a result the role of 
central policy makers should be to set principles that draw on and translate best practice 
from other high risk industries and encourage local health leaders to flex the approach to 
reflect local needs and priorities.  This local flex should aim to integrate with other corporate 
programmes to ensure that risk is embedded in all decision making and the risk of the safety 
and quality of patients is considered alongside risks that may be perceived to be a higher 

















This thesis aims to explore the role of risk management in healthcare.  The focus of this 
research is on risk management practices and arrangements in NHS Trusts.  This research 
is based on original data collection has been supplemented with national data sources to 
explore if there is a relationship between organisational and system characteristics and 
overall risk performance, predisposing Trusts to success or failure in the management of 
risk.  
 
I will be using the introduction chapter to set the context for subsequent chapters.  The 
introduction consists of four key sections: 
¥ Scene setting through an introduction to risk management 
¥ Problem overview drawing on the role of risk management in healthcare and 
perceived strengths and areas for development  
¥ Research focus provides an overview of the research including objectives and the 
key questions I am seeking to answer 
¥ An outline of the structure of the thesis structure that provides an overview of the 
content of subsequent chapters. 
 
1.1 What is risk management? Ð an introduction 
Risk Management is the process of defining and analysing risks and deciding on the 
appropriate course of action in order to minimise these risks whilst still achieving business 
goals  (Harvard Business Review 2000).  The Institute of Medicine (1999) adopts a more 
clinically biased view of risk management with a definition related to safety Òsafety is defined 
as freedom from accidental injury and does not reside in a person, device or department but 
emerges from the interaction of different parts of a systemÓ.  Whilst the wider complexity of 
cause and effect is recognised (Reason 1990) the practice of embedding this in risk 
management in the NHS remains underdeveloped.  This is demonstrated through the 
maturity of safety cultures (Kuhn & Youngberg 2002), tools used in incident investigations 
(Senders 2004) and the development of safe working practices from lessons learned (Wilf-
Miron et al 2003).  Healthcare organisations are recognised as lagging behind other high risk 
industries in the their capacity and capability to manage risk (Leape 2005) 
A search on Òrisk management definitionÓ via Google and Pro Quest identified a wide range 
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of potential definitions and references which suggests that agreeing a definition for risk 
management can be as complex as some of the systems in which it operates.   
As an independent regulator in the UK, the Health & Safety Executive (HSE) defines risk 
management in terms of the identification of a hazard and the assessment of risk in the 
context of the task.  The HSE (www.hse.gov.uk) provide the following definitions: 
   a hazard is anything that may cause harm, such as chemicals, electricity, 
working from ladders, an open drawer, etc; and 
   
the risk is the chance, high or low, that somebody could be harmed by these and other 
hazards, together with an indication of how serious the harm could be  
 
The assessment of risk is a core part of any risk management process.  Successful risk 
management systems rely on the ability to predict outcomes reliably and with confidence.  
Such outcomes are not limited to harm (Weick and Sutcliffe 2007) but extend to 
performance and what drives organisations. Organisations that are preoccupied with a 
single priority or deliverable such as operational performance, financial savings, and 
increased production start to undermine their resilience and introduce or increase risk in 
other aspects of the business.  Organisations exhibiting this behaviour are often described 
as suffering from vulnerable systems syndrome (Hollnagel et al 2001).  Performance, 
outcomes and organisational priorities are all factors that should be considered as part of the 
risk assessment process irrespective of the direct or indirect nature (Hudson 2002). The 
level of detail of the assessment will vary depending on the tools that are used and its 
purpose.   
 
1.2 Risk Management in High Risk Organisations  
 
Risk management is a function that is applicable to all operations.  The value of successful 
risk management is higher in industries and organisations where the risk of harm, loss or 
damage is or has the potential to be catastrophic (Hudson 2002).  Such circumstances are 
often associated with high risk industries.  Healthcare is often described as a high risk 
industry alongside aviation and oil and gas production (Leape 2005).  Such organisations 
are characterised by high risk operating conditions where the outcomes have the potential to 
be catastrophic and fatal.  The potential consequences require risk management is a core 
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part of how they operate and their overall performance (Hudson 2003).  The achievement of 
exemplary safety performance by commercial airlines provides healthcare with an 
opportunity to learn from other high risk industries, offering insight to systems, behaviours 
and cultures and their value / contribution to managing risk.  Kuhn and Youngberg (2002) 
recognises the evolutionary state of risk management in health, and the need and 
opportunities that exist to learn from past failures to aid future success. 
 
1.3  The Importance and Relevance of Risk Management in Healthcare 
 
In 2014/15 over 1.6 million adverse incidents were reported by healthcare organisations in 
England of these over 1.2 million occurred in acute / general hospitals (NRLS 2015).  These 
incidents included patent accidents (314,314 incidents), incidents during the course of care 
and treatment being provided (385,528 incidents), incidents involving medication (175,459 
incidents) and patient access, admission transfer and discharge (152,632 incidents).  A 
number of studies have highlighted that reported figures represent the tip of the iceberg with 
many of the incidents being preventable (Brennan et al 1991), the concept of avoidable 
patient harm (Baker 2004), the opportunities to learn lessons (Barach & Small 2000) and 
that underreporting exists (IOM 1999).   
 
Patient safety and the importance of a risk management function in healthcare has been 
recognised as a national an international priority in recent decades (IOM 1999, Leape 2005, 
Carroll & Rudolph 2006).  This renewed priority status has been accompanied and driven by 
a number of initiatives, policies and mandated standards against which health services are 
regulated as well as acknowledging the underdevelopment of elements known to be critical 
to safety performance in other industries (Hofmann, Jacobs & Landy 1995).  These drivers 
and the learning from other industries will be discussed in later chapters. 
 
High performing systems are often described in relation to their resilience and reliability 
which helps to control potential vulnerabilities embedding in operational systems (Hollnagel 
& Woods 2006).  The concept of vulnerable system syndrome has the potential to be more 
evident in commercially driven sectors where there is the potential to become preoccupied 
with activity targets, financial performance and optimising productivity (Gamble 2013).  In the 
past decade, enhanced performance management in the NHS has increased the rigour and 
attention paid to the achievement of operational performance and improvement targets with 
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early signs of vulnerability evident in systems that pursue the targets without consideration 
to the increased or additional risks to be assessed (Weick & Sutcliffe 2007).  To maintain the 
reliability of performance, including the operational delivery and effective management of 
risk, organisational systems need to align and integrate so that no single factor dominates to 
the detriment of other factors (HSE 2011).  In healthcare, the independence of risk 
management and its lack of integration and profile in core business has resulted in other 
factors dominating decision making and introducing vulnerability to the system (Cagliano et 
al 2011). 
 
1.4 Research Focus 
 
Healthcare and the NHS are not deprived of approaches, models and systems to manage 
risk with a wide range to choose from.  The further analysis of the tools and systems 
available alongside industry requirements continues to develop the understanding of 
characteristics of systems and expected levels of performance. What is clear is that there is 
an opportunity to transfer this learning to healthcare and use it to inform and develop how it 
manages risk.  Whilst there are a number of risk assessment tools and risk management 
frameworks available to healthcare providers, a gap of the system is the absence of an 
integrated tool bring together and facilitating the comparison of clinical, non clinical, financial 
and organisational risks.   This research aims to understand the strengths, weaknesses and 
opportunities to develop systems, the common characteristics of risk systems and 
organisations and how these impact on risk performance.  
 
The focus of the research is on risk management systems in the NHS and aims to respond 
to the following three questions: 
¥ Does risk management exist as a function in the NHS and what does this look like? 
¥ Is it possible to measure the success of the systems and if so how? 
¥ Do characteristics of either the organisation or system influence how a Trust 
performs? 
 
In order to respond to these questions, the following research objectives have been set: 
1. To identify common elements of risk assessment and management systems in use 
across the NHS 
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2. To analyse the impact or influence that characteristics of risk systems and of Trusts 
have on organisational performance 
3. To determine if Òrisk informationÓ is used within the organisation and the relationship 
between outcomes and organisational and other factors.   
4. To review the influence of other approaches such as national initiatives and 
individualÕs behaviour on risk management and in the achievement of a patient 
focussed service. 
 
The response will draw upon the findings of original data collection involving the survey of 
260 NHS Trusts, national data collections, regulatory outcomes across all NHS Trusts in 
England as well as an extensive literature review drawing on the experiences of international 
healthcare and other industries on the performance and content of risk management 
systems. 
 
1.5 Thesis Structure 
 
The research explores the activity and function of risk management that is evolving in its 
development and in its understanding in the NHS.  Whilst some identify and describe 
particular elements of risk systems in healthcare as embryonic or evolving (Leape 2005) 
there is an emerging picture of common characteristics shared across Trusts as well as with 
other high risk industries in the processes and arrangements that are in place to manage 
risk.  Carroll & Rudolph (2006), Sikka et al (2015) highlight the need to consider additional 
factors and criteria in the management of risk that may drive or influence successful high 
performance or equally prove to be a distraction to effective assessment and mitigation of 
risk. 
The subsequent chapters look at current practice, considers what the literature says in terms 
of national and international practice of managing risk in healthcare, presents the findings of 
the data collection and analysis and presents the findings with a supporting discussion 
structured around the research objectives and ultimately answering the three key questions. 
Chapter 2 is the detailed literature review that explores risk management systems, 
processes and arrangements in healthcare on a national and international scale.  It 
considers the maturity and performance of systems judged by the factors influencing risk 
assessments and mitigating actions through learning from the risk management systems 
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and structures in high risk industries.  Using the review of other industries measuring the 
success of risk management and aligning this to organisational characteristics is also 
identified.    
Chapter 3 provides the concept analysis.  This analysis reflects on the full breadth of the 
literature available and outlines the scope of the potential influencing factors and drivers of 
risk management systems in health care.  The identification of key drivers and the insight 
that this offers has been translated into the next two chapters on methodology including the 
analytical approaches adopted and in the presentation of the findings. 
Chapter 4 sets out the methodology of the proposal, data collection including a trial of the 
approach and the analytical approach adopted.  Throughout the chapter a reference check 
to the objectives and the three questions is continually made.   
Chapter 5 reports the results and findings through the use of qualitative and quantitative 
analysis.  The results draw together the findings of the analysis, literature review and other 
possible outcomes or theories with the aim of providing insight to relationships, 
dependencies and characteristics.  
Chapter 6 discusses the findings from chapter 5 and offers an evidence based view on what 
good looks like in relation to a risk management system in the NHS and also in 
demonstrated performance.  












In chapter 1 the complexity of risk management as a function and in its application and use 
in healthcare was identified.  This complexity being contributed to by both the subject 
through its definition (HSE 1999) and scope and in its adoption in healthcare, in itself a 
complex and high risk industry (Reason et al 2001, Areh & Klazinga 2004).  This chapter 
explores risk management systems, processes and arrangements in healthcare on a 
national and international scale.  It considers the maturity and performance of systems 
judged by the factors influencing risk assessments and mitigating actions through learning 
from the risk management systems and structures in high risk industries.  
2.2 Risk Management in High Risk Organisations  
 
Risk management is a function that is applicable to all types of operations.  The value of 
successful risk management is higher in industries and organisations where the risk of harm, 
loss or damage is or has the potential to be catastrophic (Hudson 2002).  Such 
circumstances are often associated with high risk industries.  Healthcare is often described 
as a high risk industry alongside aviation and oil and gas production (Leape 2005).  Such 
organisations are characterised by high risk operating conditions where the outcomes have 
the potential to be catastrophic and fatal.  The potential consequences require risk 
management is a core part of how they operate and their overall performance (Hudson 
2003).  The achievement of exemplary safety performance by commercial airlines provides 
healthcare with an opportunity to learn from other high risk industries, offering insight to 
systems, behaviours and cultures and their value / contribution to managing risk.  Kuhn and 
Youngberg (2002) recognises the evolutionary state of risk management in health, and the 
need and opportunities that exist to learn from past failures to aid future success.  In recent 
years healthcare systems have experienced significant changes from technological to 
normative ones all asking for increased efficiency in the face of increasingly complexity of 
hospital services (Cagliano et al 2011).  Incidents and poor performance in the management 
of risk are costly (Reason 2000) hence the role and function of successful risk management 
has never been so relevant. 
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2.3 Risk Management in Healthcare 
 
2.3.1 National Policy & Context 
In the late 1990s, safety was recognised as a national and international priority in the 
delivery of healthcare (Battles & Lilford 2003).  Similar commitments have previously been 
made with various safety initiatives introduced to national healthcare systems (Arah & 
Klazinga 2004),however this renewed commitment re launched risk management and 
questioned past practice, assumptions as well as introducing tolerance of risks to the debate 
(Power 2009).  Experience over the preceding 20 years that contributed to this priority 
included an increase in the number of adverse incidents, the potential avoidability of patient 
harm and the presence of organisational tolerance (Barach & Small 2000). This priority 
status set the scene for a number of initiatives, strengthened controls and declarations for 
improving the safety of care through active risk management.  Examples of this prioritisation 
included Institute of Healthcare ImprovementÕs programme ÒProtecting 5 million lives from 
harmÓ, the Department of HealthÕs publication an ÒOrganisation with A MemoryÓ, the WHO 
Safer Surgery Checklist and the identification of Ònever eventsÓ as part of the NHS National 
Reporting and Learning System (IHI 2004, DH 2000, WHO 2009). 
 
In spite of a myriad of ÒimprovementÓ initiatives, the practice of medicine remains vulnerable 
to error and injury with rates of harm and injury comparably higher for patients than other 
types of injury.  Kohn, Corrigan and Donaldson (1999) define clinical risk as the probability 
that a patient is affected by an adverse event voluntarily or involuntarily caused by medical 
treatments.  Kohn et al (1999) recognise that clinical risk is not solely due to medical 
activities directly impacting on patients but is reliant on a larger set of activities and 
professionals.  Factors relating to the system, environment and the interplay of individuals 
within these systems are all relevant (Cagliano 2011).  A number of models seek to 
understand why errors and failures occur and what needs to be done to achieve greater 
reliability (Gamble 2013).  In healthcare this has resulted in duplication of initiatives and 
systems on safety, multiple definitions of what to do and what success looks like alongside a 
blindness to practice and behaviours that may be hindering the required improvement (Areh 
& Klazinga 2004).  
 
This lack of clarity and consolidation of objectives and outcomes in healthcare is a potential 
barrier to achieving successful risk performance (Davies 2001).  What is clear is that there is 
a wealth of information, expertise and experience to draw upon from within healthcare as 
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well as from other industries as foundations for risk management and safety improvement 
and in setting the context and environment in which care is delivered (Hickson et al 2007).   
 
Reason (1990, 2000, 2001) identifies that fallibility exists within humans and systems 
providing the opportunity for adverse events and unintended consequences to occur.  To 
date a culture of blame (Barach & Small 2000) has prevailed in healthcare incident reporting 
and investigation focussing on the unsafe acts of individuals rather than the performance of 
systems or other factors.  The experience and lessons that can be learned from other 
sectors highlight that practices and professionals should be given equal consideration in the 
mitigation of risk as well as in the evolving state of risk management (Power 2004).  The 
work of others such as Brennan et al (1991), Baker (2004), Carrol et al (2002), Leape et al 
(2002) all recognise that the complexity of healthcare systems is reflected in the potential 
criteria that may directly or indirectly contribute to system failures or foster conditions that 
may predispose individuals to making mistakes or performing unsafe acts.  Organisational 
factors should be a focus of analysing clinical incidents (Vincent et al 2000) although if the 
outcome is to improve the quality of care received, risks need to be managed through earlier 
identification of potential failures rather than reacting to adverse events (Lawton & Parker 
2002).  In spite of a range of frameworks and tools available, prospective identification and 
analysis of risk is not a discipline that has gathered any significant momentum or adoption in 
healthcare unlike other high risk and high reliability industries (Gamble 2013, Carroll & 
Rudolph 2006). 
 
The open use of data, information and intelligence has a key role to play in managing risk, 
targeting improvements, establishing a positive safety climate and maintaining public 
confidence (Mannion et al 2009, Gamble 2013).  Davies (2004) stretches the thinking further 
with the inclusion of external pressures placed on healthcare from regulation, market forces 
and other forms of accountability as information to consider in risk performance. Halligan & 
Zecevic (2011) highlight the importance of safety and risk culture in healthcare safety 
improvement.  In spite its importance and the relevance of other criteria the continued 
absence of a common set of definitions, dimensions and measures limits realisation of the 
intended benefits of initiatives (Philibert 2009) and inconsistent implementation (Areh & 
Klazinga 2004).  The impact of poor use of information, the influence of external pressures 
inconsistency in the application and benefit delivery of initiatives was recognised during and 
as part of the recommendations of public inquiries in the NHS.  The Francis Inquiry (2012) 
and the Kirkup Inquiry (2015) identified that opportunities had been missed through learning 
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from adverse events (incidents and complaints) and in recognising the role that external 
factors such as delivery of operational targets, pressure to achieve initiatives have on 
destabilising and increasing risk levels in organisations.  Delivering the safety priority 
requires healthcare providers to look beyond the clinical environment and to consider wider 
influences (Kohn et al 1999).  It is unlikely that healthcare can be error free (Hudson 2003) 
however lessons learned from other high risk industries that promote reliability (Philibert 
2009) alongside better developed defences and controls (Carroll & Rudolph 2006) would 
strengthen local risk performance.  Actions and initiatives to date have been generic and 
lack the local commitment needed to influence the frontline delivery of safe, quality services 
(White  & Chao 2014).  
 
2.3.2 Integrating Risk Management into Healthcare Delivery 
The delivery of safe, quality care is complex (Leape 2005) and is increasingly complex with 
the drive for greater efficiencies and improvements (Cagliano 2011).  The context in which 
care is delivered means that the provision of safe, quality care is not the only requirement on 
providers and that the quality of care competes alongside other operational priorities such as 
operational targets and financial balance (Sausman 2001).  The significance of Òcompeting 
prioritiesÓ is unclear.  There is the perspective that suggests that it is within every Trusts 
capabilities to manage these priorities, a view based on the capability of some organisations 
to consistently outperform others (West 2001) whilst others may support a view that the 
pursuit of productive and financial indicators may act as blinkers to safety and quality 
priorities and introduce vulnerabilities to the system (Reason et al 2001)   
 
The plethora of initiatives that have been prompted by the renewed priority status of safety 
and risk management could be described as creating a ÒbandwagonÓ (Edozien 2000) that 
potentially creates a burden rather than a benefit to the systems and providers delivering 
safe, quality care.  
 
In a commitment to patient safety it is clear that there are multiple factors that directly and 
indirectly contribute to it.  This widens the context and factors that impact on the 
achievement and delivery of safe, quality care. The breadth of these factors range from the 
national policy, political stakeholders, performance targets, financial balance, public 
reputation and confidence and safety and quality have sat uneasily alongside or as a tension 
in the absence of integration (Firth Couzens 2002).  The reality is that these factors are all 
important and a way of working that delivers against all and at the same time manages the 
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risk is the goal that all healthcare providers should be aspiring to achieve.   There is a 
tension between rhetoric and reality, the outcomes and expectations on NHS Trusts 
demands a greater alignment and integration of efficiencies, quality and safety of services 
(Arah & Klazinga 2004)  whilst  NHS central policy continues to maintain a separation of the 
systems for identifying, assessing and managing clinical, operational and financial risk whilst 
at the same time requiring outcomes to be integrated (DH 2015). 
 
The challenge facing healthcare providers is how to deliver safe, quality care that is 
affordable, accessible and delivered within the resource envelope (DH 2015, Cagliano 
2011).  The growing agenda is challenged by the question of how to make healthcare safer 
whilst recognising and coordinating the myriad of direct and indirect factors in the NHS 
Operating environment.  A common approach evident in guidance, policy and programmes 
is through standardisation and generic strategies (White & Chao 2014) for managing risk 
that have been evident in the clinical governance and safety programmes introduced to the 
NHS.   Safety is concerned with the myriad ways in which a system can fail to function 
(Vincent et al 2014), understanding the role of organisational culture and individuals 
behaviours in safety and risk management requires further development (Smith 2004) as 
demonstrated in the absence of a common set of definitions, dimensions and measures 
(Halligan & Zecevic 2011).  The wrong culture can act as a barrier to elements of risk 
management such as incident reporting (Lawton & Parker 2002) whilst the adoption of 
learning from other industries can help to deliver reliability in areas such as communication 
and patient hand offs (Philibert 2009).  A culture of trust is seen by some (Firth-Cozens 
2004) as the keystone of patient safety as well as organisational effectiveness, identifying a 
dependency  between culture and leadership in an organisation and risk management and 
safety performance.      
 
The lack of aligned and integrated systems to date may have limited progress, however  a 
further policy mandating integration (DH 20115) provides further opportunity to optimise the 
potential benefits of integrated and alignment of operational service frameworks. This 
potentially provides the case for a financial risk such as the delivery of cost improvement 
programmes or financial balance (Cagliano 2011) to be compared against a patient 
receiving the incorrect operation, failure to achieve operational targets and a manual 
handling injury sustained by a member of staff.  At present such risk comparison is neither 
common nor explicit in the safety approaches either used or endorsed by healthcare 
providers and regulators in the UK (Arah & Klazinga 2004).  The desired outcome of this 
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integration and alignment of strategies is for an organisation whose processes are reliable, 
resilient and successful, delivering the required levels of performance. 
 
2.3.3 Key publications and insight 
The literature review has shown the priority that risk management and safety rhetoric in 
healthcare has been receiving in the last 20 years with a range of policies, initiatives and 
practices being referenced.  Subsequent reviews continue to identify that the full benefit of 
the programmes has not been achieved and that this is due to a number of factors specific 
to the issue as well as generic to the implementation.  Risk management and by extension 
quality in healthcare continues to evolve (Kuhn & Youngberg 2002).  The opportunity to 
learn from the systems, processes and experiences of other industries is well documented 
and previously referenced with parallels drawn between safety initiatives from aviation such 
as the pilots pre flight checks and the introduction of the safer surgery checklist (WHO 
2007).   This learning is supplemented by the insight offered by a number of publications 
which have acted as milestones in the evolution and prioritisation of risk and safety in 
healthcare (Hudson 2003).  Reviewing these publications provides an opportunity to identify 
the strengths of what has been delivered and the elements that need to continue to be 
developed so that further improvements can be made and the intended impact on safety 
achieved (Arah & Klazinga 2004). 
 
2.3.3.1 Institute of Medicine Ð Crossing the Quality Chasm 
The Institute of MedicineÕs report ÒTo Err is Human; Building a Safer Health SystemÓ 
highlighted a commitment to making the delivery of healthcare safer through the building of 
safer systems and designing processes of care to ensure that patients are safe from 
accidental injury and the desired outcome is achieved.  The report published in 2000 
established the foundation of the safety and quality agenda in healthcare and set a ten year 
improvement strategy.  Initially focused on US healthcare provision, healthcare systems 
across the world identified with the findings.  The report included:  
¥ A synthesised review of the wealth of literature and research linked to the quality of 
healthcare provided. 
¥ Development of a communications strategy for raising the awareness of the general 
public and key stakeholders of quality of care concerns and opportunities for 
improvement. 
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¥ Articulation of a policy framework that will provide positive incentives to improve 
quality and foster accountability. 
¥ Identification of  characteristics and factors that enable or encourage providers, 
health care organisations, health plans and communities to continuously improve the 
quality of care. 
¥ Development of a research agenda in areas of continued uncertainty. 
Institute of Medicine (2000) 
 
The scope of the report included errors in healthcare, adverse event reporting, 
understanding why incidents happen, expected performance in patient safety, the role of 
leadership and acknowledgement of accountability and the creation of safer systems, 
reflecting risk management in practice. 
 
Building on the insight from the first report, IHI continued its message in two subsequent 
report focussing on patient safety and quality.  The reports aimed to reinstate quality in 
health systems and align this with patient safety through reforms such as rules on the 
redesign of care, strengthening organisational change capacity and establishing new 
environments for care.  The insight to change and improvements extends beyond clinical 
practice to the fundamentals and supporting systems that underpin services such as 
funding, IT infrastructure and workforce.  
 
2.3.3.2 Department of HealthÕs Organisation with a Memory (OWAM) 
The identification of a role of managing risk in healthcare has been acknowledged at an 
international level since the early 1990s (Reason 1997) with a slower uptake in the UK than 
in other developed countries (Leape et al 2002). 
 
ÒOrganisation with a Memory (OWAM)Ó was first published by the DH in 2000 (DH 2001) and 
attempted to explain how adverse events are caused in healthcare organisations, why these 
events can never be entirely eliminated, but how organisations and healthcare systems as a 
whole can understand and learn from safety incidents and act to reduce risks and improve 
safety.   Building a Safer NHS (DH 2001) was the DHÕs response to the growing priority 
surrounding patient safety and the direct and indirect causes of adverse incidents.   These 
strategies were supported in the following decade by a myriad of initiatives from the National 
Patient Safety Agency (NPSA 2005), Patient Safety First (2009), the Department of Health 
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and regulators (Care Quality Commission 2009, Monitor 2009).   The common link across 
the initiatives was the focus on outcomes specifically a 50% reduction in avoidable harm, 
prevention of incidents and learning to prevent a recurrence and recognising circumstances 
that predispose failure are not well recognised.  Absent from the initiatives was the need to 
integrate and interface safety and risk with existing systems and clinical pathways (Leape 
2005). 
Progress against the findings and recommended actions such as accountability, public 
awareness and leadership is evident (Brennan et al 1991, West 2001, Sausman 2001, 
Davies 2004).  Work by Cagliano (2011), Sikka et al (2015) continues to highlight that the 
factors that influence safety and quality of services, the significance of risks and the 
effectiveness of improvement strategies are not comprehensively understood or effectively 
translated from policy to practice.  Arah & Klazinga (2004) concluded that in spite of the 
intended benefits of the safety approaches and initiatives published, in hindsight there were 
a number of foreseeable disadvantages, the number of initiatives, the lack of clarity and 
definition (ie too vague), the narrow focus, lack of awareness to external threats or forces 
and that the deliverables were too optimistic. 
 
2.4. Learning from High Risk Organisations  
 
2.4.1 Risk Management Frameworks 
Successful frameworks are characterised by their systematic approach (Gamble 2013) to 
managing risk from the identification of the hazard, the understanding of the potential 
consequences and implications, the significance of secondary factors and the effectiveness 
of mitigating action.  The frameworks can be complex not least due to the intricacy of other 
contributing or influential elements and should utilise available information to understand 
potential failures in systems (Vincent et al 2014).   For the NHS, there is an opportunity to 
learn from other high risk organisations about the characteristics of a successful safety 
system (Hudson 2002). Characteristics of systems and behaviours that provide a foundation 
for effective risk management include (Hudson 2002, Battles & Lilford 2003): 
 
2.4.2 Management Systems & Frameworks 
The level of detail of the assessment will vary depending on the tools that are used and its 
purpose (Hudson 2002). The assessment tool adopted is influenced by a number of factors 
such as industry standards, central policy, organisational culture and the commitment to the 
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risk agenda.  A review of practice in the NHS demonstrates the influence of national policy 
and the maturity of local safety cultures have on determining how assessments are 
completed, the depth of these assessments and the extent to which they reflect true cause 
and effect.  In proactive situations where the assessment is as part of a commitment to safer 
systems and learning the assessment may adopt a quantitative methodology such as 
probabilistic risk assessments or draw on information such as human behaviours.  At the 
opposite end of the scale are reactive assessments which may consider why something has 
happened. FMEA is a tool that has been adopted and is routinely used in aviation however 
the uptake in the NHS has been very limited being perceived as burdensome and 
cumbersome (Latino 2009).      
 
There are a wealth of systems, generic and industry specific, advocating a systematic 
process for the management of risks.  The status of the systems varies with individual 
frameworks commanding external verification and validation whilst others have been 
adopted by other sectors and are recognised as best practice within their specific industry.  
The following approaches have been selected as examples of techniques used in healthcare 
and more specifically in addition to common approaches to managing risk from industry. 
 
The selection of risk management frameworks, tools and techniques available for 
organisations and industries to use is extensive and reflects the different situations, 
industries and types of risks that need to be identified, assessed and managed.   The choice 
of framework can be influenced by a number of factors including organisational culture, the 
complexity of the task as well as external drivers such as national policy and regulatory 
oversight.  The following frameworks, tools and approaches are examples of formalised 
systems aligned with regulation or industry standards, proactive risk assessment tools, 
incident investigation and error causation and techniques that look at individual elements 
such as safety culture assessments.  
 
2.4.3  Formal Frameworks aligned to regulation and accreditation 
2.4.3.1 HS(G)65 Successful Health & Safety Management 
ÒSuccessful Health & Safety Management (HSG 65)Ó was prepared by the Health and Safety 
ExecutiveÕs Accident Prevention Advisory Unit in 1991 as a practical guide for Board 
members and operational managers including health & safety professionals.  The document 
outlined approach through which health and safety performance in their organisations could 
be improved.  The system provides a clear message that organisations need to manage 
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health and safety with the same degree of expertise and to the same standards as other 
core business activities if an organisation is to achieve effective control of its risks and 
prevent harm to its staff or others that may be affected by their activities. 
 
The guidance document details three main aims: 
1. To describe the principles and management practices which provide the basis of 
effective health and safety management. 
2. To set out the issues which need to be addressed 
3. To establish a framework which can be used for developing improvement 
programmes, self audit or self assessment. 
Health & Safety Commission (1997) 
 
The key elements of the system are outlined in figure 2.1. 
 
1. POLICY: Effective health and safety policies set a clear direction for the organisation to 
follow. 
 
2. ORGANISING: An effective management structure and arrangements are in place for 
delivering the policy. 
 
3. PLANNING: There is a planned and systematic approach to implementing the health and 
safety policy through an effective health & safety management system. 
 
4. MEASURING PERFORMANCE: Performance is measured against agreed standards to 
reveal when and where improvement is needed. 
 
4. AUDITING & REVIEWING PERFORMANCE: The organisation learns from all 
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The use of the five stage approach in the management of risk is reflected in HS(G) 65 
Successful Health & Safety Management, BS 8800 and the AS/NZ 4360 standard on Risk 
Management whilst element such as assessment and monitoring are key components of 
MonitorÕs regulatory compliance framework.  The five key stages are: 
1. Identify the risk 
2. Assess the significance of the risk 
3. Identify and implement effective control measures and actions 
4. Monitor the effectiveness of the controls in managing the risk 
5. Review the system with a commitment to continual improvement 
 
The framework is supplemented and strengthened by defined roles and responsibilities, and 
recognition of the influence of changes in normal operating conditions, circumstances on the 
management of risk.  This prescription supports legislative requirement that sets a legal duty 
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and expectation of standards to be achieved in managing risk (McHale 2002) whilst in other 
examples it may be through best practice guidance.   
2.4.3.2 AS/NZ Standard 4390 (1999): Risk Management 
Risk Management is recognised as an integral part of good management practice.  The 
Australian / New Zealand standard on Risk Management provides a set of principles and 
guidelines that can be generically applied across industry and different sectors.  The 
standards are updated on a regular basis (every four years) to reflect changes and progress 
in thinking, technology and systems.  The AS/NZ 4390:1999 was adopted by the NHS as an 
underpinning element to the national programme ÒControls AssuranceÓ  - a set of standards 
covering areas of risk across healthcare which were subject to annual assessment and 
review via internal audit.  
 
The AS/NZ standard provides a structured process and responds to the potential complexity 
of managing risk with a systematic, multifaceted approach. The five stage approach 
supports the systematic identification, assessment and action of risk as well as setting an 
expectation of continual improvement which builds on the monitor and review functions seen 
in other models. This commitment is a key feature in managing risk and hence minimising 
risk exposure.  The standard provides a generic guide for the establishment and 
implementation of the risk management process.  In 1999, the NHS adopted the AS/NZ 
standard for risk management as the approach to follow in managing risk in healthcare, 
equally its application is suitable for a wide range of activities, operations and industries. 
 
The key stages of the risk management process are:
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1.Establish the context:  
Establish the strategic, organisational and risk management context in which the rest 
of the process will take place.  Criteria against which risk will be evaluated should be 
established and the structure of the analysis defined. 
2. Identify risks  
Identify what, why and how things can arise as the basis for further analysis. 
3. Analyse risks  
Determine the existing controls and analyse risks in terms of consequence and 
likelihood in the context of those controls.  The analysis should consider the range of 
potential consequences and how likely those consequences are to occur.  
Consequence and likelihood may be combined to produce an estimated level of risk.  
The 5x5 matrix is used to assist with this calculation. 
4. Evaluate risks  
Compare estimated levels of risk against the pre-established criteria.  This enables 
risks to be ranked so as to identify management priorities.  If the levels of risk 
established are low, then risks may fall into an acceptable category and treatment 
may not be required. 
5. Treat Risks 
Accept and monitor low priority risks.  For other risks, develop and implement 
specific management plan which includes consideration of funding. 
6. Monitor & Review 
Monitor and review the performance of the risk management system and changes 
which might affect it. 
7. Communicate and Consult 
Communicate and consult with internal and external stakeholders as appropriate at 
each stage of the risk management process and concerning the process as a whole. 
 
Subsequent updates of the standard have identified interdependencies as well as an 
interface with broader organisational values, behaviours and functions.  For example, 
risk is defined in terms of the effect of uncertainty on objectives;  
¥ An effect is a deviation from the expected, positive and / or negative 
¥ Objectives can have different aspects (financial, health and safety and 
environmental goals, and can apply at different levels such as strategic, 
organisation wide, project, product and process 
¥ Risk if often characterised by reference to potential events and consequences 
or a combination of these 
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¥ Risk is often expressed in terms of a combination of the consequences or an 
event and the associated likelihood of occurrence. 
 
(AS/NZS ISO 31000: 2009 Risk Management Ð Principles and Guidelines) 
 
2.4.3.3 ISO 31000 (2009): Risk Management 
ISO 31000 is one of a suite of standards published by the International Standards 
Organisation (ISO) against which organisations and systems can be accredited 
although this is not mandatory in their adoption.  The purpose of ISO 31000:2009 is 
to provide a set of risk management standards that are not industry specific nor 
dependent on other systems but instead offer a best practice structure and guidance 
not only to risk management but also dependent operations 
ISO 31000:2009 provides generic guidelines for the design, implementation and 
maintenance of risk management processes throughout an organization.  The scope 
of this approach to risk management is to enable all strategic, management and 
operational tasks of an organization throughout projects, functions, and processes to 
be aligned to a common set of risk management objectives. 
An element that sets ISO 31000 apart from other models is the definition of risk. The 
definition of "risk" is no longer "chance or probability of loss", but "the effect of 
uncertainty on objectives" ... thus causing the word "risk" to refer to positive 
possibilities as well as negative ones.  This broader scope provides a shift in thinking 
that considers the interdependencies that exist between operational factors and 
successful risk management.   Using and building on existing systems the focus of 
the framework has been on strengthening accountability, aligning objectives across 
disciplines and different sources of risk, embedding reporting mechanisms and 
establishing common risk criteria.   The advantages of this system are that it not only 
reinforces the systematic approach of its sister standards and models but uses these 
as a foundation to then focus attention on other factors that learning has identified as 
important factors.  Such attributes include leadership, commitment, corporate 
objective setting and planning, strategic policy implementation. 
In addition to the core five stage model, ISO 31000:2009 supplements this with 
tactical tasks to manage the identified risk.  This includes:  
1. Avoiding the risk by deciding not to start or continue with the activity that 
gives rise to the risk 
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2. Accepting or increasing the risk in order to pursue an opportunity 
3. Removing the risk source 
4. Changing the likelihood 
5. Changing the consequences 
6. Sharing the risk with another party or parties (including contracts and risk 
Þnancing) 
7. Retaining the risk by informed decision 
 
A review of recognised models from across regulation, accreditation, high performing 
high risk industries identifies four key tasks that are accepted as core to a structured 
approach to managing risk (HSE 1997, AS/NZ1999, ISO 2009).  
1. Identification of the risk 
A key aim of patient safety must be a focus on the sources of risks and hazards.  For 
this purpose, the search needs to extend beyond care processes to enable 
organisational factors such as capabilities, performance targets, financial constraints, 
national policy to be examined for potential and actual risk factors.  The complexity of 
the context of risk identification supports the need for a standardised approach to risk 
identification and comparison. 
 
A review of a definition of risk assists with the search for such factors:  
A risk is the Òlikelihood that a hazard will actually cause its adverse effects, together 
with a measure of the effectÓ (www.HSE.gov.uk). 
 
The search can be further assisted by considering risk in the context of association 
and not simply causation.  This link to association encourages the identification of 
latent factors, which although may not be a direct cause, have contributed to an 
incident or adverse outcome. The identification of latent risk factors allows all aspects 
of a system to be studied and the significance of elements understood.  Such an 
understanding supports a proactive system of risk management as well as an overall 
reduction in risk.  Beuzekom et al (2012) argues that proactively reducing latent risk 
factors that increase the risk of error by individuals will result in delivering safer care 
more quickly than taking measures directed, often reactively at specific individuals.  
Consistent with the objective of minimal patient harm, safety management in 
healthcare should be proactive rather than reactive.  Latent risk factors can be found 
in error producing conditions (system or human error) for example poor design, 
unworkable procedures, shortfalls in training, inadequate staffing (skills and 
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competency may differ between rhetoric and operational practice).  The recognition 
of latent risk factors within a risk system promotes openness, commitment and 
cognisance of risks and hazards facing an organisation.  Carthey et al (2000) link 
such elements as defining characteristics of high reliability organisations whilst 
Beuzekom et al acknowledges the potential positive impact that this can have on 
fostering a safety culture and Rasmussen (2003) on improvements in safety 
performance. 
 
2. Assessment of Significance  
The assessment of the level of risk is potentially the most subjective aspect of the 
process requiring individuals to consider the likelihood of an event and also the 
potential consequences.  Whilst this decision making process is often assisted by a 
number of tools, there remains the potential for over exaggeration both on 
occurrence and outcomes.   A common oversight is for assessors to consider the risk 
before any controls are implemented.   Unless the task or activity is new and 
innovative controls will be in place Ð it is the effectiveness and appropriateness of the 
controls that should be assessed and used to inform both likelihood of occurrence 
and potential outcome. 
 
The use of adverse incident data provides a wealth of information on types of 
incidents occurring.  Investigation of these incidents provides the information as to 
why it happened and how to improve the system, however this remains a reactive 
approach allowing harm, loss or damage to patients, staff and property to occur 
before action is taken.  In the spirit of a system committed to improvement, the risk 
assessment process needs to be more proactive and comprehensive embracing 
human and system failures, their independent robustness and the interrelationships 
in risk management. 
 
Rasmussen (2003) suggests three examples of human / system analysis that can be 
used to establish and support a proactive approach to risk identification and 
assessment: 
1. Traditional Task Analysis and Human Reliability Estimation 
2.  Causal Analysis of Accidents after the fact 




3. Identified Risk Actions  
 The identification and assessment of risk should be followed by a risk treatment 
plan.  Such plans can be an indicator of the acceptance and tolerance of the 
identified risk.  Plans should be systematic in their application and be time limited 
with identified roles to complete the remedial work.  The ability to measure the 
effectiveness of the actions is important not only as part of the monitoring and review 
mechanism but also as assurance the accuracy of risk identification and assessment.  
 
4. Monitoring & review 
The Institute of MedicineÕs report ÒTo Err is HumanÓ examines the safety 
performance of healthcare organisations and based on the performance has made a 
number of recommendations to minimise the risk of injury, ill health or harm from 
those requiring hospital treatment.  Amongst the numerous recommendations is the 
declaration that healthcare organisations and professionals affiliated to them should 
aim to establish patient safety programmes committed to continual improvement.  
The IOMÕs recommendations for a safety programme expands on the role of risk 
assessment.  It is this expanded definition that identifies how risk assessment may 
be more developed at an operational level in clinical terms than may be presumed 
when comparing traditional models. 
 
The practice of progressing beyond stage 3 and reviewing the effectiveness of the 
action and setting a performance target has traditionally been linked to the 
management of health and safety and quality assurance and an increasingly 
recognised description of high reliability (Gamble 2013).  However the use of these 
five stages provides a basic structure for the management of any type of risk 
identified.  This framework is not exhaustive in the factors that need to be considered 
as elements of a process for managing risk.  Factors such as communication, 
priorities, and schemes for the ownership of risk should also be considered and will 
be discussed later on in the chapter. 
 
2.4.4 Proactive Approaches to Risk Identification & Assessment   
2.4.4.1 National Patient Safety Agency : 7 Steps to Safety & Risk Assessment  
            Programme 
The National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) was an Arms Length Body of the  
Department of Health up until 1 June 2012 when its functions were transferred to the  
NHS Commissioning Board (subsequently known as NHS England).  The role of the  
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NPSA was to lead and contribute to improved, safe patient care by informing,  
supporting and influencing organisations and people working in the health sector.   
The functions of the NPSA continue with the National Reporting Learning System  
continuing to collect and collate incident data from across the NHS.  
 
The National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) published its first guide to achieving 
patient safety in 2004.  The Ò7 Steps to Patient SafetyÓ (NPSA 2004) aimed to avoid 
unintentional harm to patients by promoting patient safety at all levels of the health 
care system.  The NPSA believed and promoted that risk is inherent to the delivery of 
healthcare and that these risks can be reduced by analysing and tackling the root 
causes of patient safety incidents. Such information is important in helping to prevent 
the same incidents from recurring.  This concept of analysing and learning from 
incidents is promoted further through the National Reporting Learning System 
(NRLS) established by the Agency.  The pioneering nature of the system meant that 
the system could be criticised and discussions over the consistency and quality of 
data detracted at times from the key messages and opportunities for learning.   
 
The NPSA recognised that the delivery of patient safety is the result of several 
stages which when combined delivers continual improvements in safety.  The 
approach adopted by the Ò7 StepsÓ echoes this concept of progress and 
improvement by providing a checklist to help outline and review performance in 
patient safety specifically, the steps are as follows: 
1. Build a safety culture: create a culture that is open and fair 
2. Lead and support your staff: Establish a clear and strong focus on patient safety 
throughout your organisation. 
3. Integrate your risk management activity: Develop systems and processes to 
manage your risks and identify and assess things that could go wrong. 
4. Promote reporting: Ensure all staff can easily report incidents locally and 
nationally. 
5. Involve and communicate with patients and the public: Develop ways to 
communicate openly with and listen to patients. 
6. Learn and share safety lessons: Encourage staff to use root cause analysis and 
to learn how and why incidents happen. 
7. Implement systems to prevent harm: Embed lessons through changes to 
practice, processes or systems. 
National Patient Safety Agency (2004) 
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The principles of the Ò7 stepsÓ echo the findings of incident investigations and public 
inquires with causal factors and contributory factors such as the influences of culture, 
communication, safe working systems and the ability to learn lessons from past 
incidents. 
 
In conjunction with the Ò7 StepsÓ the NPSA also promote a Òcircle of safetyÓ Ð a 
systematic process ensuring the constant cycle of progress and improvement in 
minimising risk.  The Ò7 StepsÓ represents a framework for patient safety but not 
necessarily the wider risk agenda.  Its use of familiar risk assessment tools and 
techniques under step 3 demonstrate its strong links with established risk 
management programmes in industry. 
 
Figure 2.2: Circle of Safety (National Patient Safety Agency  2004) 
 
The guidance provides another approach for healthcare organisations to adopt in 
their work to improve patient safety.  A potential weakness of the Ò7 Steps 
programmeÓ is its focus on patients and clinical activities compared with the 
operating context and non clinical activities of a functioning Trust.  Risk Management 
in any organisation is multifaceted and hence approaches to assess and manage 




















operating environment of healthcare in the UK since 2005 with patient choice, 
payment by results and foundation trust status has meant that the delivery of care is 
multi dimensional and is significantly influenced by financial demands, performance 
requirements, national policies and patients needs. 
 
The NPSA recognised the widening scope of risk assessment and risk management 
in healthcare, enhancing step three of the original Ò7 StepsÓ programme. The 
document sets out the NPSAÕs programme of work in risk assessment and describes 
approaches and suggests tools and techniques that can be applied.  The NPSA 
programme recognises the need to identify, assess, analyse and manage all 
potential risks and that decisions made within an organisation and within practice 
should take into account potential risks that could directly or indirectly affect patient 
care.  It is important to acknowledge the application of risk assessment and the need 
to analyse all potential risks.  Risk is inherent in all aspects of healthcare including: 
¥ Organisational strategy and business planning 
¥ Financial planning 
¥ Projects and service developments 
¥ Purchasing 
¥ Design of services 
¥ Treatment and care delivery 
National Patient Safety Agency (2006) 
 
Assessing each of the elements is advised for which the NPSA suggest a range of 
assessment tools and techniques including Failure Mode and Effects Analysis 
(FMEA), Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points (HACCP) and Probabilistic Risk 
Assessments(PRA).  These tools are discussed in further detail later in the chapter 
as examples of techniques developed and used in other high risk industries.  
 
2.4.4.2 Proactive Risk Assessment Techniques & Tools 
A common element of risk management frameworks is the ability to identify potential 
hazards and assess their significance and subsequent level of risk within the context 
of the organisation, activity or event.  Assessment tools and techniques commonly 





2.4.4.3 Failure Mode Effects Analysis 
FMEA is a prospective process that identifies the failure effects associated with 
individual failures within a system.  In these circumstances failure represents 
probabilistic deviation from intention and expectation (Tay et al. 2006).  By analysing 
failure modes (human and system) of particular activities and the effects it is possible 
to map the error pathway.   
 
Marx & Slonim (2003) outline the role of failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) 
in the identification and assessment of risk and its application to patient safety in 
healthcare.  The analysis is based on an underlying assumption that for every effect 
or outcome a set of causes must exist.  FMEA helps to anticipate what can go wrong 
within a high risk health care process and to apply measures to prevent the error.  
The system of assessing risk can be further refined and made more robust when 
used in conjunction with fault trees, probabilistic risk assessment and root cause 
analysis.  A complete proactive assessment is capable of identifying all the causal 
sets and the outcomes that could happen.  FMEA and root cause analysis (RCA) 
could be described as the mantras of modern risk management.  The two 
approaches represent a proactive and a reactive approach to the assessment and 
management of risk through the identification of causal factors in addition to 
revealing potential hazards and proposing mitigation measures.  Day et al. (2006) 
describe FMEA as a performance improvement tool for clinical practice. 
 
There are a number of advantages and disadvantages of using FMEA to detect 
potential defects.  The strength of FMEA rests in its proactive and prospective 
analysis of potential failure effects either through initial detection or improved 
understanding.  The analysis of a process enables a series of direct and indirect 
factors to be considered. In complex systems such as the delivery of patient care 
where a myriad of risk factors (causal, latent and other) can exist, such a process 
can provide a better informed view on the resilience or vulnerability of a particular 
pathway and the significance of identified gaps.   
 
In spite of these strengths, FMEA does have weaknesses in its application and in the 
production of meaningful results (Marx & Slonim 2003).   Due to the need to focus on 
individual processes and pathways, application tends to be locally focussed and can 
fail to recognise external forces, influencing factors and failures of complex systems.  
As the complexity of risk interactions increases the value of FMEA diminishes as it 
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cannot compare risk factors and their influence on each other in a positive or 
negative way.  Alternative analysis techniques can be used to determine the impact 
of such interactions both proactively and reactively, for example probabilistic risk 
assessment and root cause analysis. 
 
2.4.4.4 Probabilistic Risk Assessments 
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) is a systematic and comprehensive 
methodology used to evaluate risks associated with complex activities and entities.  
Commonly used in high risk industries, PRA is characterised by the magnitude of the 
possible adverse consequence (ie the severity) and secondly the likelihood of 
occurrence of each consequence (ie likelihood).. A key input to this methodology is 
the expression of consequences and likelihood both numerically for example the 
number of people potentially injured and the probability of such occurrences over 
time.  
 
Wreathall and Nemeth (2004) recognise the ability of PRA to systematically identify 
and review all of the factors that contribute to an event Ð system and human actions, 
their interactions and an understanding of the causes.  PRA examines events that 
contribute to adverse outcomes through the use of event tree analysis and 
determines the likelihood of event occurrence through fault tree analysis.  PRA has 
two aims: 
1. To identify potential areas of significant risk and indicate how improvements can 
be made. 
2.  To quantify the overall risk from a potentially hazardous activity. 
 
Wreathall & Nemeth (2004) acknowledge the roots of PRA in the nuclear industry.   
Applied to healthcare, the model supports a five stage approach to assessing risk: 
1. Identify the sources of potential hazard or adverse event 
2. Identify the initiating events that could lead to this hazard / event 
3. Establish the possible sequences that could follow from various initiating 
events (application of fault trees is beneficial to this stage) 
4. Quantification of each event sequence considering: 
a. Frequency of the initiating event 
b. Probability of failure on demand of the relevant safety systems 
5. Determine the overall risk of the incident / adverse event having considered 
the frequency of all possible accident sequences and consequences. 
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As an safety assessment tool, Probabilistic Risk Assessment combines the 
identification of potential causes of risk with a calculation of how likely is it that the 
event will occur ie its probability.  This technique compliments analysis processes 
such as event tree analysis and fault tree analysis and considers a more in depth 
analysis to that provides by root cause analysis.  Fault tree analysis and event tree 
analysis are extensions of their respective processes and provide a method of 
systems reliability / safety analysis that shows a logical description of the cumulative 
effects of faults within a system.  A key strength of fault / event tree analysis is its 
ability to show cause and effect relations among events that culminate in a Òtop 
eventÓ.  
 
2.4.4.5 Probability Trees 
Probability trees enable tasks, systems human behaviour and the likelihood of error 
within an element of the task to mapped (Reason 1990).  This mapping produces 
conditional probabilities that can be determined for every stage of the task and 
system.  The probability Tress as shown in figure 2.3 represents a summary of the 
resilience of an action and accompanying controls.  Identified gaps or concerns over 
the integrity of the defence mechanisms in particular human behaviour can be tested 
further through advanced human error techniques and fault trees. 
 
Figure 2.3: Probability Tree 
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Operator Action Trees (OATs) focus on error factors once an accident or adverse 
event sequences have been triggered. These errors are described as ÒcognitiveÓ 
errors which may materialise as mistakes, lapses or slips.  It is possible to identify 
three main types of cognitive error: 
1. Failure to perceive that an event has occurred 
2. Failure to diagnose the nature of the event and identify remedial measures 
3. Failure to implement appropriate responses correctly and in a timely manner 
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Operator action trees provide a structure for assessing operator failure modes 
independent of the procedures ie the human error element, its application is limited 
to single time reliability relationships  rather than multiple errors over a time period. 
 
2.4.4.6 Hazard and Operability Studies 
Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP) is another proactive hazard analysis tool.  
HAZOP is a team based, systematic qualitative method to identify hazards which 
include deviations from design or intent, in process industries.  The study begins with 
consideration as to the ways in which a process may deviate from the desired path, 
delivery of the desired outcomes and performance.  IOM (2004) acknowledged the 
role of HAZOP identifying gaps in corporate frameworks such as contractual 
relationships and agreements. As with most processes and action plan is developed 
to eliminate or minimise deviations and their consequences. 
 
Hazard analysis and critical control points (HACCP) also provides a systematic 
approach to the identification, assessment and control of hazards.  The application of 
HACCP has traditionally been centred on food production and service however the 
existence of Òcritical pointsÓ in the manufacturing, distribution or delivery of any 
activity allows the principles to be shared.  The HACCP approach is presented in 
seven steps: 
1. Conduct a hazard analysis preparing a list of steps in a process where 
significant hazards occur and identifying preventative measures. 
2. Identify critical control points Ð steps at which  controls can be applied to 
prevent, eliminate or reduce a safety hazard to acceptable levels. 
3. Establish critical limits for preventative measures associated with each 
identified critical control point 
4. Establish monitoring requirements for each critical control point and 
procedures to monitor results to adjust the process and maintain control. 
5. Establish corrective actions to be taken when a critical limit deviation occurs 
6. Establish procedures to verify on an ongoing basis that the HACCP system is 
working correctly 
7. Establish record keeping procedures to document the HACCP system 
Institute of Medicine (2004) 
 
A number of the steps in HACCP are familiar such as the identification of hazards, 
setting preventative measures and establishing monitoring mechanisms and are 
 39 
evident in other assessment tools.  HACCP introduces the additional elements of 
tolerability and assurance to the process for assessing and managing risk.  These 
two elements are important to an organisationÕs risk profile as they confirm the level 
of risk and organisation is willing to take either in a controlled manner or latent form 
and the level of assurance Board members and stakeholders require on the 
effectiveness of control measures.  The absence of these elements may result in an 
organisation acting beyond its safety parameters and therefore decreasing corporate 
resilience and creating vulnerable systems. 
 
2.4.4.7 Human Reliability Analysis 
The assessment and management of risk is not limited to system failures.  Human 
Reliability Analysis (HRA) is an analysis tool which considers the specific role of 
human behaviour in error occurrence and adverse incidents.  Used in conjunction 
with other assessment techniques such probabilistic risk assessments accident 
causation can be fully understood.  The benefits of this technique rest with industries 
where systems of control may be robust however adverse events occur due to the 
unpredictable input from individual human beings.  This approach is used in high risk 
industries such as Nuclear Power. 
 
A number of techniques have been identified for predicting and analysing human 
error.  This ability to predict assists with the overall calculation of reliability.  Reason 
(1990) acknowledged the work of Schurman & Banks (1984), Hannaman, Spurgin 
and Lukic (1984), Senders, Moray and Smiley (1985) and Williams (1985) as 
cumulatively reviewing twenty seven models designed to predict the probability of 
human error.  However one technique dominates, both in terms of criticism and use, 
the science of human reliability probabilities, this is THERP Ð Technique for Human 
Error Prediction (Reason 1990). 
 
THERP is a technique which considers the actions of an individual in the same way 
as it would the success or failure of an element of a control system.  The object of 
THERP is Òto predict human error probabilities and to evaluate the degradation of a 
system caused by human errors aloneÓ.  The execution of THERP resembles that of 
PRA, with four key steps: 
1. Identify the system functions that may be influenced by human error 
2. List and analyse the related human operations (this includes a detailed task 
analysis) 
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3. Estimate the relevant error probabilities using a combination of expert 
judgement and available data 
4. Estimate the effects of human errors on the system failure events.  This 
represents an integration of HRA and PRA. 
 
The effectiveness of the analysis can be tested by implementing and removing 
controls and varying conditions that may impact on human behaviour and decision 
making.  It is at this point that a detailed task analysis is essential. 
 
2.4.5 Reactive Risk Management approaches (including incident reporting &       
         investigation)  
The literature review on risk management has consistently referenced the function 
and role of incident reporting , investigation and error causation and its contribution 
to successful risk management (Reason 1990, Leape 2001, DH 2005).  The 
contribution made extends beyond knowing when things go wrong to understanding 
why the incident has occurred and supporting to learning to make the changes and 
improvements necessary to prevent a recurrence.  
 
2.4.5.1 Adverse event reporting 
In 2014/15, the NHS was reporting on average 400,000 incidents each quarter (NHS 
England 2015).   A number of reviews including the Harvard Medical Study  (Brennan 
et al 1991) and the Institute of MedicineÕs report ÒTo Err is HumanÓ concluded that 
approximately 50% of incidents (Neale et al 2001)  that occur are avoidable.  Using 
the statistics available that omit unreported incidents, there are significant 
opportunities to learn and improve the safety and the management of risks causing 
or contributing to these incidents. These conclusions offer insight on the relationship 
between incidents and the potential to manage them through safe systems and the 
influence of culture on reporting and behaviours when errors occur.  This makes 
incident reporting a core part of any risk approach as a valuable intelligence 
resource. 
 
Understanding why errors occur is essential in order to lower the rate of preventable 
adverse events.  Gluck (2007) identified four components of medical care and human 
behaviour which contribute to the possibility of error; (1) Human fallibility; (2) 
Complexity; (3) System deficiencies; (4) Vulnerability of defensive barriers.   
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Adverse event reporting systems and the use of this data to real effect by Healthcare 
organisations remains embryonic in comparison with other industries such as the 
aviation and petrochemical  (Barach & Small 2000) and as such the potential for 
further use of the information collected from actual and near miss incidents remains 
unexploited.  Weatherall (2006), Reason (1990) identify that incident reporting is not 
the only attribute of a risk or safety management system.  Other factors include top 
level commitment, just culture, learning culture, awareness, preparedness, flexibility 
and opacity. An additional dimension for healthcare to manage is the Òhuman 
elementÓ (Marx & Slonim 2003), that is the practitioner and patient relationship, the 
clinical decision making and professional judgements and the individual patient. In 
other industries such as aviation, the significance of humanness is reduced due to 
the interface between man and predictable machine or technology. 
 
In addition to the focus on incidents, complaints and medical negligence litigation 
cases provide additional potential data sources and indicators of risk.  The response 
to these events and the use of the information are aligned to the characteristics of 
risk management systems that is culture, commitment, openness and transparency 
in the potential for learning as examples.  
 
The complexity of healthcare systems provides the opportunity for multiple and 
combinations of failures (Marx & Slonim 2003).  It is unrealistic expectation to 
suggest that a zero incident rate can be achieved in healthcare, however 
improvements in patient safety and a greater understanding of how other industries 
have dealt with similar low frequency, high impact situations does provide a way 
forward.  Healthcare had not yet fully embraced a systematic approach of analysing 
errors, the interactions and building lessons learned into systems (Marx & Slonim 
2003).  This underdevelopment is demonstrated through incident reporting guidance 
which has been mandated through individual TrustsÕ policies and whilst encouraged 
there is no mandatory reporting requirement at a national level 
(www.nrls.npsa.nhs.uk).  Initiatives and requirements such as the reporting of Ònever 
eventsÓ continue to raise the profile, underreporting of incidents prevails and the 
associated development of culture, systems and organisational commitment to 





2.4.5.2 Incident Investigation  
The roots of risk management in healthcare lay in responding to incidents (Vincent et 
al 2004).  Some critics may use this to describe the philosophy and culture of risk in 
healthcare as reactive.  In the same way as incident reporting is recognised as a key 
part of effective risk management the investigation of incidents to understand what 
happened and why is equally important (Reason 1990, Weatherall 2006). 
Root Cause Analysis is one tool that has gathered that has been promoted in 
healthcare (Latino 2009) to aid the identification of what happened, why it happened 
and what needs to change to prevent a reoccurrence.  However uptake of the model 
and in true causes of incidents are dependent on a range of factors which are 
explored by other models such as accident causation and risk assessment 
processes (Vincent et al 2004).  
 
2.4.5.3 Accident Causation Models 
There are a number of models that seek to understand why incidents occur (Vincent 
et al 2004). HelmreichÕs accident causation model is a model focussed on error 
understanding and the identification of causal factors rather than error prediction.  
The model introduces the concept of error management which itself is a form of risk 
assessment (add reference).  The identification of weaknesses and gaps within a 
system leave it predisposed to failure and hence the risk of an unwanted outcome.  
The process for identifying such gaps and a commitment to learn from adverse 
events is a key component of any framework (Faunce & Bolsin 2004).   
 
To understand causation, Reason (1990) proposes three concepts that provide the 
foundation for understanding and using accident causation as a risk management 
tool. 
¥ Basic Elements of Production 
All systems whether complex or straight forward involve some for of production or 
delivery of an activity or service.  Figure 2.4 identifies the basic elements of the 
system which includes decision makers, management, preconditions, productive 

























¥ Human Elements of Accident Causation 
The very nature of human error demands understanding and mitigation.  The reality 
is that the human contribution to systems means that accidents will occur.  The 
likelihood and significance of this contribution is directly proportional to the level of 
involvement and the roles played.  The presence of machinery or automation in 
systems proportionally reduces the risk as behaviour to a certain extent and 
consequently outcomes can be predicted.  The human, human systems common in 
healthcare present the conditions for human error to occur. 
 
Mitigation is achievable however this achievement is only possible if the system is 
strengthened to address gaps in control.  Figure 2.5 maps the various human 
contributions to the breakdown of complex systems.  Reason (1990) suggests that 
the primary systemic origins of latent failures are the fallible decisions taken by 
corporate decision makers.  These are then transmitted via the intervening elements 







Integration of human and 
mechanical elements 
PRECONDITIONS 
Reliable equipment, a skilled 
































A general overview of accident causation in systems reveals key contributory factors.  
Firstly the preconditions for unsafe acts; secondly contributory factor is the 
performance of an unsafe act in the presence of an identified hazard and thirdly  the 
provision of opportunity.   
 
¥ Error Management 
In order to manage error it is necessary to understand how and why errors occur.  
The categorisation as error as either weaknesses or failures in human and system 
behaviour does provide a simple understanding of error occurrence and 
management.  It is the preconditions of error that need to be understood ie the 
context of the risk or hazard.  
 
The reporting of adverse events, outcomes or errors provides a valuable insight into 
the systems in place, the likelihood of failure, the significance of the failings and the 
assurance that control measures are operational.  The use of adverse incident 
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reports can also assist in prioritising treatment plans and risks resources to areas of 
greatest risk rather than favoured topics. 
 
All too often incident management is perceived to focus on the negative ie what went 
wrong and why.  The positive angle of managing incidents is to celebrate what went 
right and to identify opportunities for improvement through changes in practice and 
ensuring lessons are learned to prevent a reoccurrence.   In order to learn from 
incidents it is important to analyse incidents and to detect the errors and weaknesses 
in the system such as the influence of human behaviour or the likelihood that through 
system design there is the opportunity for failure 
 
A study of adverse events among hospital patients in Canada supported the notion 
that of adverse events reported a proportion were preventable hence reinforcing the 
findings of the Harvard Medical Practice Study (1991).  Unlike previous studies Baker 
(2004) also identifies that some adverse events are unavoidable complications and 
consequences of healthcare.  Application of this theory provides the link to the risk 
management principles including risk exposure, tolerability and acceptance.  In the 
wider context the links to corporate governance arrangements become evident in 
terms of corporate responsibility.  The emergence of such links needs to be 
recognised within a management programme.   Baker (2004) recommends that in 
understanding adverse events, the system for treating the risk must consider 
causation and preventability in order to create safe systems of work.  Figure 2.6 
attempts to map this process and proposes a system of learning from adverse events 
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Understanding the nature of error through the reporting of adverse events is 
important, however the reporting of incidents is itself a challenge.  It is presumed that 
underreporting of adverse events in healthcare is a reality and maintained through 
the perceptions of healthcare professionals as real threats: retribution, litigation and 
malpractice, blame, professional suicide.   
 
A key information source on risk management and performance is the use of adverse 
event data.   Such events can include incidents, claims and complaints and be used 
to identify weaknesses within existing safety systems or organisational structures.  
The data collected can also be linked to the foundation stone of improvement with a 
commitment from organisations to learn lessons from adverse events and change 
practice as a result.  Adverse events can include incidents, near misses, complaints, 
negligence claims and litigation. 
 
2.4.6 Other forms of frameworks, assessment & tools 
 
2.4.6.1 Safety culture 
 
The role of a safety culture or climate has been widely recognised as a key factor in 
successful safety systems (Hudson 2002, Flin et al 2000).  Healthcare in general and 
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the NHS specifically has suffered as a result of a blame culture related to adverse 
incidents, patient injury and unexpected outcomes.  Organisational attitudes toward 
incidents have not developed at the same rate as medical negligence litigation 
perpetuating the sense of blame and human error compared to the contribution from 
systems, circumstances and corporate priorities.  This sense of blame creates an 
anxiety about real and potential errors, subsequent reporting and investigation, in a 
community where individual professional opinion and decision making is a 
cornerstone of patient care.  Healthcare leaders need to recognise the significance of 
this and the importance of establishing trust in the delivery of safe, quality care as 
well as when errors occur.  This anxiety has the potential to be a barrier to risk 
management and its ongoing evolution of risk management is left unaddressed 
(Firth-Cozens 2002). 
 
WestrumÕs model of safety cultures recognises different maturity levels within 
organisational cultures (Westrum 1984).  At the lowest level a pathological culture is 
characterised by Òwho cares as long as we are not caughtÓ, followed by reactive 
where Òsafety is important , we do it a lot every time we have an accidentÓ to mature 
cultures described as proactive where Òwe work on the problems we still findÓ and 
generative with safety embedded into the business done.  The prevalence of 
incidents that are reported and go unreported in the NHS suggests that the culture is 
still in a formative and reactive stage.   
 
Safety culture and attitudes are not limited to incident reporting and extend to 
proactive steps such as a visible and true commitment to safety and quality, 
investment in systems designed around safety, effective management of known risks 
through continued assessment and an openness to learning and improving 
performance.  
 
2.4.7 Additional elements 
 
2.4.7.1 Public Confidence in Healthcare 
Commercial aviation recognises that there is a correlation between the trust of 
customers and safety performance.  A parallel can be drawn with healthcare where 
the potential for harm demands a level of trust and confidence in how services are 
provided, the equipment used, the environment and the staff delivering it.   
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In the last decade public confidence and the credibility of healthcare providers and 
the NHS has been damaged.  Adverse incidents and events resulting in fatal 
avoidable harm to patients and a number of public inquiries investigating systemic 
organisational failures have contributed to a loss of public confidence and a knock to 
the reputation of individual hospitals and services.  This impact on confidence and 
reputation plays directly to the effectiveness of risk management systems and the 
ability of organisations to identify potential hazards and the commitment to mitigate 
the risk, improve safety and strengthen performance.  
 
High risk organisations have responded to strengthening the publicÕs trust and 
confidence in their ability to manage and successfully deliver high risk activities.  For 
industries such as aviation and oil and gas production the additional incentive may 
also be financial in maintaining or attracting future investment.  The added dimension 
of commercial competition introduces safety as a factor / dimension in defining 
market success.   The limited influence of this within the NHS has the potential to 
create conditions of acceptance and tolerance of risk and incidents rather than 
striving for improvements in performance.  Safety culture in healthcare has been 
described as reactive only responding to incidents and events when they happen 
rather than proactively seeking out hazards and risks.   
 
The impact of poor risk management performance is not limited to the physical harm 
sustained, hidden costs such as lost of productivity, investigation time and 
implementation of remedial measures are well documented (Reason 1990). An 
inadequate response to patient harm or an inappropriate disclosure of information 
can alienate patients and damage professional reputations (McDonald et al 2010).  
When patients suffer harm most providers are ill prepared to respond.  As part of the 
review of safety cultures in NHS the tendency to shame and blame has prevailed.  
This blame culture can also be accompanied by a silence from provider which 
creates mistrust and perpetuates feeling of a lack of openness and transparency.  
Such actions have commonly been linked to the rising rate of litigation (Galbraith 
2006) as well as supplementing the evidence of a limited willingness to learn and 
improve from problems (Leape & Bates 1995).  
 
Reputation and patient confidence are important factors in managing risk in 
healthcare.  Confidence and trust varies across services along with perceptions of 
safety and tolerances of risk at key points in decision making and provision of care 
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(Cox 2013).   The adoption of a systems approach to managing risk that helps to 
predict performance will encourage the required shit from a reactive culture to one 
that is open to learn and seeks system causes as well as human causes for why 
things go wrong (Firth-Couzens, Cording & Ginsburg 2003) and help to build and 
maintain public confidence in the quality and safety of care provided and that the 
organisation is a learning organisation and committed to improvement.   
 
2.4.7.2 Risk Performance & priorities 
The nature of the work undertaken by high risk organisations in industries such as 
aviation and healthcare demands strong risk performance.  This performance can be 
demonstrated through a number of different routes as described in the literature, a 
proactive safety culture, the adoption of a systematic approach to managing risk, 
learning through adverse event reporting and a commitment to improvement.   The 
achievement of this performance needs to be a priority (Battles & Lilford 2003) 
although not to the extent that it is pursued irrespective of cost exposing the 
organisation to vulnerability as achievements of targets dominate the delivery of a 
service (Hollnagel et al 2001).   
 
Since the early 2000s quality and safety performance has been articulated through 
central policy objectives (Sutherland 2004) with national targets set to reduce types 
of incidents such as MRSA infections (DH 2005) or improve patient outcomes (NHS 
England 2014).  Performance measures directly related to risk are limited with local 
commitments prioritised around national policy.  There is little to demonstrate a direct 
link between organisational culture and performance (add reference) although insight 
provided through public inquiries and independent investigations have suggested 
links (Francis 2014). 
 
Current healthcare systems have been shaped by national programmes, policies and 
priorities.  An output of these developments has been the growth of regulation 
(Storch 2005) and the establishment of a number of organisations tasked with 
providing oversight to a number of different aspects of healthcare (McHale 2002) 
such as quality, safety, staff competencies and financial management .  
 
There are a number of external agencies such as Monitor, the Care Quality 
Commission and the professional regulators tasked with providing opinion or 
regulation, mandatory or otherwise, within the healthcare industry.  Nationally based 
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their views and recommendations infiltrate local service provision, however the driver 
behind the policy shift or initiative may over shadow the intended purpose and 
outcome with systems designed to meet requirements rather than deliver effective 
risk management (Shaw 2001).  Faunce & Bolsin (2004) reviewed the role of 
external regulation of safety management systems and the value of such schemes 
post adverse events in which key causation could be attributed to gaps within 
controls not uncovered by the regulatory process.    The reviews did highlight a lack 
of confidence in the system for identifying and managing risks or raising concerns 
although did demonstrate that national policy requirements had been met.  
 
Risk and safety are outputs and hence the focus should be on the ability of a system 
to consistently deliver the required standard of care. High risk organisations including 
healthcare have no option but to function reliably if outcomes are to be as expected 
and intended predictable (Weick & Sutcliffe 2007).  The answer, in part is in system 
design, however this not only needs to address and mitigate against significant single 
events but also be sufficiently robust to survive and respond the cumulative effects of 
multiple minor to moderate failings or even suggested gaps within a system.  
Corporate systems need to be capable of managing the unexpected to avoid 
disruptions to service and the spiral of decline associated with secondary factors 
such as financial losses, loss of reputation and a decline in public confidence 
Healthcare is at a formative stage of the model with key elements developed to a 
greater or lesser extent however it is the relationship and interdependencies that 
require further understanding along with direct and indirect factors. 
 
2.5. Common Characteristics 
 
Risk management is widely recognised as a complex function (McNeil et al 2015) 
from its definition, the countless frameworks, systems and tools that are available for 
use as well as the influence that other aspects of organisations have on it such as 
culture, national policies, corporate performance (Cagliano et al 2011, Philibert 
2009).   The complexity of systems and the industries in which they are implemented 
add further dimensions that serve to shape and introduce priorities to the function 
(Gamble 2013, Ginsburg et al 2014).  In the face of this variation, the literature 
review has identified a number of common elements that are present in the systems 
and frameworks reviewed as well as serving to highlight characteristics of risk 
management which may serve as early foundations of what is a ÒgoodÓ risk 
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management framework.  Figure 2.7  provides a summary of the models that have 
been reviewed and the characteristics derived from their purpose and core 
deliverables.    In summarising the risk characteristics six criteria have been 
identified.  There is an emerging theme of the strengths and potential benefits of 
systems in providing a systematic approach, that identifies and assesses the 
significance of risk whilst criteria such as mitigating action, monitor and review and 
continual improvement appear to be less reliable as factors included or 
characterising the system. 
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The insight provided by this summary leads the research on to its next stage and 
looking at risk management systems and practices in the NHS, what drives it and the 





Chapter 3 Ð Concept analysis 
 
In chapter 2 the literature review explored risk management systems and 
arrangements across high risk industries with a specific focus on how risk is 
managed in healthcare and the factors that influence.  The review provided insight 
that contextualised risk management, its development, the characteristics of systems 
and frameworks and its relevance and its adoption by healthcare in particular the 
NHS.   The output has identified a number of factors that influence and drive the way 
in which healthcare responds to risk management at a strategic and operational 
level. 
 
3.1 Contextualising risk management in healthcare 
 
Risk management is an increasing discipline in healthcare, from patient centred risk 
assessments such as the risk of patients falling to a corporate strategy setting our 
the delivery of care that is safe and of a high quality as well as efficient and effective. 
This broad scope of risk management confirms that risk is inherent in everything that 
we do and it is the uncertainty that surround the issue (ie the risk) that requires 
management be it reactive or proactive. 
 
Over the last 25 years, the role, insight and adoption of risk management in 
healthcare has gathered momentum.  Examples include a library of guidance, 
strategies and performance improvement targets.  On an international scale, a range 
of organisations have attempted to identify key features and characteristics of 
systems designed to ensure patient safety, the quality of service provision and 
provide an output where all associated risks are managed.  The Institute of Medicine 
(IOM) raised the profile of the debate in the late 1990s with the publication "To Err is 
Human".  The accompanying headline suggested that 98000 people per year in the 
US are killed in healthcare by avoidable incidents.  The publication offered insight 
into the role that human behaviour plays in achieving safe, quality care alongside 
systems and processes such as incident reporting and risk assessment tools.  The 
establishment of a safety culture or a just culture was seen as key development and 
an expansion of the ever growing list of potential characteristics of risk management 
in healthcare.  
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To Err is Human was the first publication in a trilogy from the Institute of Medicine 
and offered a view on the complexity of risk management by identifying 
characteristics of systems or processes.  The complexity and characteristics 
identified by the IOM and others is equally reflected in the risk systems and 
landscape of the NHS and healthcare in the UK.   Further studies on the way in 
which healthcare manages and responds to risk have identified a number of 
programmes, initiatives and features as well as potential drivers.  Drawing on these 
studies figure 1 suggests a number of factors that either influence or are prevalent in 
the identification of risk, how it's managed and expectations.  The factors can be 
broadly divided into two groups (1) operational drivers and (2) strategic drivers.   
 





3.2 What drives and influences risk management? 
3.2.1 Strategic Drivers 
 
The grouping of strategic drivers reflects factors or requirements of risk management 
systems that have been prescribed through policy, national initiatives and key 
stakeholders.  This is not an intended to be an exhaustive list although should reflect 
a list that can be easily identified with and resonates with leading publications.   
 






Quality is a growing agenda incorporating the expectations and experiences of direct 
patient care, the standard to which care is delivered and a reflection of recognised 
best practice to work to or be regulated against.  The World Health Organisation 
(2006) presented two main arguments for promoting a focus on quality in health 
systems, firstly that there is variation in the standards of healthcare delivered 
resulting in intended outcomes not being achieved; secondly investment needs to 
deliver the best results and respond to local priorities. 
 
There are many definitions of quality used in relation to health care and health 
systems, and in other spheres of activity.  One of these defines quality using six 
dimensions, (1) effective, (2) efficient, (3) accessible, (4) safe, (5) equitable and (6) 
acceptable ie patient centred.  Behind each of these dimensions is a comprehensive 
programme of delivery promoting different inputs and outputs, language and 
priorities.  These individual programmes provide an early indication of the potential 
complexity that exists in one element of a risk management system as well as the 
overlap and alignment with identified drivers such as performance through efficiency 
and effectiveness, risk overall via safety and avoidance of harm and access to 
services. 
In recent years the scope and definition of quality has evolved to include quality 
improvement.  This evolving scope shines a lens on the local context of quality and 
encompasses the efforts of everyone in making changes that will lead to better 
patient outcomes (health), better system performance (care) and better professional 
development (Bataldan & Davidoff 2007).  Translating this further shines a spotlight 
on leadership, engagement with local service users and the general public, 
achievement of regulatory standards and the adoption of particular models of care. 
 
The quality agenda is a growing and is increasingly seen as encompassing all 
aspects of patient care from the standard to which care is provided at the point of 
delivery, the adherence to national clinical standards, the safety of the care through 
to strategic leadership to where it should be provided from and how should be 
accessed.  This all encompassing agenda provides strong links and dependencies 
with incident reporting and learning from where care has resulted in avoidable harm 
as well as with performance targets relating to activity volumes, expected clinical 




3.2.1.2 Reputation & public confidence 
Reputation and public confidence are key factors in risk management and in the 
mitigation of risk.  High risk industries such as aviation and the nuclear demonstrated 
both aspects in their commercial operation.  For aviation, maintaining a good public 
reputation based on service, efficiency, safety and cost, a number of which are 
factors identified under the quality agenda, is key to commercial success.  The 
nuclear industry needs to demonstrate a positive reputation that it has the capacity 
and capability to manage the risks associated with industry to act as subject experts 
and give the public confidence on a risk that is beyond their immediate control.  The 
reputation of healthcare providers in the UK has been hit by a number of high profile 
cases in recent years for example the high death rates at Mid Staffordshire Hospitals, 
paediatric mortality rates at Bristol Royal Infirmary and maternity service failures at 
University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay.  As each incident brings its own headlines 
there are commitments of learning and improvement to prevent a reoccurrence.  
Such statements aim to rebuild public confidence, show healthcare as learning from 
mistakes to improve and that incidents highlighting risks in delivering care can be 
managed.   
 
Reputation of the sector, of hospitals and of individuals can all influence the 
confidence of patients and the public. In managing the reputation it is necessary to 
consider factors that may impact on them, positively or negatively, as well as those 
that may impact of public and patient confidence.   Factors identified includes: 
¥ Delivery against expected performance targets 
¥ Failure to meet patient expectations  
¥ Adverse clinical outcomes 
¥ Turnover of staff Ð unstable workforce 
¥ Financial management and control 
¥ Access to services 
¥ Responding to local population needs 
 
There is a synergy between the factors affecting an organisationÕs reputation or 
impacting on patient confidence and in the factors and overall drivers of risk 
management at an operational and strategic level.  Parallels can be drawn between 
factor and its contribution to enhancing public confidence and reputation or in 
managing risk for example the act and outcomes of incident reporting in patient 
choice and access to services that meet expected performance levels meeting the 
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required standards of safety, quality and operational delivery.  
 
3.2.1.3. Corporate Governance 
Governance is a term used to encompasses all aspects of how an organisation 
functions.  It extends from the composition of the Executive Board, committee 
structures, the provision of oversight and assurance of operational delivery and 
adherence to internal controls.  In the late 1990s, clinical governance had become an 
integral part of the NHS, commissioners and providers.  Previous cases within the 
sector and in other industries highlighted the potential insight that patient 
engagement can have on the quality of frontline services, in the management of risk 
and harm and in the learning to improve services and build public confidence.  
Simply asking how well a function is working or if the outputs were as intended would 
start to validate activities.  The driver of clinical governance has set standards and 
expectations that have translated the principles of corporate governance to the 
clinical setting. 
 
Focusing on healthcare, the significance of the role that governance has to play in 
health was reflected in the Health Act 1999.  Section 18 states, Òit is the duty of each 
Health Authority, Primary Care Trusts and NHS Trust to put and keep in place 
arrangements for the purpose of monitoring and improving the quality of healthcare 
which it provides to individuals.Ó  The 1999 act sets out the requirements under a 
broad heading of quality that sets an expectation that care is delivered safely and 
effectively.  This statement again starts to draw parallels with the quality agenda and 
contributes to the complexity of the picture that is evolving that describes risk 
management.  The legislative requirement not only sets an expectation of standard 
and delivery by an organisation but also is a further demonstration that recognises 
that risk management and its associated factors are multi dimensional.  
 
Under the banner of clinical governance banner, the legal requirements are 
translated into practice, clinical services and patient experiences.  Leadership and 
responsibility is identified through specific roles and responsibilities for monitoring the 
quality of clinical practice.  Overall it identifies the Chief Executive that as the 
Accountable Officer, placing the responsibilities for quality, operational activity and 
financial probity / control alongside each other and with one individual. 
 
The scope of clinical governance overlaps with a number of risk management drivers 
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(strategic and operational) as well as the nuances of the activities that sit behind 
them for example the quality agenda and the clinical governance responsibilities 
aligned to this that consider clinical effectiveness, optimizing care and a culture that 
learns from adverse events.  A key achievement and characteristics of governance is 
the ability to place to place the duties assigned to the Chief Executive as 
Accountable Office on an equal platform.  It is at the deployment stage that the 
tensions emerge and the reality of compromises and balancing competing priorities 
are the key deliverables. 
 
3.2.1.4 Performance 
The quality of care delivered to patients and service users is under significant 
scrutiny following several high-profile inquiries, such as the Francis Inquiry. At the 
same time, the NHS faces a number of profound challenges, such as severe 
spending constraints, organisational changes and increasing levels of chronic 
disease in an ageing population. 
In the 2000s, governments in the UK, particularly in England, developed a system of 
governance that set a structure with expectations on performance alongside a 
regime of accountability.   One of the drivers behind the targets and performance 
regime is one of improvement and the delivery of expected standards.  Prescribed 
performance regimes attract debates on their merits and demerits, across the NHS 
one of the greatest areas of debate has been around benchmarking and its use in 
the identification and dissemination of best practice or as an introduction of static 
performance standard.  
 
Benchmarking is one of the private sector-grown ÒmanagerialistÓ tools whose 
application and significance is rapidly increasing in the UK public sector. Despite its 
prevalence, the nature (competitive or comparative), the process (based on 
indicators or ideas) and the outcomes (standards or Òbest practiceÓ) of benchmarking 
in public services remain unclear. For the health service, the debate remains open 
with supporters describing performance targets and tools as the approach to achieve 
for best practice and improvement whilst critics may view the targets as underpinning 
judgments.  There is a group that straddles both camps and that is those that see 
performance frameworks as an ÒindicatorÓ and are inquisitive to investigate what lies 
behind a figure.  Performance frameworks are often one dimensional and fail to take 
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into account multiple variables for example a purist could view the non achievement 
of a 4 hour target in A&E as a failure and judge accordingly in terms of poor 
performance and inability to deliver to required standards.  Whilst clinical evidence 
may support that 4 hours is the optimum wait for clinical effectiveness, if a further 
wait to ensure either access to additional diagnostic services and skills requires an 
additional 2 hours can this constitute a failure if the patient outcomes have been 
enhanced by access to the right services at the right time.  This scenario highlights a 
potential relationship and tension between performance and the quality of care and 
the complexity of managing the individual and combined risks. 
 
Whilst benchmarking is a recognised performance tool, there is also a role for the 
independent stakeholders and institutions to provide an authorative view and insight 
on the quality and safety of care.  In the NHS there are a number of national audits 
and returns that are used to benchmark that equally offer monitoring and 
independent scrutiny against key indicators with the aim of highlighting areas of 
improvement and measuring improvement.  In the face of the shared goal of 
improvement is the absence of an agreement of how to measure and the 
representative indicators of quality and safety improvements.  For example the 
Quality Check a collaboration between the Health Foundation and the Nuffield Trust 
currently track almost 300 indicators of quality across Health & Social Care, the Care 
Quality Commission regularly review data sets in excess of 200 indicators.  Whilst 
there may be similarities the absence of a common set invites debates, speculation 
and challenge as well as adding further complexity to an already complex landscape. 
 
3.2.1.5. Regulation 
The regulation of healthcare in the UK is made up of a number of different bodies as 
well as a larger group of stakeholders.  The regulation of healthcare provides 
oversight of standards and promotes accountability across there key areas (1) 
service providers, (2) healthcare professionals and (3) healthcare products including 
medicines, with each aspect led by a different regulatory body.  The complexity of 
multiple owners has been widely recognised and the effectiveness of relationships 
and cross boundary working, including the sharing of information identified as 
offering opportunities for strengthening.  Such criticism was evident in the findings of 
the Francis Inquiry with subsequent inquiries and incidents suggesting that further 
learning and improvement opportunities exist.   The purpose of regulation and the 
role of regulatory bodies is subject to continual scrutiny however there is consensus 
 59 
that core to the function is an act of holding to account that required standards are 
met and more recently that performance improves. 
 
Whilst a number of the regulatory bodies are independent of the Department of 
Health in statute, there is a close working relationship via sponsor teams and 
publically accountable bodies.  The existence of regulation and independent 
regulatory bodies can also be traced back to the introduction of clinical governance 
as well as the strengthening of practice in a post inquiry learning environment.   In 
one aspect this adds to the growing complexity of the risk management landscape 
and agenda whilst also aligning and establishing a relationship across the other 
strategic drivers identified. 
 
 
3.2.2 Operational Drivers 
The grouping and description of operational drivers aims to identify tactical elements 
of managing risk, these are elements that are visible as part of day to day delivery, 
systems and processes.  In the review of the strategic drivers the potential areas of 
overlap and dependencies were evident, for example between the quality agenda 
and public confidence.  Whilst identifying the overlap and potential for duplication, the 
complexity that exists due to multiple definitions, the absence of a consistent or 
standardized approaches and the presence of tension and conflicting priorities was 
also noted.   
 
3.2.2.1 Risk assessment Tools 
Risk assessment is a process of identifying the hazard and assessing it in the 
context of a process, activity, system or behaviour.  A risk assessment considers the 
likelihood of the hazard occurring and its significance that may be in terms of harm, 
damage, loss and financial cost as examples.  Following identification of the hazard 
subsequent stages may expand the process to incorporate the assessment of 
different scenarios, Òwhat ifsÓ as well as identify mitigation measures and a 
commitment to monitoring and reviewing the risk. 
 
Risk assessment is one part of a risk management system however as frameworks 
evolve the language of risk assessment and risk management can be used 
interchangeably.  In general risk assessment is used to describe the process of 
hazard identification, assessment of its significance and the mitigating risk action.  
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Risk management generally has a broader scope that extends to monitoring and 
review processes, risk improvement targets and cultures. 
 
The term risk assessment is commonly used in health in the delivery of care as well 
as in the functioning of an organisation. Whilst the term may be common, the 
processes and systems supporting its application in the clinical, operational and 
corporate settings vary.  There are a number of tools and techniques to assess risk 
ranging from a structured model, to predictive models and those that draw on past 
performance.  These techniques will be discussed in more detail in chapter  3.  In the 
absence of a single approach to assessing risk in healthcare attempts  have been 
made through the introduction of specific guidance and initiatives, each offering a 
slight variation and adaptation of previous tools, the absence of a single approach 
not only introduces complexity and possible confusion but also makes risk 
comparison, prioritisation and comprehensive assessment a challenge.   
 
The Controls Assurance programme introduced by the Department of Health that ran 
throughout the early 2000s adopted the 5x5 matrix used in the AS/NZ Risk 
Management Standard.  The matrix adopted the traditional equation of risk = 
likelihood x consequences, with criteria scored on each axis on a 1 to 5 defined 
scale.  The result was a risk score and rating that was categorized according to the 
level of risk. 
 
Table 3.1: 5x5 Risk Assessment Matrix (Risk Rating; extreme, high, medium, low) 
 
 





As with previous initiatives and attempts to improve how risk is managed in health, 
the controls assurance programme was superseded by a number of products, 
programmes and bodies.  New products, tools and approaches emerged not least 
authored by the National Patient Safety Agency and continued the development of a 
further set of tools for identifying and managing risk.   The improvements in the 
understanding of risk through the application of common tools to financial, clinical 
and operational risk was lost . 
 
3.2.2.2  Adverse Event Reporting  
Adverse incident reporting is structured approach to recording the events when 
things go wrong.  Incident reporting has a strong affiliation with risk management, in 
the identification, assessment and monitoring of risk.  The value of reporting is well 
recognised across the literature and whilst helping to actively manage the risk also 
provides an additional insight of learning and improving to prevent re occurrence.   
 
The function of incident reporting captures information on the types of incidents that 
occur, their prevalence and impact as well as the potential to analyse them to learn 
lessons, make changes and improve systems. The aim is to strengthen prevention to 
be more proactive in the management risk compared to a solely reactive approach. 
This approach is well recognised in other industries in particular high risk industries 
where operational risks are high and any incidents are likely to have a catastrophic 
and potentially fatal consequences.    Learning from incidents has focused on 
designing safe systems and processes.  ÒError freeÓ is often used to describe 
mechanical or automated systems.  In healthcare, humans both as operators of a 
system and the source of the activity are a constant risk that requires understanding 
and management. Understanding what behaviours may lead to or contribute to error 
within a system is important.  These errors either human or system highlight risks 
that require management as well as an insight through investigations and 
understanding causes of incidents the behaviour, culture and additional drivers that 
may have been identified.  From a patientÕs perspective understanding the possible 
risk factors that they may pose such as co morbidities and procedure related 
complication rates.  These factors are all relevant in understanding why adverse 
events occur and in learning and prevent repeat occurrences. 
 
In the NHS there is no mandatory requirement for reporting for adverse incidents.  
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The National Reporting and Learning System (NRLS) is a central reporting function 
hosted by NHS England.  NRLS is a voluntary scheme for reporting patient safety 
incidents, and therefore does not provide the definitive number of patient safety 
incidents occurring in the NHS, only those that have been reported via NRLS. 
 
The insight and intelligence offered through incident reports extends beyond the 
individual incident or adverse event.  Reporting rates have been used as an indicator 
or organisational culture and safety however a low or high rate does not translate into 
a safe or unsafe organisation, instead it may highlight a culture of openness, learning 
and transparency.  Experience in other industries has shown that as an 
organisationÕs reporting culture matures, staff become more likely to report incidents. 
Therefore, an increase in incident reporting should not be taken as an indication of 
worsening patient safety, but rather as an increasing level of awareness of safety 
issues amongst healthcare professionals and a more open and transparent culture 
across the organisation. 
 
Certain types of incidents can also be used to establish a safety culture for example 
Ònever eventsÓ.  These are a nationally compiled list of incidents that should never 
happen.  The events are characterised by defined actions accompanied by 
prescribed checks and controls that if followed should deliver the intended outcome.  
An example of this is the never event of wrong site surgery and the application of the 
safety surgery checklist which sets key checks to be performed to prevent incorrect 
surgery.  From a culture perspective this sets a tolerance for incidents and a focus on 
incidents where the circumstances are such that an incident could have been 
prevented.  
 
3.2.2.3  Safety Cultures 
The introduction of culture as a part of operational risk management is potentially 
referenced most frequently in connection to adverse incident reporting.  Safety 
culture is described as an integrated pattern of individual and organisational 
behaviour that continuously seeks to minimize patient harm arising from the 
processes of care delivery. 
There is a considerable amount of literature on what is culture, what defines and 
influences it.  There have been numerous terms used to describe and set the tone for 
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safety culture, including fair blame, just or no blame.  Reason (1990) suggests four 
critical elements of an effective safety culture: reporting, just, flexible and learning 
culture.  A characteristic of culture and also a common theme of the terminology is 
the promotion of accountability for incidents alongside the context of what has 
happened.   A strategy for a safety culture needs to embrace two key elements, 
firstly it needs to promote a system that encourages reporting when things go wrong 
in which individuals feel free from blame, humiliation or retaliation.  Secondly, the 
culture and system needs to be open and equally applied and adopted.  
 
Culture is not solely defined by incident reporting.  A successful safety culture 
embraces all aspects of organisational beliefs, values and behaviours and applies 
these.  Culture may be set by leadership with clear expectations on what to do and 
the standards to deliver to alongside accountability for actions.  This shared view 
recognises the risks and errors in healthcare but continues to reinforce on a regular 
basis what is required.  This shared view extends to all staff hence it is essential that 
knowledge and skills are an essential foundation for safe practices so thinking at a 
recruitment stage of what an organisation needs to ensure it delivers is a 
characteristic of a maturing safety culture.   
 
Building a strong safety culture is a long term commitment .  Having set foundation 
stones, ongoing maturing of a culture needs to build and respond to what is 
happening and how the organisation is learning and responding.  Analysing 
performance data and data on incidents and near misses is one element, 
understanding and being open to what has happened and learning is another 
example.   
 
The significance of culture and the role it has to play in risk management and as a 
factor of other programmes should not be underestimated.  At a superficial level 
culture has strong links with incident reporting and encouraging learning from these 
events whilst the openness displayed through learning and the commitment to 
improvement aligns with the quality agenda and developing public confidence.   
 
3.2.2.4  Organisational Performance & Priorities 
Organisational performance in the NHS  has tended to be measured and reported on 
using three categories (1) finance, (2) operational activity and (3) safety or quality of 
care.   Across all categories there are a range of qualitative and quantitative 
 64 
indicators that are used to demonstrate performance, priorities and improvement.  
The outputs can take many different forms such as an annual report (eg Quality 
Account or Governance Statement) to a performance scorecard and be used to 
engage with stakeholders, demonstrate the attainment of national standards and 
promote public confidence and support of the services provided. 
 
Over the last 15 years, the NHS has had a rigid commitment to operational 
performance and priorities, with delivery prescribed through a number of operational 
and business frameworks.  These frameworks have been used to form the basis of 
commissioning requirements and delivery expectations with performance often 
aligned to a TrustÕs income and financial position.  An example of this is ÒPayment by 
ResultsÓ, an outcome based payment scheme against fixed tariffs for service delivery 
monitored by the Department of Health.  Expectations are set locally in terms of 
delivery expectations relating to volumes of activity and expected outcomes.  These 
outcomes will be informed and based around national guidelines and previous 
benchmarking of outcome data.   The scheme pays against completed activity as 
defined in the contract, however it does not take into account where activity or 
outcomes fall short or outside the expected standards for example prolonged length 
of stay due to medical complications related to treatment, additional treatment in 
response to avoidable harm or readmissions within 30 days of discharge.   In these 
circumstances Trusts may be subject to a financial penalty.   This dependency with 
finance is a strong driver in ensuring that the expected levels of delivery are achieved 
and in dominating organisational priorities. 
 
In addition to the volume of activity, the timeliness of activity defined through hard, 
quantitative targets, is also a key characteristic of performance management and has 
been a key measure of patient access to care and treatment. The origins of 
ÒtimelinessÓ targets can be tracked to the treatment of cancer and the impact of 
timely referrals, diagnosis and treatment on the quality of care and patient outcomes.  
The positive impact that rigid response and access targets had on cancer outcomes 
encouraged the wider application of time sensitive targets to Referral to Treatment 
(RTT) in 18 weeks; a maximum 4 hour wait in A&E to be seen and a decision made 
to admit, treat and discharge.  The intended driver behind these targets has been 
one of improvement to the quality and safety of care that patients receive however 
critics highlight a tension and risk that exists if the priority of achieving operational 
targets dominates.    To secure the financial income, Trusts need to deliver activity 
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commitments.  The continued pressure on tariffs, delivering services at cost or 
potentially loss result in tight financial margins where even the smallest deviance 
from plan can create a deficit.  With expectations growing, services are put under 
increasing pressure to deliver more often with the same or less resource.  Facilities, 
equipment and staff suffer fatigue and errors occur which incur penalties that add 
further pressure to an already stretched resource model and introduce vulnerabilities. 
 
The significance of the dependency between finance and operational activity may 
dominate performance reporting and the determination of priorities, however there is 
an equal wealth of safety and quality indicators support the efficient and effective 
delivery of safe services.  NHS England coordinate a suite of patient safety indicators 
that covers national standards, safe staffing, infection control and cleanliness, open 
and honest reporting, patient clinical risk assessments eg vte, pressure ulcers, 
patient falls.  The indicators support the comparison and benchmarking of hospitals 
as described in the context of strategic drivers however locally may be used by 
prospective patients in choosing the hospital or service to access. 
 
3.3 Summary  
 
Risk management has the potential to be a complex function.  As a simple model it 
offers a systematic approach to hazard identification, assessment of risk, mitigation 
and improvement actions and a process of monitoring and review.  Applied to high 
risk organisation, this structured approach remains visible although is added to with 
additional factors that add further complexity.   
 
This review of risk management in healthcare has highlighted the potential 
complexities challenging the function.  From a strategic and an operational 
perspective there is an absence of a standardized approach, from definition through 
to methodology for the assessment and management of risk.  The plethora of 
guidance, initiatives and factors that have guided the development of risk in 
healthcare, however have failed to achieve a consistent approach or clarity in terms 
of a single all encompassing definition of risk, responsibility for risk or the ability to 
compare and ensure equal assessment of risks in particular financial and 
performance risks against quality of services. 
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The strategic drivers highlight that the factors that influence how risk is managed, 
assessed, tolerated and mitigated are not exclusively local operational decisions and 
highlights the influence of policy, reputation and performance targets have on 
deciding what is the priority to manage, how it should be managed and what does 
good performance look like.  The steer from these drivers has the potential to 
introduce additional risk, issues and factors for consideration as the management of 
risk in one area may add or introduce risk elsewhere.  These dependencies and 
interdependencies may not be explicit however are added dimension that required 
consideration and inclusion in mitigating or improvement actions adding to the 
complexity of the subject. 
 
The analysis of the drivers, strategic and operational, has revealed that effective risk 
management is not solely a reactive process, with elements of the risk assessment 
process, the logic underpinning performance targets and the learning presented from 
adverse events all offering a proactive and prospective lens through which to view 
risk and critically promote continual improvement as part of the process.  Whilst the 
identification and contribution of factors to managing risk is evident, the scale and 
significance of this contribution or the added value of one factor against another 
factor is less clear.  The literature review has highlighted that this value may be 
demonstrated through a range of measures from the identification of the core 
component parts of the risk assessment through to operational performance such as 
the number of claims paid or regulatory compliance achieved.   
 
Chapter 4 sets out the methodology for testing these elements and responding to the 
original questions: 
¥ Does risk management exist as a function in the NHS and what does this look 
like? 
¥ Is it possible to measure the success of the systems and if so how? 












Healthcare and the NHS are not deprived of approaches, models and systems to 
manage risk with a wide range to choose from as described in chapter 2.  Whilst 
there are a number of risk assessment tools and risk management frameworks 
available to healthcare providers, the literature review did identify a consistent theme 
of risk systems and the limited integration with other risk systems and the core 
operational management of Trusts.   
 
A review of literature on risk management in healthcare has identified that in addition 
to multiple approaches being available, systems in healthcare are less mature than 
risk management systems in other high risk industries.  Whilst rhetoric may suggest 
that there are differences and opportunities to learn from the risk management 
approaches adopted by other high risk industries, it is important that the reality of risk 
management in healthcare, systems, scope, performance and effectiveness is 
established. The absence of a standardised approach to managing risk in healthcare 
and across organisations is evident on a national and international scale.  Whilst key 
principles are commonly advocated, the development of robust frameworks, central 
to organisational activities is less than consistent (DH 2000, Khojania et al 2002, 
NPSA 2006, CQC 2010, Monitor 2013). 
 
This research aims to understand the strengths, weaknesses and opportunities that 
exist to develop risk systems in place in NHS Trusts in England.  In addition it will 
aim to develop the understanding of the drivers of risk management in the NHS, 
identification of common characteristics adopted approaches and the impact that this 
collectively has on the performance of organisations.   
 
This chapter sets out the research method for identifying, collecting and analysing 
the empirical data.  The research method adopted is a combination of both 
qualitative and quantitative approaches to data collection and analyses.  The focus of 
the research and the data collection is on risk management systems in the NHS and 
aims to respond to the three questions previously identified in chapter 1: 
¥ Does risk management exist as a function in the NHS and what does this look 
like? 
 68 
¥ Is it possible to measure the success of the systems and if so how? 
¥ Do characteristics of either the organisation or system influence how a Trust 
performs? 
 
To answer these questions, I have used the findings of the literature review and the 
concept analysis to set the following research objectives:  
1. To identify common elements of risk assessment and management systems 
in use across the NHS 
2. To analyse the impact or influence that characteristics of risk systems and of 
Trusts have on organisational performance 
3. To determine if Òrisk informationÓ is used within the organisation and the 
relationship between outcomes and organisational and other factors.   
4. To review the influence of other approaches such as national initiatives and 
individualÕs behaviour on risk management and in the achievement of a 
patient focused service. 
 
The response will draw upon the findings of original data collection involving the 
survey of 260 NHS Trusts and the provision of Trust Risk Management Strategies, 
the use of national data collections such as the number of claims paid by the NHS 
Litigation Authority and regulatory outcomes from the Care Quality Commission and 
Monitor across all NHS Trusts in England as well as an extensive literature review 
drawing on the experiences of international healthcare and other industries on the 
performance and content of risk management systems. 
 
Table 4.1: Summary of data collection and analytical approach adopted 
Data Source Time 
Period 
Data Type of Data 
Survey 2005  Survey of 260 NHS Trusts Qualitative 
NHS Directory 
(Procurement) 
2005  Data aligned to organisational characteristics 




2012 Regulatory outcomes against outcomes 4 & 16 
Essential Standards 
Quantitative 
Monitor 2012 Breaches in authorisation of NHS Foundation 
Trusts 
Quantitative 
NHSLA 2005 & 
2012 
Total number and value of clinical negligence 
claims made and paid annually by the NHSLA 
2005/06 - 11/12 
Quantitative 
 
4.2 Research Proposal & Ethical Approval 
 
Prior to commencing the data collection, a key criterion for the effectiveness of the 
methodology was the planning and preparation of the research. 
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A proposal focusing on the collection of data was prepared and submitted to the 
Local Research & Ethics Committee in 2005.  The proposal included a summary of 
the original research proposal, details on the scope of the data collection and an 
outline of the methodology to be used for data collection.     Whilst the initial scope of 
the research falls outside the requirements of ethics approval, the research did 
involve direct data collection from NHS Trusts and other healthcare related 
organisations.  In the interest of openness and transparency and in promoting best 
practice, an application outlining the proposal was submitted to the Chair of the Local 
Research Ethics Committee and confirmation was received that approval was not 
required.  
 
4.3 Definitions of Risk Management Systems 
 
The literature review highlighted the different approaches, definitions and 
understanding of risk management in general and specifically in relation to 
healthcare.  As part of this research it has been important to define the scope of risk 
management in terms of what it means and risk management systems, what 
processes are included.  For the purposes of this research the scope is defined as:  
1. The function of risk management is defined as, Clinical risks (including 
patient safety), non clinical risks (including heath & safety, occupational 
health) corporate risks (including organisational issues, performance 
management and financial management). 
2. Risk management systems and processes include, Risk identification, risk 
assessment, treatment options, monitoring and review and will 
incorporate risks associated with all aspects of healthcare.  
 
4.4 Data Collection 
 
4.4.1 The Approach to Data Collection 
In chapter 1, I set out three high level questions for the research to respond to: 
1. Does risk management exist as a function in the NHS and what does this look 
like? 
2. Is it possible to measure the success of the systems and if so how? 




In chapters 2 and 3 I identified some of the complexities and drivers that exist in 
managing risk in a healthcare setting.  This insight assisted in detailing the role of 
risk management in high risk industries, its application and adoption in healthcare 
and the strategic and operational drivers that shape the risk management function.  
Using the literature review to identify the core components of a system, it was 
evident that the detail required to investigate risk management arrangements in use 
in the NHS Trusts did not exist in a central collated format.  The absence of a central 
data source supported the need for original data collection.   
 
The focus of the data collection in 2005 would be the collation of qualitative data 
identifying and detailing the arrangements, content and oversight of risk 
management arrangements in NHS Trusts in England.  In collaboration with my 
academic supervisor we discussed a number of approaches that could be used, 
these included face to face interviews with a series of structured and open ended 
questions, identification and testing of a series of models over a defined time period 
and a survey approach.  The approach that was selected and formed the basis of the 
2005 data collection was the development of a survey with structured questions and 
the opportunity to provide supplementary information through open ended questions 
and the voluntarily provision of relevant Trust documents.   The selection of the final 
approach was predicated on the logistics of co-ordinating data collection across a 
cohort of 260 Trusts; the achievement of a sufficient data to analyse and draw 
conclusions from; the observed evolving state of risk management approaches and 
definitions from the literature review and the need to establish an operational 
baseline of risk management function to accompany central policy.  The factors 
described supported the decision to adopt a survey approach.   This involved the 
design of a bespoke survey with questions structured to capture responses against 
the common themes emerging from both literature and rhetoric as well as 
organisational specific information such as the executive leadership given to risk 
management and a copy of the local risk management strategy. 
 
A survey encompassing qualitative and quantitative questions was designed.  The 
survey comprised of 19 questions covering the breadth of risk management and 
organisational data.   To assess the value of the survey and the information 
captured, a pilot study was conducted prior to its distribution to the 260 Trusts. 
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Data collection for this research has included a primary data collection through direct 
surveying of NHS Trusts, data requests to regulators using Freedom of Information 
requests as well as use of information and intelligence resources in the public 
domain. The data was collected in two stages. The first collection was in 2005 with a 
questionnaire distributed to 260 NHS Trusts in England.   
 
4.4.2  2005 Survey Design 
The primary source of data collection was through the distribution of a two page 
survey distributed to 260 NHS Trusts in England.  The Trusts were identified through 
the NHS Directory (procurement).  The survey contained in appendix 1, consisted of 
19 questions on the organisational and risk management processes adopted and 
implemented within the individual Trusts.  The basis of the questions was informed 
by the literature review and more specifically the key findings following a review of 
the databases (Medline & Proquest).   This review used the terms Òrisk, healthcareÓ, 
Òrisk management in healthcareÓ, Òclinical safetyÓ and Òclinical quality & riskÓ. 
 
In completing the questionnaire respondents were provided with instructions on each 
question, this included options of single and multiple responses to the questions as 
well as free text on open ended questions.  As part of the survey and specifically 
question B1, Trusts were asked to provide a copy of the TrustÕs documented risk 
management strategy.  This document has been a requirement under NHS LA CNST 
assessments (NHSLA 2012) as well as in DH policies and safety initiatives (CQC 
2010, DH 2008) 
 
For questions where the responses were structured with single or multiple options 
the information was collated in a data base identifiable by individual Trusts.   
 
4.4.3 Testing & Evaluation of Survey Design 
The proposed methodology was reviewed and approved by the academic supervisor 
of the research.  This review consisted of two distinct stages; part one involved the 
development of a survey for distribution; part two tested the survey prior to its full 
distribution to 260 NHS Trusts.   
 
To support the effectiveness and validity of the final survey, the survey was trialled 
prior to its distribution by five NHS Trusts. The pilot included acute Trusts, a Mental 
Health & Shared Services Trust, a Primary Care Trust and an Ambulance Trust, a 
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sample that represented each sector that could be included in the final distribution.  
The participating Trusts were members of a local peer review group through which 
practice and research was regularly shared, reviewed and tested. 
 
As part of the pilot, feedback was received both on the logistics of the full distribution 
of the survey and on the survey questions.  The feedback included some specific 
references as well some general themes such as: 
¥ Lack of clarification of the scope of the survey as language used did not align 
with most recent central policy or common national programmes. 
¥ Parity in application across all sectors and types of Trusts, this was a specific 
observation from the PCT who identified that the function was commonly a 
shared function with another Trust. 
¥ Phrasing of the questions assumed a technical expertise in risk management, 
which did not align with the intended target audience. 
 
As a result of the feedback received a number of changes were made to the survey.  
These included:  
¥ Changes to the phrasing of questions specifically clarification through the 
rewording of key questions relating to the risk management documents and 
risk assessment criteria.   
¥ Clarity on what was included in the scope of risk management noting that 
within the pilot sample, variation in the interpretation of the scope was 
evident.  
¥ Confirmation of the rationale and consistency of using the Chief Executive 
and Accountable Officer as the intended recipient of the survey.  
¥ Noting that risk management arrangements in PCT included in the pilot 
sample did not align with arrangements of other Trusts with risk policies and 
oversight provided from a ÒhostÓ organisation. 
 
The changes made to the survey following the pilot did not significantly change the 
survey, with the integrity of the logic behind each question intact and aligned to its 
foundation established in the literature review and concept analysis.  A copy of the 
final survey is provided in Appendix 2. 
 
It is important to note that the Trusts that participated in the pilot were also included 
in the final distribution of the survey with the amended survey sent to the Trust Chief 
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Executive in line with the other Trusts included in the sample size of 260 
organisations. 
 
4.4.4 Survey Distribution 
The sample for the survey distribution in 2005 identified using ÒThe National NHS 
Trust Procurement Directory 2004/05Ó.  The directory is a national directory 
identifying NHS Trusts by region and also by type.  Each entry includes key contact 
details within the Trust.  This information is updated on an annual basis by each 
Trust.  For the purpose of the distribution of the survey the Trust contact was the 
Chief Executive.  The Chief Executive was identified as the recipient of the survey in 
their role as Accountable Officer.  This role is one that is that is highlighted in 
legislation, and also as a duty in operational management in the NHS in the 
Department of Health publication ÒBoard AssuranceÓ and updated in the guidance 
supporting the Annual Governance Statement (DH 2012).   The full distribution list for 
the survey is contained in appendix 1. 
 
A postal survey accompanied by a covering letter and return envelope were sent to 
the Chief Executive of the each of the identified 260 trusts.  The accompanying letter 
outlined the context of the research to the recipient and requested their participation 
in the research.  The information provided included instructions on the completion of 
the questionnaire and a request for a copy of the TrustÕs Risk Management Strategy 
to be provided with the completed survey.  Both the completion of the survey and the 
provision of a copy of the documented strategy were voluntary.  
 
To achieve a satisfactory response rate that would be considered as a reflective 
sample of practice in healthcare and hence enable conclusions to be drawn, the 
survey was distributed four times over a 10 month period.  The timeline for the 
distribution of the survey is shown in table 4.1 and sees the first round of survey 
distribution starting in August 2005.  All surveys had previously been numbered using 
a unique numbering that identified each Trust.  This numbering allowed all completed 







Table 4.1: Distribution of Survey 
 
Distribution of Survey Date of Distribution 
Round 1 August 2005 
Round 2 December 2005 
Round 3 February 2006 
Round 4 June 2006 
 
The method of distribution remained consistent throughout each round of the 
distribution.  However in round 4 the distribution was supplemented by a telephone 
call and follow up emails to the Trusts who had not responded.  This approach did 
not have a significant impact on improving the response rate with only one survey 
returned from fifty Trusts contacted. 
 
4.4.5 Survey Distribution 2005 
A total of 260 Trusts in England were sent a copy of the questionnaire. The 
distribution included all Acute, Mental Health and Ambulance Trusts as well as 
identified providers of risk management services by other Trusts. Given this 
complexity and the results from the piloting of the survey that identified a multitude of 
options for the provision of risk management in Primary Care Trusts (PCTs), this 
Trust group was excluded. 
 
The data collection has excluded NHS Trusts in Wales, Scotland and Northern 
Ireland due to the promotion of local risk management programmes and specific 
initiatives.  An initial decision to exclude Scotland was made due to the existence of 
an established system for risk management and claims management through Clinical 
Negligence and Other Risks Indemnity Scheme (CNORIS).  This system has the 
support of all Trusts across NHS Scotland.  As the data collection has progressed a 
similar system is being implemented across Wales with the support of the National 
Welsh Assembly. It was concluded that the inclusion of these regions and the 
recognition of the regional initiatives and programmes would skew the results.  The 
existence of regional programmes is recognised and examined in the literature 
review and will be drawn upon to analyse the results and identify the key elements of 





4.4.6 Collation of the Completed Surveys 
All returned surveys were recorded and collated using an excel database.   The 
database was developed using an excel spreadsheet recording the individual 
responses.  To maintain objectivity throughout the analysis of the data and in the 
collation of the results, all entries have been inputted using the individual codes 
assigned to each of the Trusts at the time of initial distribution.  Responses were 
collated as appropriate including yes, no and partial in addition to specific details 
such as individuals with defined risk responsibilities and tools used in the completion 
of risk assessments.   
 
4.4.7 Collation of Risk Management Strategies 
The provision of the risk management strategies was requested alongside the 
survey, the objective was to analyse these separately to identify any similarities, 
common themes or distinct features of the strategy documents.  To assist with this 
the documents were logged separately and a matrix drafted to identify criteria, format 
and content as each strategy was reviewed.  The criteria used to map and unpack 
the strategies would refine as the detail and content of the strategies emerged.  In 
the first phase of mapping a number of broad headlines were identified that mapped 
to headlines highlighted as part of the literature review and had informed the design 
of the survey.  These were: 
¥ Identification of risk including a definition of risk and the approach adopted 
¥ Roles and responsibilities 
¥ Systems and processes for the identification, assessment and mitigation of 
risk and aligned programmes 
¥ Commitment to risk management (purpose, improvement and integration in 
business) 
¥ Measurement and reporting on risk performance 
 
Whilst the headlines were broad, a checklist or more prescriptive approach had been 
avoided so that local arrangements could be explored without the constraint of 
preconceptions.  The request for the Risk Management strategies aimed to provide 
richness and supplement the information provided in the completed survey as well as 
provide further detail on local conditions and systems for managing risk including the 
measurement and monitoring of risk.  The importance of risk management 
arrangements flexing and replicating local conditions was identified as part of the 
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literature review as a feature that develops organisational resilience and reliability 
(Gamble 2013, Hollnagel & Woods 2006). 
 
4.4.8 Supplementary Data Collection 2012 Ð Regulatory Performance & Claims 
 Management 
A second round of data collection was completed in 2012 that accessed information 
held by national agencies.   The aim of this data collection was to provide context to 
insight offered through the surveys on the impact of risk management arrangements 
on a TrustÕs performance.  Specific, tailored requests were made to the NHS 
Litigation Authority and to the Care Quality Commission and Monitor as independent 
regulators of all NHS Trusts and Foundation Trusts respectively.  The original 
request was made under the Freedom of Information Act (2000), however as 
information that is already in the public domain I was directed to the relevant reports 
on the individual websites. 
 
Table 4.3: Details of 2012 data collection 
 





2012 Regulatory outcomes against outcomes 4 & 16 
Essential Standards 
Monitor 2012 Breaches in authorisation of NHS Foundation Trusts 
 
NHSLA 2012 Total number and value of clinical negligence claims 
made and paid annually by the NHSLA 2005/06 - 11/12 
 
The aim of this additional data collection was to respond to questions 2 and 3:  
Question 2: Is it possible to measure the success of the systems and if so how?   
Question 3: Do characteristics of either the organisation or system influence how a 
Trust performs?) 
 
These questions consider the value of characteristics identified under question 1 and 
if they are significant by examining the impact on organisational performance. 
 
This second round of data collection focused on three key sources of data.   
1.  Care Quality Commission - Compliance data and details of registration conditions 
for all NHS Trusts registered with the Care Quality Commission (* Health & Social 
Care Act 2008 (Regulated Activities) Regulations 2010 and the Care Quality 
Commission (Registration) Regulations 2010 
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Outcome 4: Care and Welfare 
Regulation 9 of the Health & Social Care Act 2008 (Regulated Activities) Regulations 
2010 state: 
This is translated into a outcome reflected what patients can expect to experience as 
well as establishing an understanding with providers. 
 
People who use services can expect to experience effective, safe and appropriate 
care, treatment and support that meets their needs and protects their rights.  As a 
result providers will reduce the risk of people receiving unsafe or inappropriate care, 
treatment and support by: 
- assessing the needs of people who use services 
- planning and delivering care, treatment and support so that people are safe, 
their welfare is protected and their needs are met 
- taking account of published research and guidance 
- making reasonable adjustments to reflect peopleÕs needs, values and 
diversity 
- having arrangements for dealing with foreseeable emergencies 
 
Subsequent prompts to assist with the delivery of this standard highlights the need to 
identify risks and say how these will be managed and reviewed. 
 
Outcome 16: Monitoring the Quality of services 
Regulation 10 of the Health & Social Care Act 2008 (Regulated Activities) 
Regulations 2010 state: 
The registered person must protect service users, and others who may be at risk, 
against the risks of inappropriate or unsafe care and treatment by means of the 
effective operation of systems designed to enable the registered person to: 
a. Regularly assess and monitor the quality of the services provided in 
the carrying on of the regulated activity against the requirement set 
out in the regulations; and 
b. Identify, assess and manage risks relating to the health, welfare and 
safety of service users and others who may be at risk from the 




2.  Monitor - Identification of NHS Foundation Trusts * found to be in Breach of their 
authorisation as termed by Monitor and its operating framework (*authorised and 
operating as FTs in November 2012) 
 
Monitor regulates Foundation Trusts against a set regime consisting of four stages; 
monitoring; risk assessment; escalation; significant breach and intervention.  Figure 
3.4a shows the stepped process. 
 
Figure 3.4a: MonitorÕs Regulatory Regime (Compliance Framework 2012) 
 
 
The scope of the assurance required by boardsÕ demands a comprehensive system, 
which is subsequently declared against and regulated through the Compliance 
Framework.  This declaration is summarised by three key areas:  
1. Clinical Quality Ð Monitor requires that the board of each foundation trust 
certify in its annual pan that to the best of its knowledge and using its own 
processes that it is satisfied that effective arrangements are in place.  This 
satisfaction is supported by metrics from the Health care Commission and 
any further relevant metrics.  The aim of this is to deliver assurance to the 
board. 
2. Service Performance Ð Boards must be satisfied that plans are in place to 
ensure (1) ongoing compliance with all existing national core standards and 
targets and (2) prospective compliance with known national targets due to 
come into force going forwards. 
3. Exception and ad-hoc reports Ð Performance and risk management systems 
of an NHS foundation trust indicate that there is a significant risk that it will 
not meet a current or future national core standard or target or is at risk of 
failing to put in place effective arrangements for the purpose of monitoring 
and continually improving the quality of healthcare provided. 
 
Performance against these three areas is determined via risk ratings which are 
informed by a regular monitoring programme, focussed assessments based on key 
deliverables linking back to core performance metrics.  The aim is to clarify how 
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clinical quality and service performance issues are considered to be elements of the 
risk and performance management dimension of corporate governance in 
healthcare. 
 
The governance risk rating which also includes the outcomes of an assessment of 
risks, quantified using a 5 x 5 matrix similar to that used in the AS/NZ 4390 standard, 
reports on a Green, Amber or Red rating.  The framework and implementation 
strategy used by Monitor has a strong risk base and uses deviations in expected 
performance and organisational responsibility and accountability arrangements to 
identify, analyse and provide assurance on the key criteria .  
 
The Compliance Framework outlines MonitorÕs risk-based approach to regulating 
NHS foundation trusts.  This regulation is supported by internal mechanisms 
including an annual assessment on service performance, quality of care and other 
risk activities.  Assessments previously required by Monitor as part of the initial 
application for Foundation Trust status have been quantified using the 5x5 matrix, a 
variation of that provided in the Australian / New Zealand standards. The supporting 
sourcebook (Monitor 2006) prescribes the assessment criteria.  In the event that 
Òsignificant failingsÓ are identified, Monitor will assess the significance in light of any 
action the board is taking to resolve the issue or any relevant previous monitoring or 
intervention.  The identified failings have the potential to act as triggers and change 
the risk profile of an organisation. 
 
3.  NHS Litigation Authority - Claims received and paid as part of the NHS LA Clinical 
Negligence Scheme for Trusts. 
 
The NHS Litigation Authority (NHSLA) operates an indemnity scheme for clinical 
negligence and non clinical claims.  The scheme is voluntary and all NHS Trusts are 
eligible to join the programme.  It is noted that other insurance schemes do exist 
although proportionally the NHSLA has the largest share of NHS Trusts.  The 
NHSLA acknowledges that clinical and non clinical risks manifest themselves with 
different outputs and implications and as such operate separate schemes and 
assessment processes to determine the standards of risk systems through the 
application of three levels (Level 1 - policy; Level 2 - practice; Level 3 - performance).  
 
The Clinical Negligence Scheme for Trusts handles all clinical negligence claims 
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against member NHS bodies where the incident in question took place on or after 1 
April 1995 (or when the body joined the scheme, if that is later).  The costs of the 
scheme are met by membership contributions. The projected claim costs are 
assessed in advance each year by professional actuaries. Contributions are then 
calculated to meet the total forecast expenditure for that year. Individual member 
contribution levels are influenced by a range of factors, including the type of trust, the 
specialties it provides and the number of Òwhole time equivalentÓ clinical staff it 
employs. Discounts are available to those trusts which achieve the relevant NHS 
LA risk management standards and to those with a good claims history.  When a 
claim is made against a member of CNST, the NHS body remains the legal 
defendant. However, the NHS LA takes over full responsibility for handling the claim 
and meeting the associated costs.  
4.5 Data Collation  
 
All surveys were numbered prior to distribution to allow tracking of respondents. The 
numbers were also used to anonymise data whilst retaining traceability should 
original data need to be checked as well as ensuring that trends are based on 
analysis and not pre existing views on the Trust. 
 
The survey data was collated along with the national regulatory performance and 
claims management data on an excel spreadsheet.  This collation allowed all 
information to be centrally collected and used as baseline data for the analysis and 
presentation of findings. 
 
4.6 Data Quality 
 
4.6.1 Tracking Trusts Between 2005 and 2012 
Inevitable changes in Trust status, name and existence have occurred since 2005.  A 
full mapping exercise was completed, mapping the original cohort of 260 Trusts 
through to 2012.  To assist with this mapping exercise a number of different 
reference points were used including Trust data, website information, Strategic 
Health Authority (SHA) strategy documents as well as historical documents and 
national returns.    Aligning the claims data to the new organisations was also 
necessary and was managed on an individual Trusts basis, mapping Trusts and 
organisational changes and combining the claims data.   Where it was not possible to 
align organisations the Trusts were omitted from the data set.  The alignment of 
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regulatory performance was not affected by this process given the data collection in 
2012. 
 
4.6.2 Multiple Indicators Describing a Single Variable 
Collation of the data identified the potential for multiple indicators to be used as a 
descriptor of a single variable.  This was evident in organisational characteristics and 
specifically the size of a Trust. Data available for Trusts related to the number of 
employees as well as financial turnover.  Both indicators individually describe size 
however in terms of the relationship and subsequent correlation needed to be 
established to determine if one indicator should be preferred over the other or the 
impact that the use of one of the indictors would have in determining or influencing 
the findings.  In this example correlation determined a strong relationship between 
the two indicators with a ranked correlation coefficient of 0.86 concluding that either 
indicator could be used as the data source for the variable relating to the size of an 
organisation. 
 
4.6.3 Independent & Dependent Variables 
To aid the analysis of the collected data, the indicators have been collated and 
aligned to the research objectives.  The collation also confirmed the data as 
dependent or independent variables as part of the comparison undertaken along with 
the size of the data set as this in itself was found to vary according to responses 
received.  A summary of this collation is provided in table 4.2.  
 








2005$Survey Summary of responses from 2005 survey categorized by Trust and Region Qualitative Not$applicable Not$applicable
1.      To identify common elements of risk assessment and 
management systems in use across the NHS                                    
2.     To investigate the existence of a divide in the approaches 
and management of in NHS Trusts.
2005$Survey Summary of Executive roles with lead responsibilities for risk management Qualitative Not$applicable Not$applicable
1.      To identify common elements of risk assessment and 
management systems in use across the NHS                                    
2.     To investigate the existence of a divide in the approaches 
and management of in NHS Trusts.
2005$Survey
Summary of positive responses to the existence of a Risk Management 
Strategy categorised by type of Trust and by Region 
Qualitative Not$applicable Not$applicable
1.      To identify common elements of risk assessment and 
management systems in use across the NHS                                    
2.     To investigate the existence of a divide in the approaches 
and management of in NHS Trusts.
2005$Survey
Summary of positive responses to the existence of a documented process for 
assessing risk by type of Trust and by Region.
Qualitative Not$applicable Not$applicable
1.     To identify common elements of risk assessment and
management systems in use across the NHS
2005$Survey Risk Assessment Criteria Ð Summary by Region Qualitative Not$applicable Not$applicable
1.     To identify common elements of risk assessment and
management systems in use across the NHS
2005$Survey
Correlation coefficient calculation between two variables Òthe total number of 






3.     To analayse the impact or influence that charcteristics of risk




Correlation calculation using two variables,  Òthe total number of claims paid by 









3.     To analayse the impact or influence that charcteristics of risk





Regression analysis to Òadverse eventÓ data (incorporating the total number of 
claims paid and regulatory non compliance) against the variable of Trust size 







3.     To analayse the impact or influence that charcteristics of risk






Stage 2 of the application of regression analysis to the total number of claims      








3.     To analayse the impact or influence that charcteristics of risk







Application of regression analysis to identified regulatory non compliance 







3.     To analayse the impact or influence that charcteristics of risk






Expected and Observed values of Trust Regulatory performance measured by     





3.     To analayse the impact or influence that charcteristics of risk






Expected and Observed values of Foundation Trusts regulatory performance       
measured by breaches in authorisation and the size of the Trust based on the      








3.     To analayse the impact or influence that charcteristics of risk




Calculated correlation between two variables Òthe total value of claims paid in 
2011/12Ó and Òthe total number of claims paid in 2011/12Ó  in all NHS Trusts 








3.     To analayse the impact or influence that charcteristics of risk




Linear regression line applied to the variables of size of the Trust (Financial 








3.     To analayse the impact or influence that charcteristics of risk




Calculated correlation and linear trendline of variables Òtotal number of claims 








3.     To analayse the impact or influence that charcteristics of risk













3.     To analayse the impact or influence that charcteristics of risk









4.     To determine if Òrisk informationÓ is used within the
organisation and the relationship between outcomes and




Total number of CNST claims received by NHSLA grouped by Strategic Health 
Authority between 2008/09 and 2011/12
Qualitative Not$applicable Not$applicable
4.     To determine if Òrisk informationÓ is used within the
organisation and the relationship between outcomes and
organisational and other factors.
5.     To review the influence of other approaches such as national 
initiatives and individualÕs behaviour on risk management and in





Expected and Observed values of Foundation Trusts in breach of authorisation    







5.     To review the influence of other approaches such as national
initiatives and individualÕs behaviour on risk management and in
the achievement of a patient focussed service.
 
 
4.7 Statistical Analysis  
 
The identification and completion of statistical analysis has been driven by the initial 
objectives and the early findings of the analysis.  Table 4.3 details the dependent and 
independent variables and the size of the individual data sets. 
 
Using the data collected analysis has been completed to establish a baseline on risk 
management arrangements across the surveyed Trusts, this includes qualitative 
analysis and commentary on: 
¥ Response rate: reported overall, by region and by Trust category, this aims to 
set a baseline in terms of the spread of responses as well as demonstrating a 
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representative group from the respondents of the original distribution list.  The 
respondents in addition to be representative of Trust category and 
geographical spread also underpin the data collected from the main body of 
the questionnaire.  
¥ Inclusion and omission of identified risk assessment criteria: in their 
responses Trusts were asked to identify from a list factors what would be 
considered and assessed as part of a risk assessment.  The list was 
developed using the literature review and recognised risk assessment 
practice across high risk industries with a focus on healthcare for clinical 
elements.  The factors were also grouped by clinical and management 
process factors to assist in identifying priorities and focus.   The grouping and 
collation of criteria has assisted with making observations and commentary 
around criteria most and least likely to be considered as part of a risk 
assessment by NHS Trusts.  The results of this collation were used as an 
independent variable in correlation with variables of Trust size and the 
number of claims made under the NHSLA scheme. 
¥ Collation of risk management strategies including a three stage mapping 
process to identify common themes and headlines.  The risk management 
strategies were reviewed individually and the content collated under broad 
headings informed by the literature review.  Following this initial review and 
the collation of the findings using the headings, it was possible to refine the 
groupings further and supplement with categories that reflected the emerging 
content.  This mapping, collation and refinement of groupings were repeated 
three times. 
 
The qualitative analysis and presentation of findings aims to provide the insight to 
relationships to investigate further through the proposed quantitative analysis.  In lien 
with the objectives the quantitative analysis aims to test the presence of 
relationships, the significance of these in terms of the way they may or may not 
influence performance and the role of specific organisational characteristics as 
predictive indicators of risk performance or in pre determining the performance that 
could be achieved. 
 
Quantitative analysis was applied to the data collected in 2012 that included 
regulatory performance against standards monitored by CQC and Monitor and 
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outcome data defined by the number of clinical negligence claims made and paid 
under the NHSLA Clinical Negligence Scheme for Trusts.   
 
The data collected was analysed using principles of comparative analysis including: 
¥ Correlation coefficients: to determine the level of correlation between 
identified variables.  This has been used as the first stage of analysis to 
determine the type of relationship that exists between Trust characteristics 
such as size and performance, measured through regulatory outcomes or 
claims made. 
¥ P Ð values: to provide commentary on the significance of the correlation as a 
predictive indicator. The p value has been used to confirm the statistical 
significance of the relationship and the level of confidence that can be taken 
from the result as a finding and in informing the conclusions and 
recommendations. 
¥ Regression analysis: to investigate the strength and type of linear relationship 
between identified variables and provision of additional commentary on the 
significance as part of the risk management process. 
¥ Chi squared test: continuing the theme of relationships between variables, the 
chi squared test has been used to test the relationship between variables 
from the perspective of observed values ie the results of the data collected 
and the expected values ie based on the relationship what you may have 
anticipated or ÒexpectedÓ.  This test was also accompanied by a p value again 
to confirm the statistical significance of the result and its application to 
subsequent findings. 
 
The qualitative and quantitative approached adopted have supported the 
development of a comprehensive view based on the data available.  This view starts 
with a foundation made up of risk management arrangements in the NHS, the 
content and common themes from practical application, performance based on 
national assessments.  The analysis and techniques used have then used this 
foundation to test, monitor and explore the relationships that exist between variables.  
These variables reflect organisational characteristics, performance and 
interdependencies within these groupings.  In the event that relationships are 
identified the significance of these has been tested to determine if these could be 
considered as predictive or not.  During the course of the analysis, statistical lines of 
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enquiry and the deployment of further analysis will remain fluid and responsive to the 
results obtained. 
 
In chapter 5 I will present the findings of the research.  The presentation of these 
findings will draw on the data collected, analysis undertaken and further 
investigations completed.  The results will also be accompanied by a narrative that 
presents the analytical findings as well as providing some further interpretation that 
links this to the literature review as well as other results.  
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In chapters 1 to 4 there has been an evolving picture of risk management as a 
function and its role in healthcare.  These chapters have provided a valuable insight 
on its status, current practice and policy and the potential opportunities that may exist 
in learning from risk management practices in other high risk industries.   
 
In chapter 4, the methodology used this insight to confirm the three questions to 
answer.  Alongside the questions, I have explained how a combination of qualitative 
and quantitative approaches of data collection would be used to develop an 
understanding of risk management processes and practices in the NHS.  These 
approaches involved direct data collection as well accessing nationally published 
data.  In chapter 5, the data and the relevant findings have been presented in the 
context of answering the three questions posed in chapter 1: 
Question 1:  Does risk management exist as a function in the NHS and what  
     does this look like? 
Question 2:  Is it possible to measure the success of the systems and if so how? 
Question 3:  Do characteristics of either the organisation or system influence how 
     a Trust performs? 
 
5.2 Data Collection 
 
As described in section 4.4 there were two periods of data collection.  The first in 
2005 used a bespoke survey designed to collect information directly from 260 NHS 
Trusts on local risk management arrangements.  The second data collection was in 
2012 and used nationally collected data collated and published by national bodies 
(Monitor, Care Quality Commission & NHS Litigation Authority).  
 
Table 5.1 provides a summary of the data collected in 2005 and 2012.  Over 7000 
individual data items have been collected, collated and analysed.  In addition, this 
information has also been supplemented by 29 risk management strategies provided 
by NHS Trusts as part of the 2005 survey.  Table 5.1 provides a summary of the data 
as well as the context of its collection, the aim of the analysis and the analytical 
approach adopted.  
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Table 5.1: Summary of data collection and analytical approach adopted 
Data Source Time 
Period 
Data Type of 
Data 
Aim of Analysis Analytical 
Approach 
Survey 2005  Survey of 260 
NHS Trusts 
Qualitative To identify what a risk 
management function 
and arrangements look 














Quantitative To identify the 














outcomes 4 & 
16 Essential 
Standards 




characteristics of Trusts 
have an impact on 
regulatory performance 
using compliance with 
outcomes 4 & 16 as 
performance measures 
Correlation 
Coefficients          
Linear 
Regression           
Chi Squared 
Test 










Foundation Trusts have 






Coefficients          
Linear 
Regression           
Chi Squared 
Test 
NHSLA 2005 & 
2012 
Total number 













characteristics of Trusts 
have an impact on 
performance using the 
number of claims made 
and paid by the NHSLA 
as an indicator of safety 
performance. 
Correlation 
Coefficients                                        
Linear 
Regression           
 
The 7000 data items have been collected and collated at a Trust level with Trusts 
then grouped in the four regions (North, East & Midlands, South & London).  This 
grouping is consistent with regional NHS operating boundaries as used in the NHS 







Table 5.2: Summary of 2005 Survey Data collated by region 















































































































79 33 7,538,608 95,425 
Eastern & 
Midlands 
70 50 5,704,956 81,499 
London 
 
41 25 3,402,116 82,978 
South 
 
70 48 6,911,270 98,732 
In Table 5.2 there is variation in the information presented on the number of Trusts, 
the size of the Trusts and the number of respondents across the four regions.  This 
variation is to be expected and relates to the different types of Trusts, the different 
sizes and make up of Trusts including geographical distribution, multiple locations 
and activity (type and volume) undertaken.  Over the course of the 2005 and 2012 
data collections the sample profile (for example by Trust, region) remained consistent 
with less than 3% variation, equivalent to 7 Trusts moving between regions or 
merging with neighbouring organisations.  Where changes were noted these were 
tracked along with the relevant organisational information.   
As mentioned earlier in this chapter a further data collection was completed in 2012, 
drawing on the data held by national bodies on the performance of NHS Trusts.  The 
definition of performance and hence measures adopted a proactive and reactive 
perspective.  The proactive perspective encompassed regulation as the performance 
measure of risk management through the attainment of standards set and regulated 
through legislation by the Care Quality Commission for all NHS Trusts and by 
Monitor for Foundation Trusts (table 5.3).  Performance has also been considered 








Table 5.3: Summary of regulatory performance (collated 2012) by region 












































































































































































































































79 70 54 34 10 1816 
Eastern & Midlands 70 56 57 24 14 1363 
London 
 
41 33 34 20 1 703 
South 
 
70 66 66 17 7 1156 
The data in table 5.3 shows a high number of Trusts demonstrating compliance with 
regulatory standards set by the CQC and / or Monitor.  The figures shown in table 5.3 
are based on nationally published data and were not reliant on response rates from 
the 2005 survey hence the sample size was larger than the previously referenced 
2005 survey response rate.   
Table 5.4: Summary of NHSLA CNST claims against regional Trust data (collated 2012) 



























































































































































79 11570 1816 7,538,608 1:£49,000 
Eastern & Midlands 70 2750 1363 5,704,956 1:£61,000 
London 
 
41 4501 703 3,402,116 1:£127,000 
South 
 
70 7700 1156 6,911,270 1:£78,000 
Table 5.3 included the total number of claims paid in 2005/06.  Table 5.4 provides 
further context to these claims based on the Trusts, the size of Trusts based on 
financial turnover, region and the ratio of claims to Trust Turnover.  The results for 
London region indicate a higher financial turnover to each claim paid.  One possible 
explanation for this variation is the higher number of teaching and specialist Trusts in 
London which typically have a higher financial turnover compared to acute Trusts 
outside of London. 
Tables 5.2 to 5.4 do indicate a level of variation across regions.  In Table 5.2, 
response rates across the four regions ranged from 42% in the North to 71% in 
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Eastern & Midlands.  In chapter 4 I described the four rounds of survey distribution, 
providing all Trusts and all regions with equal opportunity to respond to the survey.  
The difference in the response rates does not appear to have had a significant 
impact on later results.  Other data presented in table 5.3 provides further context to 
the NHS landscape and operating conditions of Trusts within the regions such as the 
number of foundation trusts within regions and also the average financial turnover 
per Trust.  Whilst variation is evident it is spread across the regions and is potentially 
reflective of the complexity of Trusts (sector, services delivered, size, geographical 
location, number of employees) recognised by Khun & Youngberg (2002) and others 
in the literature review. 
 
Table 5.3 sets the scene of regulatory compliance as defined by the judgements 
made by the Care Quality Commission (all NHS Trusts) and Monitor (Foundation 
Trusts only).  The data also reflects claims data (Clinical Negligence Scheme for 
Trusts) as reported nationally by the NHS Litigation Authority.  There is a shared 
theme and level of compliance across the regions with the Care Quality Commission.  
In reviewing Foundation Trusts alone, variation was evident with London reporting 
the lowest proportion of breaches in authorisations at Foundation Trusts in the region 
whilst in the East & Midlands regions 58% of foundation trusts had been identified as 
in breach of their authorisation conditions by Monitor.  Interestingly it is East & 
Midlands region which also has the lowest proportion of authorised Foundation 
Trusts across the four regions.  Given the conditions that need to be met locally and 
the higher rates of breaches there is the possibility of local factors within the region 
playing a contributory factor in this level of performance.  The validity of this would 
need to be tested further to confirm the significance. 
 
Table 5.4 explores the claims data further beyond the total number of claims made.  
In order to draw comparisons between the different size of Trusts, services delivered 
and the sectors, the results have been presented as a ratio of claim to financial 
turnover.  In column 5, the difference between Trusts in the North and in London is 
clear with Trusts in the North region receiving approximately three times the number 
of claims compared to London Trusts.  The literature review identified that adverse 
events including incidents, complaints and claims are affected directly and indirectly 
by a number of factors.  Halligan & Zecevic (2011) identified the role that 
organisational culture plays in higher and lower  rates of events.  The lower number 
of claims in the East & Midlands region as with a higher number of breaches in 
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authorisation in Foundation Trusts suggests that other issues may be influencing 
performance such as culture or the experience of learning from incidents.  
 
The absence of consistent variation in a single region across the core data aligns 
with the wider published research on organisational performance and factors that 
may influence risk management performance such as communication, leadership 
and performance drivers / targets.  Whilst there is no reference to location as a 
factor, geography cannot be excluded as an inherent factor that can influence an 
organisationÕs performance.  I completed an initial review of NHS Trusts whose 
performance was below standard as defined under the Health & Social Care Act 
2008 or struggled to maintain standards identified a number of Trusts that shared a 
common characteristic.  These Trusts were geographically isolated, coastal locations 
although distributed across regions.   
 
The general findings presented were to be expected as the nature of the data 
collection and the analysis completed was not targeted at specific factors or the 
significance of these factors.  There was a general theme of high levels of 
compliance to be expected less than 2 years post registration however what this 
does do is conceal the factors that may be underpinning non compliance in individual 
Trusts.  Such practice may provide opportunities for learning and improvement in 
other Trusts and the promotion of a culture of anticipation of risk rather than reactive 
risk management.  
 
In reviewing the performance results at a regional level high and low performing 
Trusts across all regions have been concealed through the averaging of 
performance.  What cannot be ignored is the anecdotal evidence that suggests that 
certain factors do exist that act as integral challenges and constraints to a TrustÕs 
performance, initial attainment and maintenance of standards to the capacity and 
capability to improve.  Some of these factors will be explored later on in this chapter 
however further targeted data collection and analysis may be necessary to determine 
the true level of influence and attribution.  
 
5.3  Findings from the 2005 Survey  
 
A total of 260 NHS Trusts were surveyed using the questionnaire detailed in the 
methodology and in appendix 2.  158 Trusts responded to the survey representing a 
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61% response rate.  Absent from the respondents were any Primary Care Trusts 
which had been excluded from the sample prior to the final distribution based on the 
potential for different arrangements to exist in PCTs.  The difference in arrangements 
was identified in the piloting of the survey. As previously highlighted in the 
methodology, at the time of the survey Risk management as a function was often 
provided by a host organisation.  Based on the nil response PCTs as a category of 
Trust was excluded from further analysis to avoid future results being skewed.   
Table 5.5 shows a distribution of the survey responses by type of Trust and also 
region. 
 
Table 5.5: Summary of responses from 2005 survey categorized by Trust and Region 
 
Type of Trust 
Region 
North East & 
Midlands 
South London Total 
Acute 16 28 27 19 90 
Mental Health 7 13 8 4 32 
Ambulance 7 6 10 1 24 
Foundation Trust *(as 
at 2005) 
1 2 2 2 7 
Other 2 1 2 2 7 
Responses 33 50 49 28 158 
Trusts Surveyed 79 70 70 41 260 
Response Rate (%) 42 71 70 68 61 
 
 *To note this figure denotes the number of Foundation Trusts (FTs) in 2005 and differs to the 
  figure reported in table 5.3 which denotes the number of FTs in 2012.  
The next four sections detail the findings of the survey based around the themes of 
documented policy (risk management strategy) and processes (risk assessment 
process), executive accountability and responsibility and the influence of a range of 
organisational characteristics on Trust performance. 
5.3.1 Risk Management Strategy 
As part of the survey, Trusts were asked two specific questions in relation to a 
documented risk management strategy.  The background to the survey question and 
the requested copy of the strategy was based on the documented standards and 
requirement for a strategy.  The requirement for Trusts to have a documented Risk 
Management strategy is well documented through the CNST level 1 standards 
through to a clinical strategy forming part of MonitorÕs assessment framework for 
foundation trust authorisation.   
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In the 2005 survey all Trusts were asked the question ÒDoes the organisation have a 
documented Trust wide Risk Management Strategy?Ó with options of yes or no as 
responses.  Where Trusts responded positively a copy of the strategy was requested 
however this was optional.  A total of 154 out of the 156 responding Trusts reported 
having a risk management strategy. The two Trusts that responded negatively are 
unrelated in characteristics and performance, one Trust a Mental Health Trust in 
South region was assessed as compliant by both CQC and Monitor and had a 
relatively low number of claims made.  The second Trusts was an Ambulance Trust 
in the north region and was again assessed as compliant by the CQC however had a 
history of CNST claims. 
 
As part of the survey a copy of the risk management strategy was also requested 
however only 29 (19%) Trusts provided a copy.  There was variation in the 
documents provided by Trusts, these included executive summaries to the complete 
framework (up to 100 pages long).  The variation strongly supports the existence of 
different approaches and the absence of standardised formats and frameworks for 
risk management in healthcare ranging from the content of the strategy, criteria 
included in a risk assessment and overall management responsibility and 
accountability at Board level. 
 
A qualitative review of the Risk Management strategies focused on the content of the 
documents including definitions of risk, scope of risk management and local 
arrangements for risk management.  This review identified a number of key themes. 
 
Tables 5.6a-c map the identification of common elements and the consolidation of 
the headlines to five key themes relating to the content and practice of risk 
management in NHS Trusts.  Table 5.6a provides an initial summary of the headlines 
emerging from the sample of risk management strategies provided.  These headlines 
were identified from a review of the content and structure of the documents and the 










Table 5.6a: Common headlines emerging from the sample of Risk Management strategies 
 
Identified Headlines from Risk Management Strategies Number of 
Trusts 
Reference to NHSLA CNST standards in the introduction 29 
Reference to national policy and drivers such as Never Events, NRLS, NPSA and clinical governance 20 
Definitions of risk are generic and align to national standards 20 
Responsibility for RM identified as part of everyone's role in the Trust with no specific reference or detail 
provided of what to do 
20 
Strategies presented in a very structured / checklist format 25 
Links made to incident reporting policy and process 20 
  
Process and systems dominate the content of the strategies 25 
Improvement targets are identified and there is a commitment to learning and continual improvement 3 
Recording risk and management actions in risk registers, learning logs or on data bases are identified 
tasks, limited reference to how the information is proactively used. 
27 
Context of risk management and how well the Trust is performing not referenced 21 
Attainment of NHSLA level referenced as a performance indicator 25 
Mechanism for monitoring and review identified for policies but not content 25 
  
Detail and content of the strategy varied identifying the differences of the use of the document 3 
Limited reference to dependencies and interdependencies with other functions of the Trust - some 
acknowledgement but no process 
3 
Document did not act as a "how to guide" although the existence of this was not always evident or useful 17 
Acknowledgement that strategy needs to be part of the way services are delivered 13 
  
Human factors not identified as part of the process 13 
Organisational culture or safety climate not referenced (different to commitment) 15 
Lack of personalisation or local context to personalise the strategy to the provider 13 
Processes described are focused in clinical settings but are not clinical risk assessments such as those 
for falls or pressure ulcers 
23 
  
No Board level role dedicated to Risk management - appears as an add on to already large portfolios 29 
Responsibility for risk is not well defined 12 
RM responsibility at Board level identified as one of the duties for the named ED with no reference to time 
allocation or resource input 
19 
Relationship with other Board posts with defined responsibilities for potential influencing factors not 
referenced. 
24 
No reference to actual or proposed plans to integrate or how risk factors across an organisation are 
brought together and considered. 
24 
 
A further review of the headlines identified in table 5.6a highlighted a number of 
potential and emerging themes.  The headlines were grouped together under 




Table 5.6b: Consolidation of the common headlines to emerging themes 




Summary of Findings Number 
of Trusts 
Reference to NHSLA CNST standards in the 
introduction 
29 Reference to national policy, initiative and / or 
standards 
29 
Reference to national policy and drivers such as 
Never Events, NRLS, NPSA and clinical 
governance 
20 
Definitions of risk are generic and align to national 
standards 
20 Evidence or specific reference to approaches 
and tools adopted from national policy 
20 
Responsibility for RM identified as part of 
everyone's role in the Trust with no specific 
reference or detail provided of what to do 
20 Structure of strategy in line with headings / 
criteria from national standards or policy - not 
personalised to the Trust 
25 
Strategies presented in a very structured / 
checklist format 
25 Criteria for consideration as part of the RA 
process limited to set criteria 
25 
Links made to incident reporting policy and 
process 
20 
    
Process and systems dominate the content of the 
strategies 
25 Other factors such as performance, financial 
and operations not reference for specific 
consideration as either potential influencing 
factors (direct or indirect) or as context. 
21 
Improvement targets are identified and there is a 
commitment to learning and continual 
improvement 
3 
Recording risk and management actions in risk 
registers, learning logs or on data bases are 
identified tasks, limited reference to how the 
information is proactively used. 
27  
 





Context of risk management and how well the 
Trust is performing not referenced 
21 
Attainment of NHSLA level referenced as a 
performance indicator 
25 Strong reference to a process or structured 
systems ie Identification of hazard, 
assessment of risk, add to risk register, 
monitor and review period 
27 
Mechanism for monitoring and review identified for 
policies but not content 
25 
    
Detail and content of the strategy varied identifying 
the differences of the use of the document 
3 Limited or no reference to other types of risk or 




Limited reference to dependencies and 
interdependencies with other functions of the Trust 
- some acknowledgement but no process 
3 Reporting on risk provides little insight to 
context such as operational or financial 
performance 
20 
Document did not act as a "how to guide" although 
the existence of this was not always evident or 
useful 
17 Reference to supporting documents 3 
Acknowledgement that strategy needs to be part 
of the way services are delivered 
13 
    
Human factors not identified as part of the process 13 Limited or no reference to the different types of 
failures and understanding why this happens 
ie human and system error or risk 
13 
Organisational culture or safety climate not 
referenced (different to commitment) 
15 Reference to "learning" focused on learning 
logs not active learning and sharing of findings 
23 
Lack of personalisation or local context to 
personalise the strategy to the provider 
13 
Processes described are focused in clinical 
settings but are not clinical risk assessments such 
as those for falls or pressure ulcers 
23 Strategy guidance is not explicit that other 
criteria may need to be considered ie not an 
exhaustive list 
25 
    
No Board level role dedicated to Risk 
management - appears as an add on to already 
large portfolios 
29 Roles and responsibilities identified from the 
Chief Executive as Accountable Officer and to 
the ED lead. 
23 
Responsibility for risk is not well defined 12 
RM responsibility at Board level identified as one 
of the duties for  the named ED with no reference 
to time allocation or resource input 
19 
Relationship with other Board posts with defined 
responsibilities for potential influencing factors not 
referenced. 
24 
No reference to actual or proposed plans to 
integrate or how risk factors across an 
organisation are brought together and considered. 
24 
 
From the initial identification through the continued refinement of the emerging 
headlines and shared content of the risk management strategies the aim has been to 
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identify a number of shared themes across the strategies that offer insight on the 
content, value and arrangements for risk management in NHS Trusts.  Table 5.6c 
presents the final stage of refining the findings and the identification of five common 
themes. 
 
Table 5.6c: Consolidation of Findings to key themes emerging from the Risk Management 
       Strategies 
Summary of Findings Number 
of Trusts 
Shared Themes 
Reference to national policy, initiative and / or standards 29 Structure and content of RM strategy driven by 
national policy, initiatives and standards 
Evidence or specific reference to approaches and tools 
adopted from national policy 
20 
Structure of strategy in line with headings / criteria from 
national standards or policy - not personalised to the 
Trust 
25 
Criteria for consideration as part of the RA process 
limited to set criteria 
25 
   
Other factors such as performance, financial and 
operations not reference for specific consideration as 
either potential influencing factors (direct or indirect) or 
as context. 
21 Strong focus on process and not reflecting the 
purpose or intended impact of risk management or 
interdependencies with other systems and parts of 
the organisation 
Tolerance and acceptance of risk not fully defined 18 
Strong reference to a process or structured systems ie 
Identification of hazard, assessment of risk, add to risk 
register, monitor and review period 
27 
   
Limited or no reference to other types of risk or systems 
that the strategy should interface with. 
 
20 Evidence of separate systems that do not appear to 
be joined up or show any plans for an integrated 
model of service delivery. 
Reporting on risk provides little insight to context such as 
operational or financial performance 
20 
Reference to supporting documents 3 
   
Limited or no reference to the different types of failures 
and understanding why this happens ie human and 
system error or risk 
13 Assessment criteria not comprehensive or inclusive 
for all potential factors that may influence the risk 
Reference to "learning" focused on learning logs not 
active learning and sharing of findings 
23 
Strategy guidance is not explicit that other criteria may 
need to be considered ie not an exhaustive list 
25 
   
Roles and responsibilities identified from the Chief 
Executive as Accountable Officer and to the ED lead. 
23 Board level commitment to Risk Management defined 
although as an add on with no additional resource or 
protected time (eg MD - clinical sessions / week) or 
focus eg Finance Director and Chief Operating 
Officer. 
 
Collation of these themes across the sample of 29 documents provided highlighted 
five headlines. These are: 
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1. Structure and content of RM strategy driven by national policy, initiatives 
and standards 
2. Assessment criteria not comprehensive or inclusive for all potential factors 
that may influence the risk 
3. Strong focus on process and not reflecting the purpose or intended impact 
of risk management or interdependencies with other systems and parts of 
the organisation 
4. Board level commitment to Risk Management defined although as an add 
on with no additional resource or protected time (eg Medical Director - 
clinical sessions / week) or focus eg Finance Director and Chief Operating 
Officer 
5. Evidence of separate systems that do not appear to be joined up or show 
any plans for an integrated model of service delivery. 
 
In addition to identifying themes and similarities between the risk management 
strategies provided, the return rate and headlines has provided further insight on the 
behaviour and culture of Trusts and the potential drivers of risk arrangements in NHS 
Trusts. 
 
In chapter 3 a number of operational drivers were identified strategically in 
determining and shaping policy and tactically shaping local policies and processes.  
Cagliano et al (2011) recognised the systematic approach taken to managing risk in 
healthcare alongside the drivers and tensions of delivering against national initiatives 
and targets.  These two themes were evident in the strategies as well as 
characterising the local arrangements for risk for example documented strategies 
structured in a checklist style to meet the requirements and standards of national 
programmes whilst consideration of local conditions or a commitment to continual 
improvement was notably absent in over two thirds of the documents.  In chapter 2 
factors were identified as drivers of the development and direction of risk 
management in healthcare, one of these was the political driver of national policy.  
This review of the strategies supports the significant role that national policy and 
programmes have in not only determining the recognition and adoption of the 
function but also the content of documents and processes which appear to be written 
to meet these requirements rather than using them as a framework for local 
application.   
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In addition to the content of risk management processes, the sample of strategies 
provided a level of insight to the culture of organisations overall and / or in relation to 
risk management.  From the responding Trusts, 127 Trusts opted to participate in the 
survey, feeling comfortable to respond to questions, the results of which would be 
anonymised however did not want to support their responses with evidence of their 
practical delivery and performance in response to managing risk.  The reasons for 
this are unknown however may suggest a lack of confidence in the processes 
described to effectively manage risk, a potential level of commitment to having a 
process to meet external requirements and an lack of openness and transparency to 
Trust operations and activities.  The results would need to be analysed further and 
additional information collected in order to comment further on this however it does 
provide the opportunity for additional research in the future.  From the Trusts that did 
respond, 29 Trusts geographically spread across England and the sectors, the 
documents and analysis highlighted the significant influence of national policy in how 
and what is included in risk management.  The lack of transparency was also evident 
not least in the ÒfitÓ of risk management with other organisational activities, policies 
and processes.  
 
5.3.2 Documented Risk Assessment Processes 
 
A similar pattern to that seen in the responses of the existence of a risk management 
strategy is seen in the responses to ÒDoes the organisation have a documented 
process for assessing risk?.Ó  Only two Trusts responded negatively to this question 
from the 156 responding Trusts.  The Mental Health Trust that responded negatively 
to a documented risk management strategy also responded negatively to the 
existence of a documented risk assessment process.  The second negative response 
was made by an acute Trust in the London region.  The Trust is a single site Trust 
with less than 4000 employees and has a history of non compliant assessments by 
the Care Quality Commission as well as a history of a high number of claims year on 
year from 2005/06 to 2011/12.  
 
The strong positive response is again a reflection of the influence of national policy.  
In 1999, the Department of Health implemented ÒControls AssuranceÓ, a mandatory 
national programme for NHS bodies comprising of standards aligned to a common 
set of 18 risks in healthcare.  The standards build on the findings of the Turnbull 
Report by setting out good practice in terms of controls to manage the associated 
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risk. The foundation of the risk based framework was based on the AS/NZ Risk 
Management standard discussed in chapter 3.  The framework adopted and 
promoted the use of a 5x5 matrix for risk (Table 3.1 in chapter 3), an approach that 
was commonly referenced in the 154 responses provided.  Further elements of the 
AS/NZ standard and their presence in Trust processes was evident in the criteria 
considered and included in risk assessments, presented later in this chapter.  Risk 
assessments appear to share the checklist characteristics that were evident with the 
risk management strategies, this will be explored as part of the analysis of the criteria 
and the impact on performance.  
5.3.3 Risk Assessment Criteria 
The survey results identified the inclusion of certain factors in a TrustÕs risk 
assessment process, in particular that are most and least likely to be included in a 
TrustÕs risk assessment process based on core elements drawn from practices in 
high risk industries.  Table 5.7 shows the percentage of respondents that positively 
identified the individual criteria as elements considered as part of a risk assessment.  
The results have been grouped by the percentage of positive responses and the 
results RAG (Red, Amber, Green) rated.  The responses have been converted into 
an overall percentage based on positive responses identifying the criteria and the 
number of respondents in the survey. The data has been collated for analysis into 
four bands; less than 70%, 70-79%, 80-89% and over 90%.  These bandings could 
be seen as arbitrary in the absence of statistical analysis although represent an 
attempt to initially identify and filter the results on common and less common criteria 
of a risk assessment process.  This builds on the principles of Delphi statistical 
technique in forecasting through the use of repeated questions and the collation of 
responses.   
 






























































































































































































































































North 97% 97% 91% 88% 88% 94% 91% 94% 85% 97% 82% 73% 79% 70% 67% 61%
Eastern& &
Midlands
96% 94% 88% 90% 92% 88% 92% 88% 90% 78% 78% 66% 82% 72% 64% 62%
London 96% 92% 92% 92% 80% 88% 72% 88% 88% 84% 76% 60% 48% 68% 60% 48%
South 93% 91% 89% 84% 89% 87% 84% 80% 76% 78% 67% 71% 53% 56% 64% 69%





An observation from the results is the existence of two distinct trends, the criteria 
most likely to be included in a risk assessment and the criteria least likely to be 
included in a risk assessment.  Variation was also noted across the regions.  The 
responses clearly identify the criteria at either end of the range of criteria for possible 
inclusion and omission from the assessment process.  Three criteria were identified 
as being included in over 90% of risk assessments; these were, hazard identification 
(95%), assessment of significance (90%) and control measures (93%).  Five criteria 
were identified as least likely to be included in a risk assessment; these were, 
identification of secondary factors (68%), assessment of tolerability (62%), external 
communication of risks (65%), emergency conditions (66%) and risk improvement 
targets (68%).  
These results assist in identifying and proposing possible criteria for a risk 
assessment process and also the consideration given to management and process 
issues compared to contextual elements and factors which may need to be 
considered in identifying and assessing risk.  However to determine if such criteria 
are representative, regional responses were considered and a consistent theme of 
common and shared criteria identified which are included and/ or considered as part 
of a risk assessment.  
 
The same analysis was completed for each of the four regions to determine if there 
were any distinct differences in the individual responses. The results did identify 
variation in criteria included in risk assessments across regions.  A number of 
observations were made which would benefit from further investigation and 
understanding of the context and prevalence of criteria compared to other regions.   
North region - variation was noted to other regions in two criteria: Monitoring and 
Assurance.  Both criteria received positive responses for inclusion in a risk 
assessment with 94% and 97% of respondents identifying inclusion of the factors 
compared to the other regions where consistency ranged between 78 and 88% of 
respondents.  
Eastern & Midlands region  - variation noted with two criteria were identified as 
frequently included in risk assessments; Risk Treatment Actions and Timescales for 
actions.  The two criteria are linked and reflect a commitment to improvement 
through time limited actions.  However the regionÕs responses indicate that the 
monitoring of such actions or the risk is not a strength, with only 78% of respondents 
considering monitoring as part of a risk assessment. 
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London region  - one criteria, training, appeared to be stronger, based on 
classifications, for the London region although not significantly different when 
compared with the actual figures. The criteria that showed the least consideration 
was risk improvement targets with 48% of respondents including it in a risk 
assessment. 
South region showed further variation.  The total number of responses support the 
core criteria identified nationally although criteria least likely to be included is 
expanded beyond the external communication of risk include internal communication 
of risk and consideration to emergency conditions.  As with London, Risk 
Improvement Targets remained a low scorer with 53% of respondents including it in 
a risk assessment. 
Out of all the regions, South region identified on average lower positive responses 
across the criteria.  With strengths and preferences of individual criteria by all 
regions, this has the potential to be explored further to understand what this may 
mean in terms of different cultures and behaviours within regions and if this variation 
extends to other elements of risk performance. 
In section 5.3.1 the analysis of the sample of Risk Management strategies provided a 
brief insight into the drivers and influencing factors to risk management as a function 
as well as the criteria and stages considered as part of a risk assessment process.  
The significance of national policy was clear and could be described as dominating 
the documents, structure, content and use.  A similar theme potentially carries 
forward to the risk assessment process with risk assessment seen as an exercise to 
complete and log rather than in realising the benefits of improved performance.    
As table 5.7 shows, the criteria most likely to feature in a risk assessment are hazard 
identification, control measures to mitigate the risk and an assessment of 
significance to determine the level of the risk.  These common features extend 
beyond healthcare to other industries as well as being recognised as key steps in 
risk management frameworks outlined in chapter 3.  The strength of these criteria is 
in the systematic approach and commitment that they offer and also the suggested 
reliance on system and process based activities.   The activities confirm that a task is 
completed and its completion is likely to be documented.  Looking at how other 
criteria perform in particular elements such as communication and improvement 
targets, the criteria do not feature as strongly.  One possible explanation of this is the 
purpose and value assigned to risk management factors (direct and contributory) in 
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NHS Trusts.  The results suggest a function that is transactional in nature ie its 
structured following a clear pathway to achieve a given output.  Such characteristics 
mean that the adoption of an approach based on national policy fits well, the ability to 
introduce local criteria is limited and the value is limited as there is little integration 
with local systems, other risks or it being reflective of the real risks and challenges 
that are presented to Trusts.   
The absence of processes reflecting local conditions may also be symptomatic of the 
maturity of risk management as a function in healthcare and the confidence of 
providers to understand and achieve the benefits of good risk management.  
Hollnagel & Woods (2006) highlight the importance of resilience in the design of 
systems incorporating a sensitivity to local conditions as well as listening to 
employees in relation what works well and where the opportunities for improvement 
exist.  The absence of this has the potential alongside the pursuit of performance 
driven by targets to introduce vulnerability to operational practice and organisational 
performance.    There are opportunities to reflect and learn from other high risk 
organisations on the value that is given to risk management in systems and 
processes as well as in the culture and behaviour of organisations and the workforce 
with the criteria that is included in a risk assessment.   
There is an emerging picture in the results of the risk assessment criteria considered 
by NHS Trusts that is process focused, considers a limited set of criteria.  Based on 
incident and claims data, the risk assessments are not sufficiently comprehensive to 
consider all possible factors or reflect the complexity of healthcare.  Learning from 
incidents, errors and avoidable harm provide a lens on factors that contribute to risk 
but also the effectiveness of controls.  The priority assigned to improvement 
demonstrates a lack of learning or a commitment to putting actions in place to 
prevent a reoccurrence.  This reactive approach has previously been flagged as 
common in healthcare compared to the proactive approach that anticipates and 
prevents unintended outcomes in other high risk industries.  Clear gaps exist in a 
lack of a clear definition of risk, unclear parameters and levels of tolerance,  a lack of 
commitment to change or improvement although again documenting what needs to 
be done through learning logs and change registers.  Hofmann, Jacobs & Landy 
(1995) recognise that safety and risk performance is strengthened by looking at a 
broader set of criteria than the common process steps of hazard identification, 
assessment of significance and control measures with criteria currently least likely to 
be considered a strong feature.  An example of this is demonstrated in the findings of 
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the Francis Inquiry (2012) that highlighted the contribution that poor communication 
and sharing of information made to increasing the level of risk that patients were 
exposed to at the Mid Staffordshire Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust.  Haywood & 
Farmer (1988) confirm that a risk assessment model needs to consider multiple 
elements for it to not only be effective but also for the organisation to demonstrate 
strong safety performance.  Irrespective of the setting or industry a balance in the 
criteria considered as part of the process, be it system, human or task orientated, is 
essential. 
 
The results continue to add to the emerging picture of a function shaped by national 
policy and a generic set of requirements that once applied fail to adequately reflect 
the complexities of healthcare and adapt to the local conditions and factors that may 
influence performance.  However documented risk systems (strategies and risk 
assessment processes) alone do not produce successful safety performance.  As 
part of the importance of culture, leadership to risk is critical in setting the standards 
of what is acceptable, providing a commitment to improving and leading a culture 
where individual roles are clear about their contribution and responsibility for risk 
management and the behaviours required for optimum safety performance (Barrett et 
al 2009). 
 
Culture, incorporating leadership, behaviours and defined roles has been identified 
as a factor and a driver in risk management in chapters 2 and 3.  The extent to which 
culture is a direct or indirect contributory factor in risk performance will continue to be 
explored throughout the results.  
5.3.4 Executive Responsibility 
The survey collected information on the executive leads for risk management across 
the cohort of Trusts.  As highlighted in the review of risk management strategies, 
executive leadership for risk management was an emerging theme that was common 
across the sample of strategies analysed.  The results identified a number of 
executive roles and job titles with responsibility for risk management, these included 
statutory and non statutory executive positions. 
A total of 139 Trusts identified the executive lead for risk management as part of their 
survey response.  Table 5.8 shows the breakdown of roles by region and overall.  A 
total of six roles were identified along with an ÒotherÓ category that was used to 
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capture job titles not falling within the ÒexecutiveÓ category or were individual Director 
roles not repeated by other respondents.  The results identified the role of Chief 
Nurse (also referred to as the Director of Nursing) as dominating the executive lead 
role accountable for risk management with 44% of Trusts assigning the executive 
lead to this role, followed by the Medical Director leading risk in 15 % of Trusts and 
the Chief Executive in 12% of Trusts.  A fourth grouping of ÒothersÓ was also 
prominent with the second highest response rate (22%).   This group consisted of 
bespoke roles and titles to organisations that did not correlate with other responses, 
for example Director of Governance and Turnaround Director.  It was not clear if 
these roles were ÒExecutive DirectorÓ roles and Board members. 

























North 3 9% 10 31% 9 28% 0 0% 1 3% 1 3% 8 26%
Eastern)&)
Midlands
6 13% 4 9% 27 59% 0 0% 3 7% 0 0 6 13%
London 4 17% 2 9% 8 35% 0 0% 2 9% 0 0% 7 30%
South 4 9% 6 13% 21 46% 2 4% 0 0% 2 4% 11 24%






The prevalence of the three identified executive roles was compared against other 
indicators of the risk system and organisational characteristics.  A specific aspect of 
the role considered was the potential influence of the diversity of executive portfolios. 
However, the multiple functions and diversity of portfolios, in particular of the Chief 
Nurse role had been expected to be a factor in performance, in spite of the positive 
relationship the correlation was weak (correlation coefficient =0.2) and the breadth of 
a portfolio was not found to be a significant influencing factor on a TrustÕs risk 
performance with a p value greater than 0.1 (p>0.1). 
 
Hofmann, Jacobs & Landy (1995) recognise that senior and executive leadership of 
risk is an important factor in successful safety management in particular for leading 
strong performance in the face of competing priorities.  The sample of strategies 
highlighted defined roles for senior management and a recognition that risk 
management was the responsibility of all staff, the lack of detail defining the 
expected contribution including behaviours (Barrett et al 2009) from all staff acts as a 
barrier to embedding risk management and safety performance into the culture of an 
organisation.  Sikka et al (2015) support this finding extending the importance of role 
definition beyond senior leaders to others to foster positive safety behaviours locally.    
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The absence of a dedicated role at executive level in NHS Trusts may in itself not be 
significant however it is perhaps reflective of the true commitment and priority that is 
afforded risk management compared with other corporate functions such as finance 
or operational delivery each of which have dedicated Executive Director roles.  
However what is potentially an influencing factor on performance is the addition of 
this key function, its embryonic state well recognised (Khun & Youngberg 2006) to 
the role of the Chief Nurse and possibly one of the largest and more complex 
portfolios.  As a result capacity for development is limited with certain risks around 
staffing levels and medicines management potentially creating conflict of interest for 
a single role.  The disadvantages of this portfolio allocation and executive leadership 
are evident in the Trusts where performance is a struggle, to achieve and maintain.  
From 2011, the Care Quality Commission used its legal power to ÒinvestigateÓ under 
section 48 of the Health & Social Care Act 2008.  This power is reserved for the most 
serious cases of systemic failure and concerns relating to the quality of care and was 
conducted in just four NHS Trusts.  Having identified the Trusts I have been able to 
identify a common feature shared by the organisations that is the management 
arrangements for risk management.  In all cases the executive leadership and board 
level responsibility was for risk including safety and quality of care was all held within 
a single portfolio led by the Chief Nurse.  It could be suggested that the demands on 
any lead role in a Trust struggling to achieve the required standards needs to be 
focused on a core deliverable not spread across a diverse programme of 
responsibilities.   
 
5.3.5 Summary Findings based on Risk Management Arrangements and the 
 Characteristics of Trusts  
As I conclude the presentation of the Trust results based on characteristics of the 
system, there a number of emerging themes evident in the findings: 
¥ Strong confirmation through documented frameworks and processes that 
NHS Trusts have a risk management function 
¥ Lack of openness and transparency amongst NHS Trusts in sharing risk 
management practices which may be an indicator of confidence or a 
reflection on the extent to which it is embedded  
¥ Risk assessment criteria appears to be focused on systems and processes 
aligned to the keys steps of common risk models rather than the factors that 
could improve or strengthen safety performance 
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¥ Organisational behaviour and commitment to risk management often defined 
as a Òsafety cultureÓ is a key factor based on learning from other industries 
but is notably absent from NHS practice 
¥ The rhetoric of risk management is a key driver and influencer of local 
policies and processes irrespective of its meaningfulness in practice. 
¥ Executive leadership of risk management is dominated by the Chief Nurse 
role as an addition to an already extensive portfolio, the impact of which is 
unknown although is recognised as a common feature of struggling Trusts.  
 
The next section builds on the insight to risk management arrangements and 
practices and uses it to determine how this impacts on performance with 
characteristics inherent in a TrustÕs make up predisposing it to success or failure.  
 
5.4 Findings from the 2012 Data Collection 
 
The 2012 data collection builds on the 2005 survey data by exploring the context and 
impact of local arrangements and organisational characteristics on Trust 
performance independently assessed through national programmes.  Tables 5.3 and 
5.4 detail the empirical results on collective Trust performance against regulatory 
standards (published by Monitor and the CQC) and clinical negligence claims data 
(published by NHS LA). 
 
Using the combined evidence base provided by the 2005 and 2012 data collections, 
analysis has then been undertaken to investigate if any relationship exists between 
organisational factors (including policies and processes) and the performance of 
organisations.   
 
This line of enquiry has been identified through learning from other high risk 
organisations (Gamble 2013) where factors such as operational and financial 
performance are prioritised over the management of risk.  This prioritisation along 
with over standardisation of processes and procedures have been diagnosed as 
introducing vulnerability to the system.  In addition to being a source of vulnerability 
(Hollnagel et al 2006) there is the also the concept that the adoption of standard 
operating frameworks assists in building reliability and resilience into activities 
delivering higher quality and stronger performance.  For the purposes of this 
research, the analysis will examine the relationship between variables and determine 
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the extent of their influence on performance in assisting and enhancing performance 
or potentially limiting it.   
 
5.4.1. Organisational Characteristics & Systems 
 
The scope of organisational factors and context considers the size of the Trust 
(number of employees and financial turnover), number of locations, executive 
leadership and risk assessment criteria.  The relationship between a number of 
variables has been explored to determine if individual or collective organisational 
characteritics can be used to inform the risk management arrangements of Trusts as 
well as the relaionship between certain organisational factors and other variables 
aligned to claims management and regulatory performance. 
 
¥ Size of the Trust 
The data collection has identified a number of variables that could be used as an 
indicator of the size of the Trust.  To establish the robustness of the variables and to 
identify a potential proxy that can be consistently used in the analysis two variables 
have been considered; the total number of employees in a Trust and the annual 
financial turnover of the Trust (£million).  The data on the number of employees was 
collected as part of the 2005 survey of Trusts hence analysis of employee data was 
limited to respondent Trusts.  Trusts were requested to provide data in bandings of 
employees (up to 1000, up to 2000, up to 2500, up to 4000 and up to 6000).   Data 
on the annual financial turnover of Trusts was taken from the NHS Directory and 
based on annual submissions made by individual Trusts and represented all 260 
Trusts in the sample not just the 156 respondents. 
 
The two data sources were collated and ranked.  SpearmanÕs ranked correlation was 
applied and a correlation coefficient of 0.86 calculated.  This result indicates a 
positive relationship and strong correlation between the two variables of size Ð the 
total number of employees and the annual financial turnover. The correlation is 
significant with a calculated p value of p<0.01.  The strong, positive correlation 
between the two variables allow for either the total number of employees or the 
annual financial turnover to be used as valid indicators of size.  For further analysis 




Figure 5.1: Relationship between two variables Òthe total number of employeesÓ and the    
      Òannual financial turnoverÓ of the Trust.  
 
¥ System Characteristics 
In section 5.3 I examined the existence of key risk documents as part of risk 
management arrangements in NHS Trusts.  The existence of a documented risk 
strategy and a documented risk assessment process as required by a range of 
national initiatives and programmes provided a strong positive finding with only two 
Trusts responding to each question negatively.   The strength of this finding alone 
provided little insight into the influence and impact that this has on performance.  A 
focussed review on the negative responses also failed to provide any additional 
insight on the impact of the absence of the strategy and risk assessment documents 
on a TrustÕs performance.  Further evaluation and qualitative analysis of the sample 
of risk management strategies provided by the respondents identified common 
themes between the strategies.  Due to the voluntary nature of providing the 
strategies the sample size (29 Trusts) was too small to confirm the impact on 
performance however the themes and key findings from the literature review suggest 
that the content of Risk Management Strategies is strongly influenced and aligned to 
the requirements of national initiatives and programmes rather than being focussed 
and flexed to enhancing local performance.  However the detail provided across the 
154 respondents on the content of risk assessment process did permit further 
analysis.  The results of tis analysis is described later in this chapter. 
 
¥ Risk Assessment Criteria & Trust Size 
In table 5.7 I looked at and identified the criteria most and least likely to be 
considered and included as part of a risk assessment.   To understand this context of 
the criteria further and possible influencing factors analysis was completed to 
determine if there was any correlation between the size of the Trust and the number 
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of criteria commonly considered as part of a risk assessment.  Using a ranked 
correlation a correlation coefficient of 0.08 was calculating confirming that there is no 
correlation between the size of the Trust and the number of criteria included in the 
risk assessment process.  Trusts with the highest annual financial turnover were 
found to consider all 16 criteria whilst at the same time there were examples of 
Trusts with substantially lower turnovers that considered all 16 risk assessment 
criteria.  It was observed that between 5 and 8 criteria were commonly considered by 
Trusts irrespective of size. This compliments the findings in table 5.7 that indicated 
that over 85% of respondents considered a selected 8 criteria or less in the risk 
assessment process. 
 
¥ Risk Assessment Criteria and Regulatory Performance 
In the correlation analysis described in the previous paragraph we confirmed that 
there was no relationship between the number of risk assessment criteria identified 
as part of the risk assessment process and the size of the Trust (£million turnover) 
however as shown by table 5.7, there is a clear preference for the criteria that Trusts 
use as part of a risk assessment and therefore a reasonable question to ask about 
the relationship between the risk assessment criteria and performance.  The impact 
of the number of risk assessment criteria selected and the TrustÕs regulatory 
performance was investigated.  Correlation analysis was initially completed to 
determine if a relationship exists, further analysis would be applied if a positive 
correlation was identified.   
 
A correlation coefficient of 0.06 was calculated for the Òtotal number of criteria 
included in a risk assessmentÓ (dependent variable) and the Òtotal number of 
regulatory breaches and judgements of non complianceÓ (independent variable).  












Figure 5.2:  ÒTotal number of criteria included in a risk assessmentÓ versus the Ònumber of  
       breaches in authorisation and / or judgements of non complianceÓ in all NHS  
                   Trusts. 
 
 
A correlation coefficient of 0.06 is positive however it is not sufficiently strong with a p 
value more than 0.05 (p>0.05) to identify a causal relationship.  The analysis was 
repeated for Foundation Trusts to determine if this could be an influencing factor on 
Trust performance.  A similar pattern was identified with a correlation coefficient of 
0.05 for this group of Trusts and a p value of more than 0.05 which again is not 
significant.  In spite of the statistical insignificance of these results, the findings add 
further insight to the emerging picture and suggestion that the content of documented 
processes such as risk management strategies and risk assessment processes need 
to be driven by and be sensitive to other factors reflecting local business needs that 
support and work towards strong safety performance.    
 
Cagliano et al (2011) highlighted the influence that national policy has on shaping 
local policies to an extent that the pursuit of the national agenda overshadows local 
needs.  Whilst such policy is often designed and implemented to deliver identified 
benefits there are notable disadvantages that may be indirectly realised for example 
the fatigue of organisations and systems through continued assessment against 
checklist and external requirements (Ginsburg et al 2004).  In spite of this there are a 
number of common elements that constitute core requirements of a risk management 
system and process irrespective of the industry, sector or source of risk (Flin et al 
2000).  This core set of requirements and the potential basis of a model are reflected 
in the findings presented in table 5.7 and include hazard identification, control 
measures and the assessment of significance.   
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However the content of the systems is not the only factor that has the potential to 
influence, positively or negatively, the risk and safety performance of organisations.  
The following section looks at the influence of variables inherent in the make up 
organisations and the role that these may or may not play in pre determining, 
enhancing or acting as a barrier to risk management.  The significance of these 
factors such as size based on financial turnover or geography is unknown although 
as the literature (Mick at al 1994) as well as anecdotal feedback has suggested that 
larger organisations have found their size to potentially act as a constraint to the 
achievement of required standards and performance.   
 
¥ Number of Claims and the Size of the Trust  
The number of claims paid under the NHSLA scheme have been used as an 
alternative indicator of performance against which organisational factors and 
characteristics can be tested.  Two variables were analysed, Òthe total number of 
claims paid by Trust by the NHSLAÓ (aggregate of claims 2005/06 Ð 2011/12 Ð 
independent variable) and Òthe size of the TrustÓ (based on financial turnover £ 
million Ð dependent variable).  Due to the data sources used ie nationally published 
data, it was possible to include all NHS Trusts in the analysis and not only the 
respondent Trusts.  The information is presented in figures 5.3a and 5.3b.  The data 
was separated into two groups to reflect Foundation and non Foundation Trusts.  For 
each set of data the data was ranked using SpearmanÕs ranking and a correlation 
coefficient calculated.  The aim of the approach was to determine if there was 
correlation and the significance of this in terms of establishing a relationship between 
the size of the Trust and the number of claims paid.  A SpearmanÕs ranked 
correlation of 0.71 was calculated for non Foundation Trusts identifying a strong, 
positive correlation between Trust size and the number of claims paid.  The result is 
significant with p < 0.05 indicating the larger the Trust the higher the number of 
claims paid under the NHSLA scheme.  As figure 5.3a shows and as indicated by a 
strong but not absolute correlation there are smaller Trusts that do record a high 
number of claims paid.  These exceptions tend to represent acute organisations 
providing specialist services focussed on a single core activity or service for example 






Figure 5.3a: Calculated Correlation between the variables Òthe total number of claims paid by 
        Trust by the NHSLAÓ and Òthe financial turnover of the Trust (based on financial 
        turnover £ million)Ò in non Foundation Trusts 
 
 
The analysis was repeated for Foundation Trusts only (Figure 5.3b).  The results 
replicated the findings of non Foundation Trusts with the identification of a positive 
relationship demonstrated by a correlation coefficient of 0.61 which was a significant 
result with a p value of less than 0.05 (p<0.05) confirming that there is a strong 
relationship between the size of the Foundation Trust and the number of claims paid. 
 
Figure 5.3b: Calculated Correlation between the variables Òthe total number of claims paid by 
        Trust by the NHSLAÓ and Òthe financial turnover of the Trust (based on financial 
        turnover £ million)Ò in Foundation Trusts 
 
 
Based on the strong, positive correlation between the two variables (Òthe total 
number of claims paid by Trust by the NHSLAÓ and Òthe size of the TrustÓ (based on 
financial turnover £ million) the scatter plot indicates a linear pattern.  To understand 
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the significance of this pattern and the relationship between the two variables, 
regression analysis has been applied.  The decision to apply regression analysis is 
based on the strong positive correlation already identified (correlation coefficient = 
0.7) and the observed linear pattern on the scatter plot.   
 
The regression analysis has been approached in three stages in order to determine 
the significance of individual variables.  The first stage of the analysis considers the 
significance of the relationship between regulatory non compliance / claims ie an 
indicator that unintended standards of care or services have been delivered against 
the size of the Trust.  For future reference this will be referred to as Òadverse eventÓ 
data.  The use of the variables in this way aligns with a perception from practice and 
within the literature review that it is more difficult for larger Trusts defined either by 
turnover, locations or the complexity of services offered to achieve and deliver care 
that meets the requirements of the myriad of quality, safety and operational 
standards (Love et al 2008,). Figure 5.4a sets out the Òadverse eventÓ data against 
the financial turnover of all Trusts.  The trend line has been applied and confirms the 
linear pattern previously identified.  Application of regression analysis provides a 
calculated R value of 0.38.  This indicates a significant between Òadverse eventsÓ 
and the size of the Trust.   
 
Figure 5.4a: Stage 1 of the application of regression analysis to Òadverse eventÓ data    
        (incorporating the total number of claims paid and regulatory non compliance)  




However, the application of the trend line in figure 5.4b, has provided a further line of 
inquiry that raises a question in relation to the variables and if the significance of their 
contribution in equal.  The adverse event data was separated out to establish the 
independent data sources and variables of (1) the total number of claims paid under 
the NHSLA scheme and (2) identified regulatory non compliance.  The regression 
analysis was repeated for each data source alongside the variable of the size of the 
Trust.  The results of this analysis are displayed in figures 5.4b and 5.4c.  
 
Figure 5.4b shows the findings using financial turnover as the indicator of size did 
produce a stronger linear trend line with R²=0.49.  It is not a definitive indicator in 
predicting the number of claims paid although as the linear regression trend line 
shows a value of 0.49 it is sufficient to acknowledge that a relationship exists 
between the two variables.   Calculating a p value as an indicator of significance 
shows that the relationship of the variables Òannual financial turnoverÓ and Òthe total 
number of claimsÓ and Ònon compliance with the CQC Essential StandardsÓ is 
significant with p<0.05.   
 
Figure 5.4b: Stage 2 of the application of regression analysis to the total number of claims 
        paid (under NHSLA scheme) against the variable of Trust size (financial turnover 
        £ million). 
 
 
The analysis was repeated again for the second variable previously included in the 
Òadverse eventÓ data.  Figure 5.4c shows the final stage of the analysis application 
with the plotting of variables of regulatory non compliance and the size of the Trust.  
The trend line added to the scatter plot confirms that in spite of a previously 
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moderate positive correlation of 0.49, the relationship is not significant.  This confirms 
the previous findings in figure 5.4b that the linear relationship only exists between the 
number of claims paid and the size of the Trust.   
 
Figure 5.4c: Application of regression analysis to identified regulatory non compliance  
           against the variable of Trust size (financial turnover £ million) 
 
The findings have identified an emerging theme relating to the size of the Trust and 
its significance in influencing risk performance.  In reviewing the size of the Trust, two 
indicators were originally considered, the number of employees and financial 
turnover.  To further strengthen the understanding of this factor a third indicator of 
size has been considered largely prompted by the work of Mick et al (1994) on the 
geography of hospitals and the impact on performance. This third indicator of size 
exists from the data collected in the 2005 survey and relates to the number of 
locations in a Trust.  There are a number of limitations to the use of this data as a 
primary indicator of size not least due to the myriad of factors influencing the number 
of locations and the absence of a standardized profile for example an NHS location 
must have a certain number of employees, beds, income or turnover, activity or 
services.  In reality the variation exists as much within Trusts themselves as in the 
sector and across different types of Trusts.  Sites may also only act as hosts to 
services such as community services with the care or activity being delivered 
elsewhere such as in a patients home.  In spite of these limitations the relationship 
between the number of claims paid and the number of locations of a Trust was 
considered.   
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Initial analysis of the relationship between the number of claims paid and the number 
of locations in a Trust was undertaken.  The relationship identified was not a linear 
relationship hence logistic analysis was pursued.  Table 5.9 shows the application of 
Chi squared test to investigate the relationship between regulatory compliance and 
non compliance and the number of locations to all Trusts.  A p value of 0.33 was 
calculated which indicated that the relationship was not statistically significant 
(p>0.05). 
 
Table 5.9: Expected and Observed values of Trust Regulatory performance measured by 
       CQC compliance and the size of the Trust based on the number of locations.  
 




Trusts with 1 site 27 3 30 
Trusts with more than 1 site 86 18 104 
Total 113 21 134 
    




Trusts with 1 site 25.3 4.7 30 
Trusts with more than 1 site 87.7 16.3 104 
Total 113 21 134 
 
The analysis was repeated for Foundation Trusts only.  As an organisational 
characteristic it is important to determine if this is a factor that influences 
performance in any way.  Table 5.10 shows the observed and expected values for 
Foundation Trusts.  A p value of 0.26 was calculated.  This result reflects that already 
reported for all Trusts and again in not statistically significant (p>0.05), confirming 
that irrespective of Trust status there is no statistically significant relationship 
between the number of claims paid per Trust and the number of locations in the 
Trust. 
Table 5.10: Expected and Observed values of Foundation Trusts regulatory performance         
       measured by breaches in authorisation and the size of the Trust based on the 
       number of locations.  
Observed Values (FT only)  
Breach in 
authorisation 
No Breach in 
authorisation 
Total 
Trusts with 1 site 7 17 24 
Trusts with more than 1 site 10 46 56 
Total 17 63 80 
 
   
Expected Values (FT only)  
Breach in 
authorisation 
No Breach in 
authorisation 
Total 
Trusts with 1 site 5.1 18.9 24 
Trusts with more than 1 site 11.9 44.1 56 
Total 17 63 80 
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Although these findings relating to the size of the Trust and its impact on 
performance are not statistically significant, they are relevant in responding to the 
perception that the size of a Trust is a predetermining factor in the performance 
(quality, financial and operational) of a Trust.  Anecdotal evidence across the sector 
suggests it is more difficult for larger Trusts as either single site or multi site 
organisations to achieve the same standards and performance beyond risk 
management compared to that achieved by smaller Trusts.  The results and the 
relationship shown in figures 5.4 a-c and 5.5 shows that this is not the case. Whilst 
the size of a Trust remains a factor it is not a factor that can be used to predict and 
predetermine performance suggesting that other factors may and do have a role in 
how well a Trust performs in achieving and maintaining standards of quality and 
safety and overall operational success. 
 
¥ Claims Management Performance Ð a holistic view 
Having considered the relationship between claims and other variables linked to 
organisational characteristics, the results have also considered the claims 
performance of Trusts over a 6 year period.  The purpose of this focus is to identify 
any patterns either in claims reporting or in the Trusts reporting higher number of 
claims made and paid.  In order to identify the latter Trusts that met one or more of 
the following criteria were initially identified as outliers.  The criteria included the top 5 
highest number of reported claims, a number of claims double the national annual 
average and a frequency to the a high report number.  This data was anonymised to 
avoid any bias.  This focus has identified a number of Trusts who appear as frequent 
outliers ie they present with a higher number of claims compared with other Trusts in 
the sample.  These Trusts are represented in figures 5.6 a Ð f by the letters A to O.  
The reason for looking at the claims data in this way is to determine if there are any 
common organisational characteristics shared between Trusts with a high number of 
claims that could be investigated for their potential impact on risk performance.  Over 
the 6 year period, four Trusts were identified as having a total number of claims 
significantly higher claims made than the national average, a higher number of 
claims when compared with their peers and also at a frequency that occurred for 







Figure 5.6a: Total number of NHSLA claims presented by Trust in 2006/07 
 
Figure 5.6b: Total number of NHSLA claims presented by Trust in 2007/08 
 




Figure 5.6d: Total number of NHSLA claims presented by Trust in 2009/10 
 
 
Figure 5.6e: Total number of NHSLA claims presented by Trust in 2010/11 
 




Trust A consistently had a high number of claims made throughout the 6 year period 
and reported the highest number of claims made in four out of the six years.  This 
high number of claims aligns with the national trend of an increasing number of 
claims  over the period.  The three other Trusts reporting a similar pattern of high 
claims over the period are Trust C, Trust F and Trust K.  Trust F reported the second 
highest number of claims over the period with a high number of claims made in 5 out 
of the 6 years.  These Trusts share a number of common factors such as a smaller 
Trust, the range of services delivered, non Foundation Trusts, no previous conditions 
imposed at the time of registration under the HSCA 2008.  In addition to the 
similarities, the Trusts also share a history as Trusts that have struggled to achieve 
maintain and improve on operational, financial and quality performance.  There are 
also distinct differences in the Trusts with the absence of a shared geography, Trust 
A is city based whilst Trust F is in a coastal location; the neighbouring Trusts to Trust 
A are acknowledged as high performing organisations based on national indicators 
(DH 2011).  
 
The review of the data in this way suggests that other organisational factors other 
than the size of the Trust can influence the risk performance of an organisation.  This 
again confirms the role of multiple strategic and operational drivers of risk 
management as introduced in section 3.1 of the concept analysis chapter. 
 
¥ Claims Management Ð the financial value of claims 
Having established a relationship exists between the size of the Trust and the 
number of claims paid, the next stage of investigation and analysis seeks to 
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investigate the validity of the performance measure of the number of claims paid 
used in figures 5.3 a and b as well as the relationship that exists between the number 
of claims paid and the value.  This second point seeks to understand if a similar 
relationship exists between the higher number of claims in smaller Trusts due to the 
specialist nature of services and hence if claims are low in volume but high in value.  
 
Initial analysis sought to determine if a relationship existed between the number of 
claims and the value of the claims.  The data for 2011/12 was selected as the last 
published data set for claims made and paid under the NHSLA scheme in 2012.  
Data was used from 209 Trusts that could be mapped against the original sample of 
260 Trusts.  The difference in numbers is explained by changes in organisations over 
the period including Trust mergers and non reported information suggesting that an 
alternative scheme to that offered by NHSLA had been adopted by some Trusts.  
Figure 5.6a plots the correlation of two variables, firstly Òthe total value of the claimsÓ 
(dependent variable) and a second variable of Òthe total number of claims paidÓ 
(independent variable).  The correlation coefficient was calculated at 0.03.  The result 
confirms a positive relationship however the very low value combined with a 
calculated p value greater than 0.1 (p >0.1) confirms the correlation and relationship 
is not significant.  These results confirm that there is no direct correlation or 
significance between the total number of claims and the total value of claims paid.  
One possible factor in this is the high value attached to some individual claims.  This 
reflects the inherent risks associated with key service types such as specialist 
surgery and novel treatments.   
 
Figure 5.6a: Calculated correlation between two variables Òthe total value of claims paid in 
         2011/12Ó and Òthe total number of claims paid in 2011/12Ó  in all NHS Trusts    






































A further review of the number of claims paid and their value provides further insight 
into claims management and the risk behaviour of organisations.  The scatterplot in 
figure 5.6b shows clustering in the total number of claims paid that depicts a theme 
of a high volume of low value claims under the NHSLA insurance scheme.  The 
number of claims that a Trust receives has already been identified as being 
influenced by a number of factors some of which are within but also beyond the 
organisationÕs control.  A potential influencing factor here relates to culture and 
organisational behaviour in setting a risk appetite around the level of risk that can be 
tolerated, accepted and defended in terms of evidence of systems (Sikka et al 2015). 
 
Figure 5.6b: Calculated correlation between two variables Òthe total value of claims paid in 
         2011/12Ó and Òthe total number of claims paid in 2011/12Ó in all NHS Trusts     






































¥ Claims Management Reporting Patterns across Strategic Health 
Authorities 
Looking at national patterns of claims reporting and payment, consideration was 
given to the potential for regional variations from the Trusts; variation between Trusts 
and regional reporting was identified in the responses to the 2005 survey.  To 
determine the significance of the claims data it is important to consider its context 
and also any regional or national variations either in trends or practice. Figure 5.7 
shows a year on year increase between 2008/09 and 2011/12 in the number of 
claims received by the NHSLA.  To note, the number of total number of Trusts has 










Figure 5.7: CNST claims reported to the NHSLA between 2008/09 and 2011/12 
 
 
At a regional level, represented by Strategic Health Authorities, the reporting trend is 
again reflective of the national picture of year on year increases, with the highest 
proportional increases (2000 claims) between 2009/10 and 2010/11.  It is important 
to note that over the same period the total number of Trusts remained constant with 
variations limited to no more than a +/- variance of 2 (Trusts) across the regions.   
 
Noticeable in figure 5.7a and highlighted 5.7b are stepped changes in the number of 
reported claims.  The step is marked on both occasions suggesting events. 
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In order to determine if claims management and reporting practices are consistent 
across regions, the number of claims per Strategic Health Authority have been 
examined as an average across the number of Trusts in the SHA.  Figure 5.8 
provides details of the average number of claims made by Trust by former Strategic 
Health Authority.   
 
Figure 5.8:  Average number of CNST claims made per Trust grouped by former Strategic 




The claims data presented in figure 5.8 shows variation in the activity of claims made 
and paid.  An average number of the claims made per Trust (unit) has been 
calculated across each of the SHA regions to support cross region comparison.  It is 
evident from the claims data that there is variation across the SHAs.  Yorkshire and 
Humberside and East Midlands consistently report a higher average number of 
claims proportion of claims in the region over the four year period whereas East of 
England, South Central and the South West have consistently reported a lower 
number of claims being made.   
 
An explanation to this variation needs to consider the influence of factors beyond the 
reporting of adverse events as indicators and drivers of risk management 
performance.  As discussed in chapter 3 there are a number of strategic and 
operational factors influencing risk management arrangements and practice for 
example national policy, leadership, culture and performance management.  Carroll 
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& Rudolph (2006) highlight the importance of these factors in contributing to the 
design of high reliability healthcare organisations.  By extension these factors can 
also be applied to the effectiveness of systems to manage adverse events.  Hickson 
et al (2007) highlighted the existence of regional variation in the management of 
medical malpractice. 
 
¥ Application of Further Analysis to the Impact of Organisational 
Characteristics to the risk performance of NHS Trusts. 
 
The findings so far have considered the role that organisational characteristics have 
to play as predictors in performance.  During the course of the results chapter and 
analysis I have considered the status of foundation and non foundation Trusts as a 
an organisational characteristic that has the potential to influence performance.  A 
Department of Health policy commitment reported that all NHS Trusts in England 
would need to achieve Foundation Trust status by 31 March 2015.  Oversight of the 
authorisation of a Trust to Foundation Trust status would be provided by Monitor with 
the achievement of FT status representing the achievement of standards rewarded 
by operational autonomy within defined limits in relation to financial and operational 
performance.  As an organisational characteristic the significance of FT status and its 
impact on risk performance has been tested. In order to investigate if the 
performance of Foundation Trusts as a precursor to higher performance in the safety 
and quality of services a Chi Squared test has been applied to Foundation Trusts 
authorised up to 2012 and non Foundation Trusts. 
 
Tables 5.11 and 5.12 show the observed and expected values for Foundation and 
non Foundation Trusts and their respective regulatory performance.  For Foundation 
Trusts this performance includes the variables of compliance with the CQCÕs 
Essential Standards Trusts and the variable identified breach of authorisation and not 
in breach of authorisation under MonitorÕs Compliance Framework.  
 
Table 5.11: Expected and Observed values of Foundation Trusts in breach of authorisation 
       and their corresponding regulatory performance under the CQCÕs Essential    
       Standards. 
 
Observed values (FTs only) 
Outcome 16 
Compliance 
Outcome 16 Non 
compliance 
Total 
Breach in authorisation 14 4 18 
No Breach in authorisation 93 1 94 
Total 107 5 112 
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Expected values (FTs only) 
Outcome 16 
Compliance 
Outcome 16 Non 
compliance 
Total 
Breach in authorisation 17.2 0.8 18 
No Breach in authorisation 89.9 4.1 94 
Total 107 5 112 
 
 
Using table 5.11, a Chi Squared value was calculated at 0.000065 and using a 99% 
confidence interval, the p value was calculated at less than 0.05 (p<0.01) and 
therefore was statistically significant.  This means that a TrustÕs Foundation Trust 
(FT) status does predispose it to the delivery of services of a higher quality or to a 
standard judged as being more likely to meet regulatory standards.    
 
The chi squared test was repeated for non Foundation Trusts (Table 5.12) using the 
variables of compliance with CQCÕs Essential Standards (Outcomes 4 and 16) and 
non compliance with CQCÕs Essential Standards (Outcomes 4 and 16).  The 
application of the chi squared statistical test identified a similar result to that 
calculated for Foundation Trusts ie a relationship exists between compliance and non 
compliance between the two outcomes.  The significance of this relationship however 
was not as strong as the relationship that exists in Foundation Trusts and compliance 
and breach in authorisation.  A p value of 0.046 was calculated which was 
considered significant at a 95% confidence (p<0.05).  
 
Table 5.12: Expected and Observed values of non Foundation Trusts and their corresponding 
       regulatory performance under the CQCÕs Essential Standards (Outcomes 4 and 








Compliant Outcome 4 216 10 226 
Non Compliant Outcome 4 20 12 32 
Total 236 22 258 







Compliant Outcome 4 206.7 19.3 226 
Non Compliant Outcome 4 29.3 2.7 32 
Total 236 22 258 
 
 
In the context of operational delivery at a Trust level this means that if a Trust is 
assessed as non compliant in one outcome there is a strong possibility that a similar 
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level of performance can be expected in the other outcome.  Outcome 4 sets the 
standards for the delivery of care and the welfare of patients incorporating safety and 
quality within the expectations of all aspects of service delivery.  Outcome 16 sets 
out the expectations for monitoring and oversight of care delivery incorporating 
aspects of required governance arrangements, incident reporting and culture aspects 
such as learning.  The practical relationship between the two standards is undeniable 
with one outcome (outcome 4) setting the standards for operational delivery and the 
other outcome (outcome 16) providing the arrangements for ensuring that the 
standards are delivered and improvements made through a culture of learning and 
changes triggered through adverse event reporting.   
 
This finding and relationship aligns with a core component of risk management 
models implemented within high risk industries.  A stage in the process that 
ÒmonitorsÓ and ÒreviewsÓ if the preceding steps of risk identification, assessment and 
implementation of controls have been effective (HSE 1996).  This function is a 
notable gap in the core criteria and processes used by NHS Trusts to manage risks 
as highlighted in tables 5.6a-c and table 5.7.  The significance and value of a step in 
the process that monitors and reviews the effectiveness of the preceding steps is 
widely recognised.  The value is multi factorial incorporating elements of 
understanding of harm incurred when care is not delivered as intended (Reason 
1990, Vincent et al 2000), barriers to achieving intended performance (Lawton & 
Parker 2002) and the benefit of specific features of safety practice and interventions 
(Taylor et al 2011).  At a strategic level the function of monitoring and review is a 
common feature of risk management models often aligning with a broader cultural 
commitment to continual improvement (AS/NZ standards 1999) continuation of the  
quest to for optimum reliability and resilience through the design of systems and 
processes (Carroll & Rudolph 2006, Hollnagel & Woods 2016, Gamble 2013) as well 
as the ongoing maintenance of safety standards (Vincent et al 2014).  
 
Vincent et al (2014) identify the importance of measurement and monitoring in 
healthcare.  As we are aware from the work already presented the focus and 
prioritisation of measurement has been driven through the significance applied to 
performance (delivery and reporting) within NHS Trusts.  The value of a monitoring 
function will only be realised if it is accompanied by shifts in national policy to embed 
risk management as a function and as a pre requisite of high performance, there is a 
culture commitment to that is open to using proactively the results of monitoring to 
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improve operational delivery and overall performance and the function importantly 
exists as a real entity and not as a characteristic of a checklist.  
 
5.5 Summary of Collective Findings 
 
The combined analysis of the 2005 and 2012 results has provided an insight to risk 
management arrangements in NHS Trusts and the performance of these 
organisations based on the outcomes of independent regulation and nationally 
compiled clinical negligence claims data.  The findings when summarised provide the 
following headlines: 
¥ The risk management performance of Trust is influenced by a number of 
factors consistent with the findings of the literature review and the drivers 
identified under the concept analysis however the significance of individual 
factors such as culture and leadership was not definitive. 
¥ On investigation it was possible to define if a relationship exists between 
certain organisational characteristics such as the size of a Trust, the status of 
the Trust and other operational factors such as Executive responsibility for 
risk management the significance of factors varied. 
¥ The relationship between Foundation Trusts in breach of authorisation and 
non compliant performance under the Essential Standards was assessed as 
statistically significant.  A similar relationship was identified in non Foundation 
Trusts relating to non compliance in different outcomes of the CQCÕs 
Essential Standards.  Whilst the statistical significance was not quite as 
strong this does confirm a pattern of performance in Trusts where non 
compliance or breaches predispose the organisation to non compliant 
performance in other areas. 
¥ Anecdotal evidence has suggested that it is more difficult for larger Trusts to 
achieve and maintain standards of care as defined by nationally set 
requirements.  The analysis undertaken confirmed that size if not a definitive 
factor in determining a TrustÕs performance (regulatory or claims 
management).  This trend continued through the testing of three different 
indicators of size the most relevant to influencing performance is possibly the 
number of locations.  This relationship was again found to not be statistically 
significant in either Foundation or non Foundation Trusts. 
¥ Adopting a focus on NHSLA claims to identify any common characteristics 
across Trusts with high rates of Claims paid identified the absence of 
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common criteria preventing the development of a profile although did identify 
a relatively small group of Trusts (15 out of 260) that consistently reported the 
highest number of claims on more than one occasion over a 6 year period.   
 
 
These findings start to challenge and cast doubt on the assumptions of higher rates 
of compliance and higher standards in the quality of care are found in Foundation 
Trusts due to their FT status and authorisation and smaller Trusts.  As a national, 
political initiative it is further evidence that supports the emerging pattern that 
systems, policies and processes are designed to meet rhetoric, national targets and 
other initiatives compared with enhancing the quality and safety of the services and 
care experienced and delivered.  When compared to the drivers in other high risk 
organisation such a model could be described in the context of HollnagelÕs model of 
diagnosing vulnerable systems syndrome (Hollnagel & Woods 2006).   
 
Hollnagel & Woods (2006) and Reason et al (2001) flagged the pursuit of 
performance targets and prioritising their achievement over the quality of the product 
as introducing vulnerability to an organisationÕs performance.  The pursuit of 
Foundation Trust status and authorisation by organisations has been identified as 
potentially contributing to serious failures in the quality and safety of care provided in 
individual Trusts (Francis 2012, Kirkup 2015).  Whilst the conceived benefits support 
the delivery of high quality and successful risk performance as seen in high risk 
organisations (Gamble 2013), the reality has witnessed the display of traits aligned to 
vulnerability and risk ie the pursuit of targets, over standardisation of procedures and 
a focus on delivering to a national agenda divorced from local needs. 
 
In conclusion the results and the findings of the subsequent analysis have provided 
sufficient insight to risk management as a function in the NHS to provide a summary 
of what is in place: 
 
National policy Ð a defined national programme establishing central policy and 
prescribed standards for healthcare organisations to implement and adopt.  The 
standards are cross cutting of service types as well as oversight bodies although 
interdependencies are not fully integrated.   
 
Documented Systems and processes Ð risk management arrangements are 
supported through documented processes promoting a concept of standardised 
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practices to identify risks, assess the significance and implement mitigating actions. 
Documentation reviewed included the Trust Risk Management Strategy and content 
and criteria considered as part of the Risk Assessment process.   The documentation 
was reflective of the prescription from central policy and with implementation 
adopting a checklist approach for inclusion.  The limited consideration given to 
operational application of the policies and overall purpose of the process was evident 
in the core criteria most likely to be considered (hazard identification, assessment of 
risk and control measures) and least likely to be part of the process (identification of 
secondary factors, risk improvement targets, emergency preparedness, 
communication and assessment of tolerability) 
 
Roles and responsibilities Ð leadership to the risk management function is 
recognised as an important factor in ensuring risk is embedded in the delivery of an 
organisationÕs activities.  Executive leadership has been well documented with 
consistency across Trusts in the nomination of the Chief Nurse as the Executive lead 
for risk.  This leadership role is frequently one of many functions and corporate 
responsibilities held by the nominated lead.    
 
Performance Ð the measurement and monitoring of risk performance through safety, 
quality or other measures is not prominent in the TrustÕs risk management 
arrangements.  It was evident that there is an established culture of performance 
reporting for operational and financial risks such as Referral to Treatment Times 
(RTT) or financial overspend, with a premise of judgement and consequences rather 
than improvement.  Risk reporting and in particular improvement targets were less 
likely to be considered as criteria of a risk assessment.  In spite of this the benefits of 
a performance improvement programmes related to healthcare risk have proved to 
be positive in enhancing patient experience, supporting changes in practice and 
reducing risk.  A myth buster identified within identified arrangements in terms of 
performance was the impact of organisational characteristics such as size, 
geography and financial turnover as predictors of safety performance. 
 
This final stage of analysis completes the findings and insight offered through the 










The focus of the research has been developing an understanding of risk 
management as a function in the NHS.  This focus has provided an informed view 
that establishes a baseline of risk management arrangements in place in NHS Trusts 
and the role that these factors have on influencing, positively or negatively, 
organisational performance.  The research and data collection has also considered if 
certain characteristics of a Trust predispose the organisation to either additional risk 
or a certain level of performance.  The collective insight delivered through this work 
has supported a number of observations to be made with varying degrees of 
confidence, from definitive viewpoints to emerging themes requiring further 
investigation. 
 
In chapter 1 I set out a number of questions underpinned by more detailed aims, 
which I was seeking to answer through the research approach and findings.  In 
chapter 2, the literature review looked at risk management practices in healthcare as 
well as in other high risk industries to understand the work that has already been 
undertaken and the opportunities for learning from other sectors.  This work informed 
chapter 3 and the concept analysis that proposed the existence of multiple drivers at 
a strategic and operational level that impact on the way risk is managed in healthcare 
and specifically in the NHS.  This wealth of background information had already 
identified some potential themes that would be tested through the methodology 
described in chapter 4 and the findings presented in chapter 5 along with a view on 
the significance of factors and relationships.  
 
In this chapter I will be bringing together the information and insight gained from the 
preceding chapters and using this combined intelligence to discuss the questions 
that have driven this research previously set out in chapters 1 and 4. 
 
¥ Does risk management exist as a function in the NHS and what does this look 
like? 
¥ Is it possible to measure the success of the systems and if so how 




In discussing the possible and actual responses to these questions, drawing on the 
contextual learning from the wider healthcare sector, risk management practices in 
industry and the performance of high risk organisations I will be sharing some 
additional potential lines of enquiry that have been identified and may benefit from 
further investigation. 
 
6.2 Does risk management exist as a function in the NHS and what does this     
      look like? 
      Objective 1: To identify common elements of risk assessment and risk management    
                           systems in use across the NHS 
      Objective 2: To investigate the existence of a divide in the approaches and management  
                          of risk in NS Trust 
 
Risk management as a function exists in the provision of healthcare and is evident in 
NHS Trusts in England.  This statement is supported by the findings presented in 
chapter 5 that confirm the existence of systems, policies and processes, identifies a 
number of common and characteristics of how risk management works and starts to 
suggest how risk management is used within the organisation.   
 
Over the last 30 years there have been a number of examples of risk practices 
(identification, management and monitoring) being introduced to clinical practice and 
the delivery of care to patients (Karsh et al 2006).  The results of the survey of 260 
NHS Trusts confirmed that the function of risk management is recognised by NHS 
Trusts.  This was demonstrated by the confirmed existence of policies, systems and 
processes as well as specific arrangements and responsibilities for the management 
of risk.  What was evident from the information collated is that the description of the 
function, the role of the function and what drives it differs from that seen and 
operated in other high risk industries (Carroll & Rudolph 2006) such as corporate 
context, culture  and a commitment to improve.  This difference and the influence of 
key drivers are discussed further in the following paragraphs. 
 
6.2.1 The Influence of National and Central Policy 
National programmes and policy that promote risk management provide a clear 
demonstration and represent a commitment to the function and its adoption.  The 
policy position on risk management for the NHS is largely prescriptive and promotes 
a myriad of standards, requirements and best practice published from within the NHS 
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as well as by regulatory and oversight bodies (The Care Act 2015).  In addition these 
requirements have also been informed by experience and a series of high profile, 
catastrophic and isolated cases (Ritchie 1999, Francis 2013, Kirkup 2015) not least 
reinforced by a common theme that harm incurred whilst delivering care is largely 
avoidable (IHI 2000).  Avoidability assumes a level of integration of systems, risks 
and a complex environment working together.  The practical experience is different 
and results in an approach full of complexity and interdependencies which are 
delivered with varying degrees of success and results in fragmentation being evident 
between systems that manage different types of risk such as operational, clinical and 
financial. 
 
Risk management arrangements in both high risk and high reliability organisations 
are visibly integrated within core business activities and represent a way of working 
(Carthey et al 2001) that sets out what is required, how it should be done and why it 
is relevant.  Such an approach actively manages the risks of over standardisation of 
processes, the lack of sensitivity to local conditions and feedback from operations, 
and a culture of learning to support continual improvement (Carroll & Rudolph 2006).  
As has been evident from the literature review these risks can present and introduce 
vulnerability to an organisation in particular if combined with the pursuit of targets 
such as operational delivery and financial performance (Cagliano et al 2011).   
 
The development of national initiatives and central policy appear to have ignored 
these warnings and introduced frameworks and a culture of prescribed practice and 
action.  This has contributed to the disabling of local needs and requirements being 
reflected in the approach as Trusts perceive any alternative approach to that 
proposed as unacceptable. Whilst this may not have been the intended impact it is 
the unintended consequence of a standardised approach.  The influence of local 
conditions and requirements in healthcare should not be underestimated and 
represents a stark contrast to other high risk industries.  Unlike in aviation where 
there is a high level of similarity between aircraft irrespective of the external 
branding, there is no ÒstandardÓ acute hospital.  The absence of a standard setting or 
product means that the need to consider local operating conditions and the impact of 
local factors is increased.  As Belascu & Horobet (2011) note, risk management 
needs to be developed beyond a rules based approach and reflect local elements of 
an organisation.  The contrast in activities between high risk industries limits the 
direct translation of safety practice from aviation and limits the effectiveness of 
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standardisation however does allow for principles of risk management and safety 
practice to be shared (Hudson 2003) 
 
The standardization of a function across an industry with an estimated annual 
operating budget in excess of £116 billion (NHS England 2016) aims to deliver 
consistency not only from the providersÕ perspective but also from the perspective of 
patients and the public.  The function needs to set not only the ÒhowÓ but also the 
ÒwhyÓ.  The IHI through its trilogy of publications in the early 2000s (IHI 2000, 2001, 
2004) balanced the impact of a central, national directive and local delivery through 
the focus on the intended outcomes.  This approached avoided a checklist approach 
that confirms that a strategy document exists or that mandatory training has been 
completed however does not address or evaluate if it has delivered the intended 
outcome or impact.  Instead the approach focuses on deliverables either through a 
quantified target or a supporting rationale including an outcome such as the value of 
a task, activity or step in a process.  Cagilano et al (2011) recognise the benefits of 
this prescriptive approach as key part of a programme of delivery.  Across the 
literature either through the lensÕ of high reliability organisations, the development of 
resilience within systems to cope with normal and abnormal conditions or in the 
identification and / or establishment of vulnerability within operational practices of 
systems, functions and activities driven by prescription, performance targets etc, can 
by default introduce additional risks to the process rather than their intended purpose 
of mitigation and strengthening the safety of the environment.  
 
6.2.2 Documented processes 
The confirmed existence of a risk management strategy and risk assessment was 
overwhelmingly positive with only three responding Trusts providing a negative 
response.  It is possible that this result is indicative of the impact of national policy 
that relies on documentation, such as strategies, risk assessment processes and 
arrangements to demonstrate the existence of a function and its effectiveness.  The 
need for a documented risk assessment process is yet another requirement which 
has been supplemented by a preferred tool again promoted via national policy (DH 
2000). 
 
The extent to which national prescription is replicated in practice was evident in the 
arrangements identified at a Trust level.  The similarities between individual Trust 
strategies that were geographically dispersed, delivered different services in 
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incomparable operating environments were undeniable.  As described in tables 5.6 
a,b,c, there were a number of common headlines from the Risk Strategies that were 
provided by respondent Trusts.  The documents as presented were similar not only 
in content but also in the presentation giving a sense that the documents had been 
constructed using a template or proforma that acted as a checklist of contents and 
structure.  This observation aligns with the emphasis that Trusts apportion to meeting 
external requirements and standards irrespective of the local context or impact.  
Whilst some healthcare organisations have viewed the role of regulation as a burden 
(Nieva & Sorra 2003), other negative implications have included the pursuit of certain 
performance levels irrespective of cost or additional risk and a culture that does not 
embrace reliability and resilience (Love at al 2008) 
 
As the content of risk management documentation is reviewed the results extend the 
insight to the impact that prescription has on the function as it moves from national to 
a Trust level.  The prescription through national models of thinking, delivery and 
standards does have an impact on implementation with possible constraints 
including:  
¥ Agreement of a single and meaningful definition of risk (Reason 1990) 
¥ Flexing arrangements to local risks and conditions (Eastaugh 2000) 
¥ Interface of risk policies with other risk, organisational and corporate 
structures (Alexander et al 2006) 
¥ Local ownership and leadership of risk that provides clarity of the local risk 
appetite and establishes a positive Trust safety culture (Kentel & Aral 2007) 
¥ Effective team working (Barrett et al 2009) 
 
This finding and the insight supported by subsequent analysis of the national data 
sets is further evidence of the significance of central policy and political initiatives on 
risk, its arrangements and the priority given to different types of risk Ð safety, 
operational or financial. 
 
Whilst high risk organisations are characterised by the need to standardise, an 
awareness and flex to local conditions and needs is equally important (Latino 2009).  
This absence of local flex and awareness of local conditions is again reflective in the 
risk assessment process and the criteria considered.  The dominance of a framework 
and tool previously promoted through the Department of Health initiative Controls 
Assurance (DH 2001) continues to be prevalent although lacks the local flex of 
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context, local conditions and secondary risk factors that may capture elements such 
as culture, pressure achieve certain targets or cooperating constraints such as staff 
shortages and financial deficits; all of which are risks continually challenging the 
NHS.   
 
6.2.3 Culture 
ÒCultureÓ is a phrase that has been commonly referenced in the description of 
successful safety performance in high risk industries.  Attributes commonly 
associated within a safety culture relate to systems, behaviours, environments and 
leadership.  Critically a take away message from the literature reviewed relates to 
doing the right thing not just in the task but also about when systems are not working.  
Ginsburg et al (2014) reflected on the culture in healthcare as seen through one of 
the many safety culture assessments promoted.  The perception of a ticked checklist 
is again evident with culture being reflected through assessments rather than 
actions, changes to behaviours or the leadership that sets risk management as a 
priority. 
 
As identified in other high risk industries (BP US Refineries Independent Safety 
Review Panel 2007) and a theme that has emerged as a possible explanation to risk 
performance during this research is that of culture and leadership.  Individual NHS 
Trusts are staffed and led by local teams that may reflect regional demographics and 
provide a local dynamic to the delivery of services.  Such dynamic may set the 
thresholds for the recruitment and retention of staff, reflect local values and 
behaviours as well as set the appetite for changes and improvements aligned with 
the management of risk.  The literature is explicit about the importance of individuals 
understanding what their role and responsibilities are in managing risk (Sausman 
2001).  
 
At a Trust level roles and responsibilities for core duties are well defined with risk 
being ÒeveryoneÕs responsibilityÓ.  Such a statement can equate to a lack of 
accountability and ownership with assumptions made that if it is everyone that takes 
responsibility.  The virtual checklist of national policy adopts this approach although 
does identify the importance of executive leadership.  In practice, this commitment is 
frequently fulfilled by the Chief Nurse as a responsibility within an often already 
overcommitted portfolio.  It is the absence of a dedicated role to risk management or 
an aligned discipline such as safety or quality which provides one of the most 
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significant indicators on the true commitment and priority that the function is given 
and its integration in to core business activities.  Functions such as operational 
delivery and financial performance in NHS Trusts have dedicated Board level posts 
(Monitor 2013) representing, leading  and reporting on the delivery of the function.  
This dedicated resource is potentially reflective of the priority given to the other 
functions through mandatory performance targets such as the Referral to Treatment 
Time (RTT) and financial balance and cost improvement programmes.   The absence 
of a dedicated role has been seen as promoting the function as cross cutting and 
part of all senior roles (DH 2004).  In practice the function and its purpose is 
potentially compromised as Òrisk managementÓ is an additional responsibility without 
a resource.    
 
It is not only the absence of a dedicated role where there is a gap in the 
organisational commitment to risk management.  Risk management in spite of 
national programmes encouraging integration remains a stand alone function with 
limited practical integration at a Trust level or in operational delivery.  Whilst some 
steps have been taken to reference risk  through other systems, the review of the risk 
management strategies confirmed the lack of alignment with other corporate 
programmes or the broader consideration of risk beyond the immediate issue being 
assessed.  Whilst this was the observation from a relatively small sample (8% of 
Trusts), it is another possible indication of the significance of national guidance as a 
driver to what risk management arrangements look like and their application at a 
local Trust level. 
 
The definition of roles and responsibilities is closely aligned to the findings defining 
culture and board commitment.  Leadership of risk and at the most senior level sets 
the expectations for risk and safety not only in terms of policy but also the expected 
levels of performance (Love et al 2008). 
 
6.2.4 Risk Management Models & Frameworks in the NHS 
The risk management model in use in the NHS consists of a number of principles 
seen in both high risk industries and in general risk management models.  The 
NPSAÕs publications Ò7 steps to patient safety (NPSA 2004) and the Circle of Safety 
(2006) reflect aspects of the HSEÕs HS(G) 65 model on successful safety 
management through a systematic approach that provides a feedback loop for 
continual improvement.  A notable gap in the model and supporting frameworks 
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adopted in the lack of integration of other types of risk or a co-ordination of 
programmes to ensure delivery to a common goal.   
 
This gap is made more relevant by the level of prescription from central policy which 
limits, whether intended or not, the inclusion of arrangements, dependencies and 
consideration of local risk priorities.  The adherence to central policy is also seen to 
limit deviance reflecting local conditions or taking into account the prevalence of 
individual organisational risks.  One possible reason for this is the national steer 
provided to risk management as a function and the arrangements.  The detail of 
policy or the method of implementation such as the NHSLA standards encourages 
the adoption of the arrangements and reproduction in local systems and processes.  
The risks associated with this prescription include a function that fails to operationally 
manage risk, a culture that is falsely assured that risk is being managed as 
completion of the strategic checklist is represented of the function and an operating 
context that has the potential to establish an environment in which risks, operational 
and strategic can flourish.   Overall the policy and strategic assessment of risk is 
responding to the questions that have been set rather than those that need to be 
asked.  This has been particularly evident in promotion of safety culture through 
culture assessments (Ginsburg et al 2014). 
 
Risk management  as a function in the NHS is heavily influenced by external factors, 
which are considered by some to burdensome, and a potential barrier to the delivery 
of safe, quality care.  External factors that influence the function, its existence, 
purpose and operational implementation include political rhetoric, individual high 
profile incidents and central initiatives.  The impact and extent to which this is 
considered as a burden and potential hindrance to successful safety importance is 
only truly acknowledged retrospectively following adverse incidents and the 
subsequent learning.  The recommendations from public inquiries following failings at 
Trusts including Mid Staffordshire Hospital (Francis 2012) and the University 
Hospitals of Morecambe Bay (Kirkup 2015) highlight the myriad of factors including 
the influence of external factors including policy, acceptance of risk and performance 
reporting as contributory factors when things go wrong.  The main risk for central 
policy to balance is ensuring the synergy between concept and the output of 
operational delivery with the intended benefits being realized.  
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Given the commitment of learning from adverse incidents occur (Leape et al 2002), it 
may have been reasonable to think that the documented processes of risk strategies 
and risk assessment processes would reflect this in their purpose, content and be 
visible as part of their implementation.   However in spite of numerous headlines, 
reported clinical incidents, claims and complaints documenting avoidable harm and 
the more formal public inquiry following systemic failure of a healthcare provider, 
learning lessons and affecting changes to prevent a reoccurrence continues to 
require improvement (Barach & Small 2000).  Latino (2009) continues to highlight the 
opportunities that exist to optimise safety assessments in healthcare with the 
adoption of proactive tools that anticipate failure (e.g. Failure Modes and Effects 
Analysis) alongside reactive tools (e.g. Root Cause Analysis).  Tools alone are not 
sufficient and hence the model needs to be accompanied by a culture that promotes 
safety and risk and leadership that sets the expectations for safety and acceptance 
of risk. 
 
A number of observers may consider this a harsh critique of risk management in 
NHS Trusts however the context and examples provided in the earlier paragraphs 
support this statement and start to set out the case that recognises the current 
arrangements for risk management, identifies the impact of key drivers and the 
potential benefits and constraints of the model(s) in place.  
 
6.2.6 Learning from other Industries 
Risk management is a core specialist function in high risk industries.  The need to 
actively manage risk, to embed it within the work activities and processes is seen as 
a pre requisite for reliability, resilience and successful risk and safety performance 
(Hollnagel & Woods 2006).  In addition to enhanced performance through a focus on 
resilience and reliability of systems and processes, Love at al (2008) highlight that a 
risk management model needs to multifactorial (Love et al 2008) responding to 
different types of risk, influencing factors and dependencies with other corporate 
programmes.  Raju et al (2002) highlight the alignment with financial and quality 
performance.  The learning between risk models extends beyond performance 
measurement to include the basics of hazard identification, assessment of 
significance and importantly the corporate tolerance to the risk perspective.  This last 
factor is important in setting the context for safety cultures through safe 
environments, listening to frontline staff and using them to inform safety controls as 
well as moving towards a work practice based on the anticipation and prevention of 
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risk and not the reactive reporting.  Such factors are not commonly associated with 
risk management systems in the NHS nor the wider healthcare however is reflected 
in the aspiration of policy makers. 
 
The development of the capacity and capability to anticipate is broader than an 
assessment tool.  The tools and models described in chapter 2 have the potential to 
provide a foundation for this shift to a more proactive approach to risk management 
through the open identification of the potential hazards, failures and their impact and 
in assessing the likelihood of the event.   The approach makes use of risk information 
gathered such as incidents reported in addition to leading a commitment to learning 
and continuous improvement. 
 
6.3 Is it possible to measure the success of the systems and if so how? 
   
For industries where the potential implications of not managing risk are catastrophic, 
serious injury and possible death, there is a need to measure the effectiveness of 
systems as a safety net, in reducing errors, in improving systems and in 
strengthening their ability to anticipate and not solely react to risk.  One measure of 
success of an organisation is its ability to manage risk from identification through to 
mitigation and monitoring (Power 2004).  Increasingly the business environment in 
high risk industries such as nuclear power, aviation and energy production 
increasingly talk in terms of reliability with the aim of the sector and company being 
known as a high reliability organisation.  Gamble (2013) identified 5 traits of high 
reliability organisations that should be hardwired into a business, these included a 
sensitivity to operations, systems and processes; a reluctance to accept simplified 
explanations to problems; a preoccupation with failure; deference to expertise and 
corporate resilience.  Such traits aim respond to the expectations and value of 
shareholders.  Love et al (2008) offer an alternative perspective, which is based on 
the critical considerations of healthcare leaders where performance measures are 
financially focused and include operating profit margin.  The findings also highlighted 
consideration of non-financial indicators such as physician and employee 
satisfaction, hospital-acquired infection rates, surgical site infection rates, inpatient 
mortality, infection control outcomes, and medication error rates.  
 
The operation of the NHS as a public service demands public accountability and the 
demonstration of continual improvements often demonstrated through political 
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commitments.  Since the 1990s, performance measures at all levels have been a key 
feature of the management of healthcare provision by NHS Trusts.  The focus of the 
indicators may shift, although ultimately they should support the delivery of high 
quality, effective healthcare recognised by both services users and providers of the 
care (Love et al 2008).  Such measures have been used by commissioners to set the 
standard of the quality, safety, cost and activity of services provided.  Measures set 
by oversight bodies such as the former Strategic Health Authorities and NHS 
England have aligned to the delivery of headlines of quality and effective care and at 
a national level measures have focused on the timeliness of operational delivery, its 
cost effectiveness and to a lesser extent the quality of care provided.   
 
Performance measures as indicators of success, continual improvement or areas to 
target resources were not identified as a strong feature of risk management 
arrangements in the NHS.  As part of the generic models for risk management (HSE 
1997, NPSA 2004, ISO 2009) the common characteristic committing to continual 
improvement was evident through feedback as well as defined step of monitoring 
and review.  As part of the review of risk assessment processes the criteria least 
likely to be considered by NHS Trusts included the setting of risk improvement 
targets and processes that incorporated the monitoring and review of risk, the impact 
of mitigating action and the ongoing tolerance.  Vincent et al (2004) highlight the 
importance of measurement and monitoring of safety in healthcare not only as a 
source of improvement but more importantly maintaining standards and not allowing 
risk and concerns to increase.   
 
The absence of such measures may be partially explained by the scene set 
nationally where central policy acts as a driver to what happens locally.  Historically 
the risks associated with MRSA bacteraemia cases were well documented.  In 2004, 
the Department of Health launched a commitment to reduce MRSA bacteraemia 
cases by 50% by 2008 and Clostridium Difficile cases by 30% by 2010/11.  Evidence 
based clinical practice suggested that these cases were avoidable and it was a 
tolerance that had established at all levels of the NHS from point of care through to 
the oversight and commissioning that continued to accept the reporting of these 
incidents and harm to patients.  This commitment and setting of reduction targets 
challenged the preceding culture and prompted attention, action and avoidance of 
these cases.  At the end of the 5 year period cases of avoidable hospital acquired 
infection had significantly reduced.  The key factor here is the influence of national 
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targets with the 5 year strategy led to a perceptible change in trust leadership on 
infections and responding to infection rates (NAO 2011) as well as operational 
changes in policy and practice.   
 
The absence of key performance measures, improvement targets, a commitment to 
increased reliability from risk assessment practice and also standard operating 
processes suggests that the journey for learning is still ongoing.  The understanding 
of risk management needs to be developed beyond checklists or national standards 
to local needs, priorities and context within day to day delivery of health care.  Farrow 
(2015) describes how quality & safety performance is influenced by a range of 
factors including organisational design and structure.  Policy makers will be just one 
influencing factor others may include leadership (NAO 2011), culture (West 2001), 
risk appetite and tolerance (Kentel & Arah 2007).  The learning to take away is that 
risk management is not one dimensional and hence in a complex sector such as 
healthcare the model needs to multi factorial, focused on improvement and have a 
locally driven purpose. 
 
6.4  Do characteristics of either the organisation or system influence how a 
 Trust performs? 
 Objective 3:  To analyse the impact or influence that characteristics of risk systems 
 and Trusts have on organisational performance 
 Objective 4:  To determine if Òrisk informationÓ is used within the organisation and the  
             relationship between outcomes and other organisational factors 
 Objective 5:  To review the influence of other approaches such as national initiatives 
 and individualÕs behaviours on risk management and in the achievement of a patient 
 focused service. 
 
Healthcare and the provision of high quality, safe care is recognised as complex 
(Leape 2005).  This complexity transfers to the systems and arrangements that 
organisations have in place to deliver on a day to day basis but also as part of a 
wider system and operating landscape.  Central to this delivery is the patient and the 
expectations that they have on the services provided Ð access, responsiveness, 
quality and safety (CQC 2013). 
 
The analysis that has been undertaken and the data that has been collected does 
demonstrate variation in the way in which Trusts manage risk and the success with 
which they do it.  The source of this variation may be explained by the type of Trust, 
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activity undertaken and demographics incorporating health conditions of the local 
population.  In addition the research has also attempted to understand if there are 
factors that are inherent to an organisation that pre determine performance 
irrespective of the outputs.  Such factors may be characteristics of the organisation 
such as size, financial turnover, geography as well as system content and criteria. 
 
The findings presented in chapter 5 have informed the presentation of a high level 
framework incorporating organisational factors and characteristics and the influence 
that these have on performance.  These findings have proven insightful in dispelling 
myths that exist around predictors and pre requisites for effective risk management 
performance and in identifying factors that may assist or enhance a TrustÕs 
performance. 
 
6.4.1 Factors to enhance and strengthen risk performance in NHS Trusts 
All Trusts have the potential to achieve successful performance in the management 
of individual risks or in the attainment of nationally set targets, standards or 
requirements.  As Cagliano et al (2011) and the research findings have identified 
there are a myriad of factors that have the potential to influence performance, some 
of these were identified in chapter 3 in figure 3.1 and include a mix of strategic and 
operational factors.  It is potentially these factors that ultimately influence an 
organisation in terms of what it does, how it does and how well, rather than factors 
inherent to the Trust such as size, location, geography and status.  It is these last 
factors that have often been referenced by organisations at all levels of the NHS 
hierarchy in explaining strong and not so strong performance.  However whilst the 
indirect influence of these factors as contributory factors to organisational 
performance is evident their individual significance does vary.  
 
A number of possible indirect factors were identified through the review of the data, 
information and findings.  These included culture, leadership, and unintended 
consequences of national programmes that continue the curiosity of risk 
management arrangements in the NHS compared to other high risk organisations.  
The common finding that joins these factors together is the possible immaturity of 
risk in the NHS in comparison to other industries and in particular sectors where 
getting it wrong has catastrophic consequences.  These factors are visible in 
aviation, nuclear energy and oil and gas production and are key features due to the 
learning from past incidents.  The independent safety review panel that investigated 
the BP Texas City oil refinery fire accident in 2005 that resulted in the death of 15 
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employees, injury to over 170 members of staff and significant economic losses 
identified serious concerns relating to the corporate safety culture.  These concerns 
related to the  effectiveness of the BP North AmericaÕs corporate safety oversight of 
its refining facilities and a safety culture that may have tolerated serious and 
longstanding deviations from good safety practice.  The final report made a number 
of recommendations identifying shortfalls in existing systems and the opportunity for 
improvements in relation to safety leadership, safety culture, clearly defined 
expectations and accountability for safety, Board monitoring and becoming an 
Industry leader (BP US Refineries Independent Safety Review Panel 2007).  These 
recommendations and learning points are as relevant in safety and risk management 
in the NHS in developing systems and enhancing performance. 
 
6.4.2 Organisational Characteristics 
The results presented in chapter 5 confirmed the variation that exists in the risk 
management arrangements adopted by NHS Trusts.  This variation was evident in 
the systems and frameworks adopted, the different executive leadership models 
applied to risk management by individual Trusts and the impact and influence of 
other organisational characteristics.  The relationship that exists between these 
factors needs to be understood individually and collectively.    
 
i. Size of the NHS Trust 
NHS Trusts have been described or referred to as complex organisations (Leape 
2005).  Such descriptions often follow periods of adversity, unexpected outcomes or 
poor performance. The size of an organisation, a process or an activity could be 
considered to be a factor that influences and determines overall performance and 
outcomes in quality, safety or financial performance. 
 
The results showed that when indicators of size were considered alongside variables 
of regulatory performance and claims management, the impact of size was not 
statistically significant.  This challenges the perception and evidence that may be 
presented by Trusts to explain performance that falls below expected standards.  
Although size was not statistically significant in determining performance, the 
relationship with claims management was stronger than that with regulatory 
performance.  This difference is not unexpected and the trend in litigation could be 
influenced in part by a number of factors such as service type and clinical activity as 
well as size of the organisation and its ability to monitor the quality of care. Terziovski 
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& Samson (1999) qualified their understanding of the impact of size on quality 
performance through the ability to influence practice through behaviours or systems.  
Again this supports the earlier thinking on culture and performance.  
 
The dismissal that the size of the Trust does not influence performance should be 
approached with caution.  The relationship was not statistically significant it was not 
the absence of an influence.  Data relating to two indicators of size was collected and 
examined as part of this research; financial turnover and the total number of number 
of employees represent macro indicators and are supported by multiple meso 
indicators that have the potential to impact on the quality of care being delivered. For 
example relating to staffing; staffing levels, recruitment and retention of staff, 
vacancies, skill mix, patient to staff ward based staffing ratios are all elements 
relating to workforce that are known to impact on the quality of care delivered.   From 
a financial perspective, whilst turnover may be the most appropriate indicator of size, 
other elements that may impact on quality include cost improvement programmes 
and their delivery.  As with the size of an organisation, close links are drawn between 
financial improvement targets and cost reductions and the quality of the services 
delivered.  Whilst again there are examples of the detrimental impact that fiscal 
policies have on patient experiences and clinical outcomes, there will also be 
examples of where financial pressures and the need for savings have not impacted 
on the quality of care provision.  This reintroduces the concept of systems designed 
for other priorities other than the intended outcomes and the risk to Trusts of 
vulnerable systems syndrome, testing and revealing organisational priorities, 
commitment and culture.  
 
In understanding the impact on the quality and safety of care provided, Òcan a Trust 
be too big?Ó. The results have already highlighted both positive and negative 
responses to this, for example with the correlation between size and regulatory 
performance as well as the total number of claims reported and paid.    If there is an 
optimum size of an organisation, proportionally is there a scale that relates to the 
quality of service provision and the impact on patients.  Bojke et al (2001) ask the 
question Òis bigger better for primary care groups and trusts?Ó Their findings are 
summarised by the following observations: 
¥ The size of the organisation is one of the factors affecting performance not 
determining it. 
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¥ There is no evidence that increases in the size of organisations (primary or 
secondary care) will automatically generate substantial improvements in 
overall performance or economies of scale 
¥ Optimal size varies substantially for different functions 
¥ Organisational structures can be used to achieve the different optimal sizes 
for various functions 
 
It is clear that local conditions are influential on structures and arrangements for 
managing risk as has been seen through risk assessment criteria and executive 
leadership. In addition, policy priorities are also seen as influential factors, which 
again supports the links with vulnerable system syndrome already referenced.  
These two aspects were not specifically explored as part of this research however 
the observations made as part of the results analysis has raised this a future area of 
study.   
 
A related aspect to size may be that of culture which has a strong alignment with 
leadership, values and organisational behaviours.  This relationship provides a link 
back to the design and content of risk management strategies and frameworks 
including leadership. Culture is inevitably influenced by values and behaviours to 
create a ÒwayÓ of doing things. It is possible to apply this cultural thinking to 
leadership and the impact or significance that the backgrounds of leaders have on 
risk performance and standards of quality and safety, priorities and tolerances. 
 
Hollnagel et al (2006) shares the concept of Vulnerable System Syndrome where 
organisations are focused on finance and activity targets above all else hence 
attacking and putting the resilience of a function or organisation under pressure. 
Shared responsibility for risk as well as for finance or operational performance has 
the potential to compromise the system further.  Independent and objective oversight 
of the individual functions is lost and inevitably the higher priority wins.  The lack of 
integration of systems equally supports the delivery of the perceived highest priority 
such as a financial bottom line or the delivery of a national or a delivery target, as 
cause and effect and hence true costs and consequences of decisions or focus of 
resources is not identified.   
 
Whilst this research was explicit in its scope focusing on risk management, it is 
interesting to note the emerging practical reconciliation of quality and safety along 
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side financial risk given the challenges inherent in NHS service delivery of savings.  
This potentially creates an operating tension from the extent to which risks are 
identified, assessed, tolerated and mitigated through to executive leadership and 
corporate priorities.  
 
ii. Foundation and Non Foundation Trust status 
In reviewing the Trusts, the difference between Foundation and non Foundation 
Trust status was considered.  The achievement of Foundation Trust status was been 
seen as a display of robust governance arrangements, strong financial controls and 
operational performance (Monitor 2013).  As part of the assessment process Trusts 
have been seen to redesign, add to and strengthen their internal systems to meet the 
required standards and performance.  The authorisation process is a challenging 
process, the decision to explore any potential differences was two fold; firstly in order 
for Trusts to be authorised as Foundation Trusts the internal systems, structures and 
functionality in areas such as governance, financial management and operational 
performance are assessed and forensically analysed.  In practice Trusts can be seen 
to redesign, add to and strengthen such systems in order to become analysed.  Such 
changes and strengthening of systems may be expected to enhance performance 
however may also detract from operational delivery running in parallel. 
 
In reviewing and comparing the results and outcomes for Foundation and non 
Foundation Trusts, there was no significant difference or variation between the two 
groups in characteristics of the Trust such as size, claims management performance 
and regulatory outcomes or in the themes emerging from risk management 
arrangements. It was noted that Foundations Trusts identified in breach of 
authorisation were less likely to go on to be non compliant in the next CQC 
inspection again suggesting the role of culture in improving and delivering the 
required standards of care. 
 
The result of no discernable difference between Foundation and non Foundation 
Trusts was unexpected due to the requirements on risk and governance systems in 
the application and authorisation of Trusts by Monitor.  The absence of any 
significant difference poses a number of possible questions and possible 
explanations such as, the rigor of assessment in testing the true performance of 
systems and governance arrangements supporting the delivery of quality care; 
systems and governance architecture may be designed to satisfy assessment 
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purposes and not a sustainable operating model; prescriptive systems and 
requirements such as those set out in the authorisation and subsequent operating 
framework by Monitor fail to deliver notable improvements in the operational delivery 
of healthcare.   The absence of variation poses a potential counter to the requirement 
of all NHS Trusts becoming Foundation Trusts, a counter indirectly supported by 
failure to deliver all aspirants Trusts to Foundation status by 31 March 2014 deadline.  
 
6.4.3 Regulatory Performance & Risk Management Systems 
A review of regulatory performance identified a number of broad themes and 
relationships between difference data sets to allow consideration and commentary to 
be made around organisational characteristics and the influence on risk performance 
and also as potential predictive indicators.  Faunce and Bolsin (2004) found 
regulation did not always identify shortfalls in an organisationÕs performance or in 
attaining the required standards.  The analysis of the regulatory performance data for 
outcomes 4 and 16 of the essential standards did confirm a relationship between 
assessments.  For example if a Trust was assessed as compliant with outcome 4 
relating to the care and welfare of patients there was a string likelihood that the 
organisation would also be compliant with outcome 16 which assessed monitoring of 
these standards.  The same was true for non-compliance.  Irrespective of the 
statistical significance this result aligns with the general expectations as a Board 
member, Commissioner, Regulator or indeed a patient.  However, the absence of a 
perfect correlation does highlight the potential for other factors to influence these 
outcomes.  
 
Leadership has already been noted as being as important factors that influences the 
risk management function (BP Safety Review Panel 2007, Love et al 2008).  
However for the purposes of regulatory performance it was not something that was 
observed through the results.  Executive leadership for risk management had been 
dominated by the Chief Nurse role however in relation to regulatory non compliance 
this was shared with executive colleagues in particular the Chief Executive and 
Medical Director.  There is a relationship that cannot be ignored and that is the role 
of the Chief Nurse and executive responsibilities held in organisations that have 
experienced significant failings in the standards of care.  This is an area that requires 
further investigation as although the role is a common factor the diversity of the 
portfolio, breadth and functions may also be a factor and may an insight on 
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governance and the maintenance of openness and transparency in decision making 
and reporting (internally and externally). 
 
In terms of indicators of the quality and safety of care that be used to inform and 
assure a Trust on the quality of services being delivered, there are a number of 
different indicators and outcomes that can be used.  The drivers behind this range of 
metrics may in fact influence the final outcome and any potential bias in terms of 
reporting or proposing a certain level of performance.  For example, a national review 
of mortality rates and indicators in early 2013 identified 14 NHS Trusts as possible 
outliers in performance.  Agreement on the ÒlistÓ was not universal with regulators, 
academic institutions and information teams suggesting alternatives from their own 
lists that did not feature in what became known as the ÒKeogh TrustsÓ.  Mortality is 
commonly used as an indicator of the quality and safety of clinical care however 
there is a lack of consensus in the measure Ð crude mortality rates, standardised 
mortality rates, risk adjusted mortality rates or a combination to triangulate the overall 
view.  Jarman, Pieter and Jones (2010) compared a hospital standardised mortality 
ratio against a risk-adjusted model as a tool for Dutch hospitals to assess their 
quality of care, illustrating the variety of models, approaches and measures for 
mortality.  
 
In July 2013, a further 18 Trusts were identified by the Care Quality Commission.  A 
mix of Trusts displaying a range of high and moderate risks across a range of 
indicators of safety and quality.  A third ÒlistÓ potentially exists using and testing the 
characteristics that have emerged through the research. As part of the results and as 
a test of the emerging findings, the following characteristics were identified for each 
programme, as shown in table 6.1. 
 
Table 6.1: Summary of Trust characteristics displayed in nationally collated lists of ÒriskyÓ   




As the findings of table 6.1 identify there is limited correlation in the characteristics of 
the Trusts appearing on each ÒlistÓ. This in itself is suggestive of the challenges 
facing the identification of predictive indicators of shortfalls in quality and safety and 
an ultimate indicator of quality and safety.    
 
Healthcare relies upon a complex series of interactions between systems, 
practitioners and patients with each of the interactions containing its own intrinsic 
rate of failure.  Terziovski & Samson (1999) recognise the difficulties in reconciling 
patient experiences with evidence based information and data.  Anecdotal reports in 
the media are common from members of the public, past patients and current service 
users when services are threatened with closure due to safety or quality issues.  
Whilst there may be a requirement of a risk management system to be proactive in 
the anticipation and identification of risk, the use of predictive indictors may only be a 
partial answer and must be considered along side additional undetermined factors 
reflective of the wider system, such as geographical context, local demographics, 
performance across the health economy, patient experience and public perception.  
The design and performance of health systems may be badged as being in the public 
interest however as the results have shown there are alternative drivers including 
policy and politics that prevail overriding the logic and desire of clinicians for patient 
centred care. 
 
Monitor and the Care Quality Commission operate different models and approaches 
to regulation.  In April 2016 the regulatory landscape change again with Monitor 
merging with NHS Trust Development Authority (TDA) to form NHS Improvement.  
This potential streamlining of regulation around a common purpose of ÒimprovementÓ 
supports an emerging theme from the results and compliance with standards 
monitored by the CQC and Monitor.  It was also noted that Trusts identified in breach 
of their authorisation were less likely to then be found non compliant by the Care 
Quality Commission.  Whilst not a predictor, this is an interesting characteristic which 
may provide grounds to assess the impact of regulatory intervention (irrespective of 
source) on the overall performance of a Trust and its behaviours.   There is a 
potential caveat to this suggestion in as much as is the performance and recovery of 
the Trust is influenced by the intervention of a single regulator however if the scrutiny 
is provided by a multiple regulators is the same benefit experienced.   
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The aim of any regulatory model should be to minimize the burden on the provider 
and deliver efficiency and effectiveness through its regulatory approach (Adil 2008).  
The findings have presented a clear view on the significant influence that central 
policy has on local systems as well as the lack of integration between the various 
models that providers are assessed under.  This complexity presents a danger of 
providers responding to rhetoric instead of operational needs and improvements.  
The findings of the review of risk assessment criteria are broadly supportive of this 
notion with criteria being predominantly system based with potentially less attention 
being assigned to the consideration of clinical aspects of a system.   Given the core 
business is clinical and the setting is healthcare, the context for risks is limited or not 
considered at all.  The HSE in its guidance around the management of health & 
safety (HSE 1998) identifies one of the first steps of a risk system as Òestablishing 
contextÓ.  
 
In addition to Trusts responding to regulatory requirements in the design and content 
of systems as seen in the content of risk management frameworks, there is the 
potential for this profile to be extended to what and how an organisation prioritises Ð 
characteristics of vulnerability systems syndrome.  Whilst this is a simplified analogy, 
the findings flag a potential correlation not only with a negative impact on quality but 
also a positive influence on organisational behaviours, risk performance and a 
commitment to improvement.  The research identified that Trusts found in breach of 
their authorisation by Monitor were less likely to subsequently be found non 
compliant by the CQC suggesting that the impact of interventions such as formal 
regulatory notices (Monitor 2013, Care Act 2015) acted as a lever for improvement 
not only against the original breach but also improving quality standards and 
organisational behaviours.  
 
6.4.4 Claims Management and Risk Management Frameworks 
Runciman et al (2003) state that while people understand that disastrous outcomes 
can result from avoidable failures in health care delivery, most people believe that 
these outcomes are isolated events.  Such incidents including those that progress 
and are addressed through litigation offer an insight into errors and an opportunity to 
learn lessons to inform safe system design in healthcare.   Reason (1990) promotes 
the importance of understanding incidents, adverse events and unexpected 
outcomes and the causes behind them in order to prevent a repeat of events.  As a 
result, claims as a data source have the potential to be used positively as part of an 
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improvement strategy to enhance the quality of care.  In addition an organisationÕs 
response to claims may assist in identifying its culture and commitment to quality, 
safety and learning from such events in addition to identifying drivers and priorities in 
the delivery of care.   
 
Vincent et al (2000) highlight the importance of investigating and analysing clinical 
incidents, encouraging learning and changes in practice from individual incidents as 
well as themes and trends.  The analysis of the risk assessment criteria and the 
increasing trend in the total number of claims made both directly and indirectly 
support the absence of learning or at least learning that results in change and 
improvement in the NHS.  The risk assessment criteria did not routinely consider 
secondary factors in the assessment of risk nor did it commitment to improvement 
targets as part of effective mitigating action.  The gap in monitoring and review stage 
of the process has already been noted however this is relevant for claims 
management as it fails to monitor trends and themes in the claims made which may 
change the overall assessment of risk, tolerance and action taken.  In the context of 
emerging trends, a small number of Trusts were identified for frequent high levels of 
claims reporting over a 6-year period.  Two Trusts in particular displayed higher rates 
than the other Trusts as well as demonstrating variable regulatory performance.  As 
indicators of poor performance the true cause of this performance may lie elsewhere 
such as culture and leadership as indicated by the absence of learning.   Whilst 
claims data and its possible relationship with organisational performance is not 
definitive as a predictor it continues to add value (Phillips et al 2004) to the 
effectiveness of risk management arrangements.  This value is added through its 
proactive use in improving  future systems through learning and strengthening 
systems and changing behaviours. 
 
The role of culture, leadership and behaviours continues as a strong theme and 
influencing factor in risk management.  Culture is a key factor in how healthcare 
organisations manage risks to the safety and quality of care provided and responds 
to information that may be indicators of risk or failures in systems and processes.  
Reports of negligence create a defensive atmosphere compared to the openness 
and candour to aid learning and promote improvement.   Hence the culture element 
developed as part of the overall risk management framework is key.  The culture has 
a tendency to focus on carelessness or omission of an individual and apportion 
blame rather than look at the broader system issues as either root causes or 
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contributory factors.   In the absence of a systematic approach, other factors, 
behaviours and priorities have the ability to influence (Cagliano et al 2011). 
 
6.5 The Model Organisation & Operating Environment 
 
The research findings have provided a view and insight to the existing strengths and 
opportunities to strengthen risk management in healthcare and in particular in the 
NHS.  Drawing on these findings it is possible to make the following 
recommendations in terms of strategic and operational drivers.  Using the drivers 
identified in chapter 3 (figure 3.1) as a framework:  
 
6.5.1 Strategic Drivers 
Central policy and political context is a strong influencing factor which at times is at 
risk of overwhelming the function and shifting the emphasis of delivery from effective 
management of the risk to the fulfilment of policy requirements.  The prescribed 
approach replicates characteristics of arrangements in other high risk organisations 
however the over simplification through standardization of strategies, risk 
assessment tools and a culture that promotes checklists at the expense of 
consideration of local conditions is at risk of introducing vulnerability and further risk 
to the system.  A balance needs to be achieved that presents a framework to work 
within that recognises and rewards local application with performance measured 
through both outcomes and inputs.  This subsequent measurement could form the 
basis of regulation which seeks to regulate the entirety of the function represented 
through the what, the how and how well. 
 
From a performance perspective the relationship to date has been to measure for 
judgement.  Learning from other industries, other models such as those subject to 
independent accreditation, and also as a key feature of a safety culture, the purpose 
of performance measurement of risk should be to support improvement.  Industries 
successful in managing risk establish continual improvement targets that stretch 
performance to enhance outputs, increase reliability and reduce error.   Over the last 
decade there are examples of this both in strategy and practice set out by the 
Institute of Healthcare Improvement and the Department of Health however the 
perceived threat of financial penalties in an environment of increasing deficit provides 
a difficult scorecard to balance and deference to performance as priority.  The move 
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in 2016/17 to the development of Sustainability and Transformation plans may assist 
in achieving this balance or the start of a realigned journey. 
  
Risk management in healthcare is complex and is increasingly referenced and 
encompassed in the quality and safety of health care delivery.  The breadth of this 
scope demands an understanding of the dependencies between risk, quality and 
safety and the operational and corporate delivery of providing services.  As the 
findings indicated risk as a function is often a standalone programme, lacking 
integration with other corporate systems such as operational efficiency delivery and 
financial balance.  In industries such as aviation, effective risk management is 
integrated into Òbusiness as usualÓ operations with decisions considering safety and 
the quality of a service alongside the delivery of the activity and its financial viability.   
To strengthen risk management as a function in healthcare further integration with all 
corporate and operational activities is necessary to ensure that the delivery of certain 
areas of performance is not at the expense of others.  This integration needs to exist 
beyond the page of a policy and to a Òway of workingÓ. 
 
Love et al (2008) flagged the importance of being able to demonstrate accountability 
in the use of resources and the outcomes achieved.  Comparisons with industries 
such as aviation and energy production are helpful in drawing similarities in the scale 
of consequences but potentially less so in parallels of safeguarding reputation and 
maintaining public confidence in the services and providers of services.  The key 
difference is that in other industries it is assumed that the customer has choice of an 
alternative supplier.  However in healthcare whilst choice may exist it may not be 
accessible or an option to all.  The maintenance of public confidence is critical and as 
such protection of a sense of purpose and outcome for the service user should not 
be forgotten.  The initiatives reviewed during the period of this research recognised 
the value of patient experience and responded to it with a further programme where 
the interface with risk was not explicit.   
 
The case of integration is an area that is critical to managing risk and achieving 
sustainable performance.  This is reflected in the new Sustainability and 
Transformation Plans Ð STPs (DH 2015) underdevelopment across the 
commissioning areas of NHS England.  These plans aim to provide an integrated 
plan for the operational delivery of the Forward View, a five strategy for the delivery 
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of health and social care that considers in equal measure the resource envelope, 
operational performance and the quality of services. 
 
6.5.2  Operational Drivers 
A number of operational drivers were identified, conceptually and operationally, that 
highlighted some of the practical priorities and challenges facing the successful 
implementation of risk management in Trusts.   
 
The development and delivery of risk assessment tools that present consistency at a 
strategic level and allow local flex to incorporate local conditions and circumstances 
is important.  As identified by Gamble (2013) over simplification and standardisation 
of processes whilst achieving a common way of working can also introduce 
additional risks to a system.  Adopting a tool that reflects national requirements as 
well as local conditions is key to successful management but also in terms of 
recognising dependencies with other local corporate programmes and a local way of 
how things are done the nuances of which may not be reflected in a generic policy.  
Such nuances may include culture, leadership as well as elements of risk appetite 
and tolerability. 
 
Adverse event reporting is a first step and indicator of an unexpected and unwanted 
event.  Reporting rates are influenced by a number of factors, which are directly or 
indirectly influenced by policy, performance and local behaviours.  In line with the 
ethos of performance measurement incidence of adverse events (incidents, 
complaints and claims) should be used as levers for improvement rather than 
punitive.  The events provide a valuable intelligence resource for learning and 
strengthening practice and performance (Leape 2002) that can be used to enhance 
reliability and resilience of systems and organisations. 
 
The role of safety culture has been an emerging theme through the findings, the 
significance of which would benefit from further investigation.  However as an 
interdependency that cuts across what is done, how and who does it and how well it 
is done, the contribution of culture and with it leadership would benefit from further 
investigation and analysis.  There is the potential for organisational culture in relation 
to risk and more widely to be a latent factor in performance. 
 
Organisational performance and priorities are strongly influenced by the current 
rhetoric.  Strategically the drivers behind policy changes and national initiatives have 
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been developed in isolation to the practical application.  As such dependencies and 
the consequences of the policy, intended or otherwise, may not have been full 
appraised.  In order to achieve robust risk management that is demonstrated through 
the successful management and mitigation of risk, performance measurement and 
reporting should be multifactorial.  For example the reporting of organisational 
performance through a corporate index that takes into account financial, operational 
and safety performance and provides leaders of organisations with an insight on their 
position on a performance scale made up of integrated measures and a single index. 
 
6.5 Successful Risk Management in Healthcare 
 
The collective view provided by this research has highlighted a number of 
characteristics and behaviours that have been used in other industries to strengthen 
risk management.  Working from a position that opportunities still exist for the 
arrangements in healthcare and in particular the NHS to mature, the following 
represents a view on characteristics of a future model and approach.  The framework 
should: 
 Strategically: 
¥ Set out an agreed definition of risk, the purpose of risk management and the 
scope of its application.  The detail needs to balance prescription for 
consistency and foster a local drive for ownership. 
¥ Be inclusive in its application and consideration of different sources and types 
of risk present in a healthcare environment 
¥ Provide a systematic approach to the context, identification, assessment, 
mitigation and monitoring of risk whilst ensuring an overall commitment to 
continual improvement 
¥ Represent a core set of nationally agreed requirements which on 
implementation are supported by locally developed arrangements, systems 
and processes 
¥ Embed risk management as core to the delivery of safe, quality healthcare 
across the NHS reflected in the appointment of a dedicated Board level 
position in all Trusts  
¥ Align national standards and possible oversight of healthcare to reduce the 
burden, bureaucracy and differences in expected levels of performance to 
enable a focus on achievement, improvement or holding to account. 
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¥ Promotes a culture that promotes learning, improvement and change that 
engages senior leaders and operational delivery equally 
¥ Integrate risk management into business deliverables and strategic planning 
 
 Operationally: 
¥ Prioritise safety of its staff, patients and its ability to deliver high quality care  
¥ Be aligned to the local setting with national principles translated to local 
conditions, arrangements and priorities as appropriate 
¥ Agree a local appetite for risk and seek to continually improve on it, acting as 
a local and national leader 
¥ Design policies and processes that support Ògetting it rightÓ removing barriers 
between competing priorities and promoting an integrated approach 
¥ Be supported by a culture that promotes safety performance and successful 
management of risk alongside performance measures as part of a high 
performing organisation. 
¥ Provide clarity to all staff avoiding generis statements on their roles and 
responsibilities in effective risk management. 
¥ Seek to continually improve through learning from cases of avoidable harm, 
themes and trends from corporate data and from listening to its workforce not 
only on what to improve but how to do it. 
  
Learning and improvement are important attributes of a successful risk management 
system.  In considering a future model it is essential that the function continues to 
evolve to reflect its industry in which it is embedded, the lessons to be learned that 
will continue to present from incidents, complaints, patient experiences and claims 
and the new models of care and service delivery that continue to demonstrate the 
innovative trait of healthcare.  Over the next 5 years the delivery of healthcare and 
the access to services will undergo significant change (DH 2015) and as such risks 
will be present.  The pressure is on the function not only identify them irrespective of 
source or presentation but to find ways to minimise the risk of harm, loss, and 
unintended consequences to the patient, the business or the service.   
 
The direction going forward reflects a number of characteristics.  The future needs to 
ensure that nationally and locally safety and the quality of care received by patients 
remains the highest priority.  To achieve this and in the face practical constraints 
such as funding, change is essential.  The level of change spans behaviours through 
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to models of care however is characterised by the need for sustainability at all levels; 
from concept and central policy, through to operational delivery and a commitment to 
delivering safe, quality care within the financial envelope provided. 
 
Successful risk management is something to be defined.  A key learning point 
through this research has been that the systems and arrangements in high risk 
industries are not directly transferable.  Successful risk management for healthcare 
would need to be defined and could take the structure of performance against 
improvement targets, an indicator of patient experience potentially drawing on the 
role of the ÒcustomerÓ or as and integrated index that brings together financial, 
operational and safety to provide a corporate score.  The merits of different 
approaches to measurement requires further exploration and should interface with 
the STP proposals and 5 year strategy. 
 
6.6 Limitations & Constraints  
 
Over the course of the different stages of the research from design to data collection 
through to analysis I have encountered certain limitations that have constrained the 
final outputs. 
 
6.6.1 Operating Landscape  
In the last 10 years the operating environment and landscape of healthcare its 
delivery by NHS Trust, its oversight by Strategic Health Authorities and regulation 
has evolved.  In practice there have been changes to individual Trusts through 
mergers, expanding scope of services provided, changes to regional boundaries and 
the introduction of new oversight arrangements including performance monitoring 
and regulation.  These last two points as examples are relevant as the changes 
resulted in the introduction of new additional bodies and organisations to the 
healthcare environment.  The role of the relationship and stakeholder management is 
a critical one. 
 
This ever changing landscape of context, stakeholders and purpose has been a key 
risk to manage to ensure the work remains valid and relevant.  The risk has been 
actively managed through the tracking of changes to individual organisations, 
additional data collections that take into account the changes in the 2010-2012 
period and a continual update and refresh of standards to reflect learning through 
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policy changes as well as ensuring that comparable periods and standards are 
consistent. 
 
6.6.2 Time periods 
A potential limitation to the research was the protracted time period over which data 
was collected, analysed and presented.  The data was collected in two separate 
phases, which presented a risk that data related to organisational performance would 
not be directly comparable to the 2005 data set due to organisational changes.  This 
risk was mitigated by the tracking of changes to Trusts in the original 2005 
distribution list and then in the 2012 data collection.  Where changes were identified 
the data was also tracked.  
 
6.6.3 Inconsistency in the Sector 
A key finding from the literature review and observation from the review of risk 
management arrangements in the NHS was the inconsistency that exists.  This 
inconsistency is displayed in regional variations in performance, criteria considered 
as key to a risk assessment process and executive responsibility.    Accompanying 
this inconsistency was a strong degree of commonality between local arrangements 
and national policy.  Although the variation noted could have been viewed as a 
limitation to the research it instead provided evidence and a key finding that the lack 
of local flex and amendment to central policy relating to risk management when 
implemented by Trusts.    The absence of a shared and common definition of risk 
management that did not distinguish between sources of risk was also recognised.  
The conclusion of the discussion chapter has recommended the development of a 
common definition for risk and risk management for use in the NHS that does not 




Healthcare is a complex industry and as such the management of risk to support the 
delivery of safe, quality care is also complex.  The multiple drivers and factors that 
influence how risk is managed adds to the complexity whilst not always adding value 
or having a positive impact.  In the course of this research I have attempted to 
identify the current arrangements for managing risk, provide a view on performance 
measurement and also the extent to which factors inherent in an organisation and 
the sector influence and possibly predetermine performance.   During the research 
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the operating environment of the NHS and healthcare provision in England has 
changed at a national level with the introduction of regulators and stakeholders to the 
oversight of quality and safety whilst at the same time the loss of some key players.  
In spite of these changes which have aimed to strengthen the management of risk 
learning and adopting safety practices from other industries it is possible to conclude 
that risk management as a function in the NHS is different to that seen in high risk 
industries.   
 
National initiatives and central policy are a significant influence on what is considered 
risk, how risk is managed and what local arrangements look like.  The influence of 
local risk management practices is an important factor that would benefit from further 
investigation as it is largely invisible to standards and requirements set nationally.  
Such local conditions do not relate to the organisationÕs profile or status but reflect 
the softer elements of leadership, behaviours, commitment, roles and responsibilities 
and integration with local programmes.  The findings of the research have constantly 
hinted that it is elements such as these that influence and underpins successful risk 
and safety performance.  This finding challenges what has been assumed or given 
as anecdotal evidence that there are conditions and characteristics inherent to the 
organisation that predetermine its performance.  In summary successful risk 
performance is not achieved through a single action but through the combined 
relationship and interdependencies that exist and drive complex systems.  As such 
























Vincent (2001) recognises the key role of risk management in healthcare in 
enhancing patient safety and delivering safe clinical services.  However it is evident 
that safeguarding the safety of patients is more complex than the clinical 
competencies of healthcare professionals and requires consideration to the wider 
factors that may influence and act as risks to the safety and quality of care. In 
addition to influencing the patientÕs experience at point of care, national directives, 
performance targets and similar drivers also influence the content of systems and 
processes.  
 
The results highlighted a number of findings in response to the questions and 
objectives set.  In the first instance, risk management is a recognised function in 
NHS Trusts with a significant part of arrangements, approaches and requirements 
defined by central policy and national initiatives.  Variation was identified in the 
content of risk management systems within NHS Trusts.  Using this variation it was 
possible to identify common elements and attributes of systems such as the 
existence of a strategy and a risk assessment process however the detail of its 
content including individual risk criteria considered highlighted further differences but 
also possible characteristics of organisational culture and priorities.  The significance 
of these characteristics when compared against other variables such as regulatory 
performance or claims management provided further insight into the influence of 
initiatives and risk factors on the overall effectiveness of the system and risk 
management capabilities.  
 
The research identified a number of themes as well as the possible existence of 
findings that support the identification of characteristics of other high-risk industries 
that could be applied to NHS and broader healthcare delivery.  The themes from both 
sets of data collection and subsequent analysis included:  
¥ Performance against regulatory standards and requirements is not 
determined by the size of a Trust. 
¥ The characteristics of a Trusts such as size, geographical spread and 
multiple locations do affect the number of claims reported and paid however 
are not predictors of performance. 
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¥ The status of a Trust as a Foundation or non Foundations Trust did not 
determine overall risk and quality performance.   
¥ Executive leadership responsibility for risk management is often seen as part 
of a portfolio and is dominated by three roles, Chief Executive, Medical 
Director and Director of Nursing. 
¥ Criteria considered as part of a risk assessment favours management 
processes compared to clinical factors with a limited number of criteria that 
could be considered as ÒcoreÓ to a risk assessment. 
¥ Variations exist across regions and risk systems in terms of performance and 
also practice and the ability to identify common elements of a system. 
¥ Few Òtrue indicatorsÓ exist to support predictive modelling in relation to 
regulatory performance or in the effectiveness of risk management systems. 
¥ Successful risk management supporting the delivery of high quality, safe care 
is dependent on multiple factors that extend beyond systems, processes and 
standards and are influenced by local conditions such as Trust leadership, 
culture and behaviour. 
 
These findings and the wider results when tracked back to respond to the original 
objectives concluded the following against each objective and key questions: 
 
Question 1: Does risk management exist as a function in the NHS and what 
does this look like? 
Common elements do exist in risk management systems and frameworks.  The 
existence of a documented risk management strategy and risk assessment prevailed 
across 98.7% of Trusts.  In addition to confirmation of documents, the content of risk 
assessments also highlighted a number of  common elements in the criteria most 
likely to be included (>90% of respondents) such as hazard identification and least 
likely (<70% of respondents) to be included such as risk improvement targets.  In 
addition to the common elements there were a number of observations including 
44% of Trusts assigning lead responsibility at Board level for risk to the Director of 
Nursing. 
 
As a high risk industry it was evident that the NHS through central policy and national 
initiatives has tried to replicate approaches characterising risk management 
arrangements in other industries.  Examples of this include the standardisation of 
operating procedures, arrangements for the oversight of risk and the way in which 
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risks are assessed.  Although the rhetoric is correct, the translation has resulted in 
the adoption of the prescribed rather than the application of the standards to suit and 
reflect local needs, conditions and priorities.  This structure not only impacts on the 
effectiveness of the approaches adopted but also limits the ability for systems and 
programmes to be truly integrated .  This lack of integration not only challenges the 
profile of risk as a core function but also results in compromises and other activities 
being prioritised ahead of safety and quality of care.  Such challenges are evident in 
operational and financial performance in spite of the hidden costs both financially and 
operationally associated with the poor management of risk.   
 
The lack of integration was further highlighted in the results of the review of the Risk 
Management Strategies provided.  The absence of any reference, dependency or 
association with other programmes was significant.  However it was the absence of a 
clear commitment to risk and detailing of expectations from tolerance, appetite and 
responsibility for risk that highlighted the absence of a strong safety culture.  This 
gap confirmed that not only are systems not integrated in relation to risk however the 
organisational behaviours are also not a strong feature of the TrustÕs culture.  
 
Question 2:  Is it possible to measure the success of the systems and if so 
how? 
The literature review highlighted that systems and performance can be influenced by 
multiple factors.  The results confirmed that organisational characteristics can 
influence performance however it is not a direct causal relationship hence any 
measures need to reflect local conditions.  However as the survey results confirmed 
the monitoring and review of risk including mitigating action and the use of 
improvement measures or targets is not a common feature of processes.  On the 
basis of the information collected and findings measurement of risk should 
encompass: 
¥ A clear purpose set locally and reflective of local priorities and risks identified 
¥ A balanced set of measures reflecting the efficiency of the systems and 
processes (standards that consider the optimum use of resources for 
delivery, risk control and assurance); effectiveness (to support the delivery of 
the intended outcome and impact) and economics (integrates systems to 
provide value for money). 
¥ A commitment from local leaders that measurement of risk is for improvement 
and not judgement 
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¥ A set of measures that are meaningful to stakeholders, this includes 
commissioners, patients and staff.  The measures should be clearly defined 
be accompanied by expected levels of performance that ideally stretch the 
organisation to eliminate risk 
¥ A demonstration of learning, improvement and increasing shift towards the 
anticipation and prevention of risk and not solely reactive. 
  
The ability to identify and manage risk relies on effective measurement to understand 
not only overall performance but opportunities to strengthen and develop systems for 
incremental improvement at key stages of the process.  As a result measurement 
and improvement are closely aligned to organisational culture and leadership which 
set the tone for what can be achieved. 
 
Question 3: Do characteristics of either the organisation or system influence 
           how a Trust performs? 
 
On commencing the research I had expected the findings of the research and  
analysis to support the identification of a Trust profile that could be associated with  
strong risk performance and a ÒsafeÓ organisation.  Whilst the results did confirm that  
certain characteristics of a Trust could influence performance there was no single  
factor that performance could be attributed to.  The findings did help to dispel a  
number of preconceptions such as it was more difficult for larger Trusts to comply  
with required standards and that Foundation Trusts are perceived to be higher  
performing organisations.  In the 260Trusts reviewed there were exceptions to these  
statements hence the ability to use characteristics either of an organisation or 
through performance as predictive indicators is potentially limited. 
 
Although there was no significant different between the performance of Foundation  
and non Foundation Trusts, there was indirect evidence of risk information being  
used in Foundation Trusts that are found in breach of authorisation.  Subsequent 
breaches were followed by compliance with the CQCÕs assessments suggesting that 
the use of information in the initial assessment was used to improve standards  
overall.  Whilst not a specific analytical result, the use of information does align with  
an organisationÕs safety culture and a commitment to improve.  This represents a 
further area of study alongside the broader topic of culture in NHS Trusts. 
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It was evident that national policy and initiatives have previously influenced the  
design and development of systems.  The prevalence of management criteria in the  
risk assessment process could be suggestive of a response to external requirements  
compared to local conditions.  The impact of rising claims again is possibly explained  
through a lack of learning and changes to local practices and policy suggesting a  
degree of disconnect between policy and practice and the drivers behind both.   
Organisational culture in particular resilience and reliable design, flags the pursuit of  
targets and priorities not aligned to local objectives as introducing potential  
vulnerability rather than rigour to the system. 
 
At present there are divisions in the approaches used by NHS Trusts in managing 
identified risks based on the risk issue, its origin and the perception of individuals and 
organisations to mitigation.  Systems currently in use display signs of vulnerability 
with safety overshadowed by a focus on performance.  Whilst such systems may not 
have been consciously designed in that way, risk management needs to be a core 
element of all corporate functions.   The achievement of this integration can driven be 
by internal actions of leadership, a positive safety culture and external actions which 
respect and support a balance of safety, quality and operational performance in the 
delivery of health care.   From the perspective of central policy and ongoing national 
programmes the prescription needs to focus on achieving consistency and whilst the 
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